

## THE AWAKENING

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January 1, 1989

## 11. Nightmares

The time has come to awaken from a long night of social and political sleep. Partly our slumber has been characterized by a deep sleep of indifference, but we have also experienced some horrendous nightmares. Fortunately we have also had some pleasant dreams, offering visions of a better life. As a new dawn approaches, we are gathering strength for new ventures. As we awaken, we will discover that some persons were never lulled into social sleep. The practical experience of their expressed concerns can offer us guidance for the new day.

In our nocturnal journey we dread most the nightmares that torment us. Some are imagined in our sleep. Others are real; they have happened to us and to others.

A child relates that he/she..... [PSR].

A woman/man reports that.... [Hiroshima]. This occurred on August 8, 1945 in Hiroshima, Japan.

[Similar interspersal of dream and reality; or reality and dream. Re:

Ghetto, barrio living

Refugees, homeless

Losing job, farm

Drugs

Street crime

Environment -- can't breathe

These are the nightmares of our age. Some are real, some are imagined. In our sleep we ourselves conjure up the phantasies that torment us, filtering daily events through fear into nightmares. In our wakeful lives we -- in the collective sense -- bring about, or neglect to alter, the circumstances that produce living horror.

Sleepers, awake. Leave behind the nightmares of troubled sleep. End the agonizing conditions that make life a nightmare for ourselves and for many others.

AWAKE.11

January 10, 1989

## 2. Deep Sleep of Indifference

In human sleep patterns dreams, both good and bad, give way to periods of deep, dreamless sleep. So also in our wakeful lives we escape nightmares by entering into a deep sleep of indifference.

In 1967 after # years of violent outbreaks in black ghettos in # cities, the President's Commission on Social Disorder (?) reported that

Twenty years later.....Evidence .....

In between these benchmark reports: widespread indifference to the racial polarization of our society.

While the 1988 presidential election was going on, former presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter assembled some of their former staff and other experts to write a report intended to advise the 41st president of the United States. They released their report, entitled American Agenda, just after the voters determined that George Bush would become president. Among other things they stated: [re rich/poor]....

As evidence they .....

Other evidence....

What has been our response to this growing disparity of wealth in the United States? Mostly indifference. And not merely indifference but in many circles an

affirmation that this disparity is quite acceptable.

In the 1980s, as some have observed, greed became respectable again. Especially on Wall Street where all kinds of manipulations occurred: leveraged buyouts whereby.....; [etc., including illegal activities]. The overwhelming purpose was to make money, lots of it, not to serve a social need. Gone was the redeeming feature of capitalism that insists on earning profits by making a better product, offering a useful service, improving production efficiency, motivating workers to perform at highest capability, both labor and management working hard and diligently. Although the grossest illegalities of the Wall Street manipulators have been condemned and some (but not all) of the perpetrators have been prosecuted, generally apathy has prevailed among the broader public.

This lack of concern has extended to the steady revelation that a sizable number of President Reagan's political appointees have used public office to achieve unlawful private gain. For some this occurred while on the federal payroll; for others, afterward, as they banked their contacts with previous associates. The philosophy of privatization, which the Reagan administration espoused, took on an individual meaning. Before an indifferent public.

Worldwide disparity ..... North/South

Civil and regional wars



Nuclear numbness

[December 14, 1988]

### 3. Good Dreams

In The Republic Plato tells about some people living in a cave, chained so that they cannot look towards the light streaming in. They can observe only shadows on the cave's rear wall. A fire behind the prisoners enhances their own shadows and the shadows of men passing between them and the fire. For the prisoners the shadows become the reality. But in truth the shadows are merely images, not the real thing.

So also for us today, in our social slumber we permit the shadows of indifference and the dark images of our fearful dreams to distort reality. As we awaken from the long night of social and political sleep, we must accustom our eyes to the growing light of dawn. As with Plato's prisoners, who upon release realized their error, the first look into the light will be painful. Our eyes must adjust to the light. But the reward will be a clearer vision, a better understanding of reality, a superior basis for action.

Fortunately for the awakening and the entry into the light, we have guides who can lead our way. One source of guidance is the good dreams of our sleepful past. Another source is the deeds of those who have refused to dwell in darkness, who have shown concern rather than become mired in indifference. From their experience we can extract some guiding principles to help us find our way into wakefulness.

Some of the dreams that point the way are old, some new. Some are well known, some not.

An old dream, but still fresh, is twice expressed in the Jewish books of prophesy and incorporated into the Christian Old Testament:

Nations shall beat their swords into plowshares,

and their spears into pruning hooks;  
Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,  
neither shall they learn war any more.<sup>i</sup>

Standing in front of the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, 1963, Martin Luther King,  
Jr. proclaimed:

I have a dream.

[Dreams of children, community leaders, etc.]

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January 10, 1989

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i. Isaiah 2:4; Micah 4:3

#### 4. Stirrings

Beyond these inspired dreams, we have a wide variety of precursor experience than can guide us as more and more people awaken to greater social concern.

Take for example the nuclear weapons nightmare that has haunted us since that fateful day in 1945 when the first nuclear weapons exploded in warfare.

[See previous manuscript for data.]

[Accomplishments of Freeze: Reagan change, etc. But shortcomings, such as failure to broaden agenda and to pay greater attention to broad political issues.]

Those who never slept:

Children's Defense Fund

Neighborhood, community organizations

Churches

Other voluntary efforts

State and local government (while national government went to sleep)

So we have both hopeful dreams and promising experience to lead us into the dawning light of wakefulness. We are fortunate. And there is more.

AWAKE.14 January 10, 1989

## 5. Dayspring

In recording the birth of John the Baptist, the Gospel according to Luke tells that the parents, Zachariah and Elizabeth, were both old and that Elizabeth was barren. As Zachariah carried out his priestly function by burning incense at the altar in the inner temple, an angel of the Lord appeared and told him that Elizabeth would bear a son. Because Zachariah didn't believe this, the angel took away his power of speech until the day the prediction would be fulfilled. Sure enough after the birth of John, Zachariah regained his speech. He cradled his infant son in his arms and told him (as King James' translators put it):

And thou, child, shalt be called the prophet of Highest:

for thou shalt go before the face of the Lord

to prepare his ways;

To give knowledge of salvation unto his people by the remission

of their sins, through the tender mercy of our God;

Whereby the dayspring from on high hath visited us,

To give light to them that sit in darkness and

in the shadow of death,

To guide our feet into the way of peace.<sup>i</sup>

(For the "dayspring" phrase, the Revised Standard Version of our century substitutes "the day shall dawn us from on high.")

Soon thereafter Jesus of Nazareth appeared as the Dayspring. He healed the sick, preached good news to the poor, called sinners to repentance. When a lawyer from the

Pharisees challenged him to state "the great commandment in the law", Jesus replied:

You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets.<sup>ii</sup>

And we can add that this statement also summarizes the essence of Jesus' own teaching.

As a Jew, Jesus inherited all of the insights and experiences of the Hebrew people. More than a thousand years before his birth the Jews had come to an understanding that there is One God for the whole universe. This contrasted with the prevailing notion of a collection of tribal or territorial gods. Christians and Muslims are spiritual descendants of this belief. Christianity has stressed three principal aspects of God's nature: Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer. In the East people also gained the insight that there is One True God, though they express their belief with different terms. We travel different routes, but we approach the same point: Eternal God, the Loving Force that unifies creation.

God exists. This is reality. God's existence is intrinsic and does not depend upon our belief, our articulation of creed.

Nevertheless, in knowing God we want to articulate our understanding of God's nature. This is not a simple task because our direct experience of a relationship with God occurs primarily in the realm of feeling, intuition, and nonverbal communication. This is true even when we verbalize our prayers. To describe this experience and our apprehension of God we have to speak in similes and metaphors. The language we use

is an approximation. It draws on traditional expressions, is influenced by thought patterns of our own era, and cannot be expected to be adequate for all times.

In my own thought I emphasize God as a force: Love Force, Creative Force. This does not exhaust the depth and breadth of God's nature, but it describes for me what is most important about God.

The concept of force has meaning for me partly because "force" is a characteristic term of our era, used frequently in physical and social sciences and in literature. Moreover, this term helps me counteract mental imagery that develops in thinking of God as Supreme Being: the tendency to visualize a person with human characteristics living in a particular location. This leads to problems of gender. It sets up imagery of a physical place called heaven -- up there -- where we will see God face to face.

Nevertheless, I can conceive of God as Force and Being. An imperfect analogy is light, which scientists tell us is both mass (photons) and energy (waves). This combines two separate characteristics into one unified entity.

God Force has for me two principal expressions: creation and love.

God the Creator works through processes that produce out of matter life forms which can grow, carry out various functions, and reproduce. Men and women can discover these processes and even intervene by guiding the direction of certain processes. But God Force is the creator of the process and over centuries and millennia moves creation to new life forms, new modes of being, new levels of consciousness, new relationships among the creatures, and new relationships between living creatures and

their Creator.

God as Love Force enters into an ongoing relationship with all of creation. Here our human experience offers us insights. We understand that love is caring but also discipline. Love is rejoicing and suffering. Love is a relationship that must be experienced and not merely talked about. Love is giving and receiving. Love is reaching out and accepting. Love is judging, understanding, and forgiving. Love is repenting when necessary. Love is renewing broken relationships.

In our lives we discover Love Force (God) welling up from within (a preferable metaphor than God's love beaming down from heaven above). Love Force is constant but our capacity to receive may be not yet released, only partially developed, or blocked in some manner or other. Love Force is available to us at all times and in all places if we choose to avail ourselves.

God as Force is everywhere in the universe. Just as the force of gravity occurs wherever matter exists, so also God as Creative Force, as Love Force exists universally, is ever-present to all of creation.

Jesus of Nazareth felt keenly the presence of God in his life. As a Jewish boy he learned from the elders in the synagogue. He learned the prayers that have come down to us in the Mishnah, short prayers for each occasion daily life: rising, mealtime, going to bed, and other activities. Typical is the prayer before meal, still used by Jews today, which Jesus probably said before eating the Last Supper in the Upper Room:

Bless be Thou, Lord our God, King of the universe, who bringest forth bread from the Earth.



As he was growing up, Jesus quite likely roamed the hills surrounding Nazareth and walked to the shores of the Sea of Galilee, reflecting on God's purpose for his life and strengthening his feeling of God's continuous presence.

Having developed an intimate relationship with God, Jesus realized that he had a special mission in life. That mission and his verbalization of it was shaped by the Jewish heritage, the thought patterns and language of that period, the social and political setting of Israel and the surrounding lands. He tested his calling through a period of solitude in the wilderness and turned aside temptations to use his natural gifts in ways contrary to the mission he would undertake and the message he would convey.

Jesus began his ministry of love through healing the sick, the lame, the blind. He recognized the relationship between physical, mental, and spiritual illness and ministered to all three. He instructed his disciples and others about the ways of God, preaching a gospel of love and right relationships. He spoke out against social injustice. In doing so he clashed with religious and civil authorities, and they regularly challenged him verbally. In response to such a challenge he articulated the two great commandments, quote above: love of God and love of neighbor. On another occasion he extended the scope of love by applying it to one's enemies.

Feeling their power threatened by truth of Jesus' teaching, religious and civil authorities conspired together, arrested him, conducted mock trials, and then crucified him. The different gospels record different final words of Jesus on the cross, although traditionally we have felt comfortable in combining them to provide a complete understanding. Luke<sup>iii</sup> records that from the cross Jesus prayer for his persecutors:

"Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." Mark<sup>iv</sup> and Matthew<sup>v</sup> have him crying out with a loud voice, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Luke<sup>vi</sup> presents his concluding words as "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit." In combination we have a believable picture of love and forgiveness giving way to despair but then yielding to faith.

Yet, many ask, if God is good, why did Jesus suffer and have to experience such a shameful death? Why must anyone suffer? If God is omnipotent (all powerful), as some would claim, why does God allow evil to exist?

This last question starts with the wrong premise, that God is omnipotent. Omnipotence, and omniscience (all knowing), are constructs of philosophers and not necessarily the most essential attributes of God: God the Creator, God the All Loving. As we know from our human experience, a necessary part of loving is to suffer. That is true in the relationship of husband and wife, parents and children, and other human connections. As a person whom we love suffers, so also we suffer. Love consists of intertwined joy and sorrow. And so also God, as Love Force, suffers as human beings, who are the product of God's work as Creative Force, suffer. God enters into this suffering. God suffered with Jesus on the cross as God suffers on all other occasions of human cruelty.

On the third day after Jesus' crucifixion his disciples became aware of his resurrection through a series of appearances. Later after they were transformed at Pentecost by an experience they attributed to the coming of the Holy Spirit, they preached Christ crucified and risen from the dead. Resurrection became the symbol of

overcoming suffering and death. This triumph occurred because the all-loving God enters into human suffering, on the cross and elsewhere.

The Gospel according to John uses a different thought pattern to answer the question Jesus put to his disciples, "Who do you say that I am?"

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it....

And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth: we have beheld his glory, glory as the only Son from the Father.<sup>vii</sup>

In a Christmas play, *Lead, Kindly Light*, I wrote several years ago, I let a pastor offer my interpretation of this passage:

I find it useful to think of the Word as the Essence of God, that is as God's true nature. The Word -- God's essence -- pre-existed before the coming of Christ. In Jesus, the essential nature of God was manifested. It became flesh and dwelt among us.

What is God's essential nature? It is Love. An overwhelming love, seeking us out until it finds us. A forgiving love. An amazing grace.

God so love the world that he gave us his Son. In Jesus the Christ we can perceive that the essence of God is love. This is our beacon, a kindly light to show us the way. Through Love, we are able to tap into eternity. But

without the Love of God, we dwell in darkness.

As God is One, so also humankind is bound together in organic and social unity. We are biologically the same, though on the surface we may look different. We all have the same basic nature, combining concern for self and concern for others, though how this combination is expressed may vary. Even though we are divided into nations, we share the same planet.

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January 11, 1989

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i. Luke 1:76-79

ii. Matthew 22: 37-40

iii. Luke 23:34

iv. Mark 15:34

v. Matthew 27:46

vi. Luke 23:46

vii. John:1:1-5, 14

#### 41. Spiritual Awakening

Our contact with God the Creator, God as Love Force can come through processes we call prayer and meditation. In these processes our human brain may verbalize with languages we use to communicate with other human beings, but the actual communication with Love Force is nonverbal, our emission of mental and spiritual energy properly channeled to make connections with Love Force. (An imperfect analogy is radio waves.) It is feeling more than verbalization. It may be a product more of the right brain than the left (to use our current understanding of the mind). Hence, music, visual arts, ritual drama, and methods of relaxation (centering down) can set the stage for our contact with God.

Nevertheless, we can also experience God in the midst of human activities, such as congregate worship and cooperative endeavors through which we love one another. And as Thomas Kelly has taught,<sup>i</sup> it is possible to feel the presence of God alternatively, and ultimately concurrently, with our day-to-day activities, whatever they may be.

AWAKE.41 January 11, 1989

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i. Thomas Kelly,

*Building the Understructure of Democracy  
Lessons Drawn from American Experience*

*Fragments and Outline of an Essay  
by Howard W. Hallman*

*It's astonishing, but true, that words, ideas, and political deeds, not bombs, missiles, and military deployment, constitute the greatest U.S. contribution to peace and freedom in the world. The most recent proof was the remarkable address by Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel to a joint session of the United States Congress on February 21, 1990. Speaking in English at the end of his speech, he stated:*

*When Thomas Jefferson wrote that "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," it was a simple and important act of the human spirit. What gave meaning to that act, however, was the fact that the author backed it up with his life. It was not just his words; it was his deeds as well.*

*Havel was, of course, taking a phrase from the inspirational beginning of the Declaration of Independence. For the signers, "consent of the governed" was the way that fundamental human rights are assured.*

*We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. -- That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.*

*Though not as widely quoted, the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, is equally inspirational and meaningful as it succinctly states the purposes of constitutional government in a democratic society:*

*Form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.*

*Together these two expressions in the Declaration and the Preamble, stated in less than 100 words, are the seeds from which a wealth of wisdom and richly varied, practical experience has grown. For instance, the 85 essays of *The Federalist* enlarge the meaning "a more perfect Union." The history of American political parties is an important chapter in a lengthy book on how "the consent of the governed" is obtained. Basic rights of life and liberty have gained protection in 15 amendments to the*

*U.S. Constitution, also in various statutes and numerous court decisions.*

*In our present era when democracy is springing up in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Central America, and elsewhere around the globe, we in the United States can appropriately offer our own experience with democracy. Not with exaggerated self-pride -- after all our Union was so imperfect that we engaged in a bloody war between the states -- but with a conviction that our hard-earned lessons in democracy might help other peoples as they devise their own indigenous expressions of democracy.*

*The structure of democracy is complex. Most visible is the superstructure whose design deals with the "big questions": division of government into branches (legislative, executive, judicial); relative power of these branches; their relationships (separation of powers, as in the United States, or a combining, as in Great Britain and other parliamentary democracies); electoral processes and political parties; protection of fundamental rights; geographical division (national/state/local in U.S. terms), expressed as federalism, confederation, or delegation of powers to subordinate units.*

*Less visible is the understructure of democracy. It consists of the organization of government and political parties in localities; the network of citizen associations that people use for advocacy, lobbying, and carrying out tasks for themselves; governmental processes that enable people to deal with their government on a day-to-day basis; various forms of citizen participation in public decision-making; all of this held together by a spirit of civic concern and responsibility. Without these undergirding elements the superstructure of democracy would collapse.*

*As we observe what is currently occurring in the emerging democracies, most attention is now necessarily directed toward the superstructure. Powerful forces are contending for control and influence. They are working out governmental structures reflective of national history and experience, though drawing on models from older democracies. This is not unlike what occurred during the founding period of the United States.*

*Then as the answers to the "big questions" are agreed upon, the people can give more attention to the intimate details of the understructure. In the United States this elaboration has gone on for two centuries and is still occurring.*

*The intent of this essay is to analyze U.S. experience with the understructure of democracy with the hope that it may help the emerging democracies. It is offered not as a simple pattern to copy without change but rather as a review of hard-earned experience which can suggest points of departure for others facing these issues afresh.*

[After this introduction, the essay will deal with several major topics. The following outline, while not complete and subject to further development, suggests some of the topics to be covered.]

### **Citizen Associations**

When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s, he observed:

*In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objectives, than in America. Beside the permanent associations which are established by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals.<sup>i</sup>*

Elaborating on this finding, he wrote:

*Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds -- religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminutive.<sup>ii</sup>*

[Then a summary of what de Tocqueville wrote about the use of associations in that period. Follow this with my own observations about contemporary America. For instance, in my book *Neighborhoods: Their Place in Urban Life* (Sage, 1984) I noted that neighborhood associations are involved in human services, education, housing, economic development, delegated municipal services, and a wide variety of self-help activities dealing with public safety, environmental improvements, care of children, youth, the aging, and staging communal events.

And there are many other kinds of citizen associations active in American civic life.]

[Discussion of how citizen associations supplement the work of government, most often working in cooperation with government.]

[Consideration of what it takes to organize and run an effective citizen association. How associations can be established to respond to unmet community needs.]

### **Citizen Participation**

Beyond the electoral process, there are many other ways in which the consent of the governed is



*expressed in American democracy.*

*[Citizens seeking to influence legislation and executive decisions through lobbying; various forms of public advocacy, including protest activities.]*

*[The process of citizens interacting with governmental officials in decision making and program implementation goes by the name of "citizen participation."]*

*[Reasons for citizen participation (see p. 2 of attached Citizens and Program Implementation for six reasons).]*

*[There are many expressions of citizen participation. Involvement in planning public works: highways, schools, parks, refuse disposal facilities, etc. Participation at successive stages of public program cycles: planning, implementation, and evaluation leading to the next round of planning, implementation, and evaluation. Appearance at public hearings. Service on advisory committees. Citizen-initiated proposals.]*

*[How to achieve effective citizen participation. Review of extensive experience and extraction of general findings.]*

### ***Utility of Associations and Citizen Participation***

*One can add "citizen associations" to municipal institutions in the following observation of de Tocqueville.*

*Local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Municipal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty. <sup>iii</sup>*

*Around 1960 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba made a comparative study of the civic culture in the United States, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Among their findings they stated:*

*As many writers have argued, local government may act as a training ground for political*

competence. Where local government allows participation, it may foster a sense of competence that then spreads to the national level -- a sense of competence that would have had a harder time developing had the individual's only involvement with government been with the more distant and inaccessible structures of the national government.<sup>iv</sup>

Thereafter during the 1960s the War on Poverty required "maximum feasible participation by persons and groups served" by the program. The Model Cities Program had similar participation requirements. These and related efforts were a veritable training ground for blacks, Hispanics, and other groups previously underrepresented in the ranks of local and state officials, in Congress, and top appointive positions. Thus, one can add to the Almond-Verba finding that not only local government but also local associations and citizen participation processes provide training for political competence.

In considering competence and democratic values, Almond and Verba noted:

Everything being equal, the sense of ability to participate in politics appears to increase the legitimacy of a system and to lead to political stability.<sup>v</sup>

Participation provides competence and makes citizens self-confident.

In many ways, then, the belief in one's competence is a key political attitude. The self-confident citizen appears to be the democratic citizen. Not only does he think he can participate, he thinks that others ought to participate as well. Furthermore, he does not merely think he can take part in politics; he is likely to be more active. And, perhaps most significant of all, the self-confident citizen is also likely to be the more satisfied and loyal citizen.<sup>vi</sup>

[Further elaboration of these ideas.]

### **Local Federalism and Public/Private Partnerships**

In the 46th Federalist essay, James Madison explained the federal system proposed by the new U.S. Constitution in this manner:

The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.

In his retirement years Thomas Jefferson recognized that a kind of three-level federalism was developing: national, state, and local. He wanted to extend the concept to a fourth level: "ward republics, for the small, and yet numerous and interesting concerns of the neighborhood." He believed that

in government, as well as in every other business of life, it is by division and subdivision of duties alone, that all matters, great and small, can be managed to perfection. And the whole is cemented by giving to every citizen, personally, a part in the administration of the public affairs.<sup>vii</sup>

During the last 20 years in the United States neighborhood councils and other forms of neighborhood participation have gained a strong foothold in many cities. In the suburbs small municipalities and townships in effect are neighborhood governments. In looking at how best to organize government in metropolitan areas, I have advocated "local federalism" to apply Madison's notion of the people being served by different agents, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes. [*Small and Large Together: Governing the Metropolis*. Sage, 1977.]

The idea of local federalism has applicability in metropolitan areas around the world and also in the governmental structure of rural districts.

[To be developed further.]

Public/private partnership is another concept that has emerged in American democracy. Sometimes it is a three-way partnership involving government, private enterprises, and nonprofit organizations. This reflects the pluralism of American society. It is an effort to maximize the best features of the respective sectors.

[To be developed further.]

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i. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. Translated by Henry Reeves. New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., n.d. Vol. 1, p. 204

ii. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 114

iii. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 62

iv. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1965.

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v. *Ibid.*, p. 204

vi. *Ibid.*, pp. 206-297

vii. S.K. Padover, *The Complete Jefferson*. New York: Duel, Sloan & Pearce, 1943. p. 290

[March 8, 1990]

*Building the Understructure of Democracy  
Learning from the American Experience*

*Some Ideas Suggested  
by Howard W. Hallman*

*The emergence of democracy in many parts of the world is one of the heartening developments of our era. As new democratic systems replace previous totalitarian regimes, they face many challenges. An excellent exposition of the public management challenge in Eastern Europe has been offered by the Standing Panel on International Affairs of the National Academy of Public Administration. I would like to pick up and enlarge upon comments made in this statement about federalism and local government*

*The structure of democracy is complex. Most visible is the superstructure whose design deals with the "big questions": division of government into branches; relative power of these branches and the relationships among them; electoral processes and political parties; methods for protecting fundamental rights; geographical division of government (federalism, confederation, or delegation of powers from central authority to subordinate units); governmental organization and the conduct of public management.*

*Looking at the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, the International Affairs Panel identifies the following public management issues: depoliticizing and developing the civil service; developing market-oriented government services; privatization and new public-private partnerships; federalism and local government. These issues deal mostly with superstructure matters, but the latter two items begin to get into the understructure.*

*This understructure is absolutely essential to the effective functioning of democracy. Among the major elements are the following:*

- o organization and functioning of government and political parties in localities;*
- o networks of citizen associations which people use for advocacy, lobbying, and carrying out tasks for themselves;*
- o governmental processes that enable people to deal with their government on a day-to-day basis;*
- o various forms of citizen participation in public decision-making;*
- o all of these held together by a spirit of civic concern and responsibility.*

*Without these undergirding elements the superstructure of democracy would collapse.*

*This has been recognized in Eastern Europe through consideration of the concept of "civil society", composed of "a constellation of informal, voluntary, nongovernmental associations."<sup>i</sup> Indeed, it was*

*the practitioners of civil society -- autonomous unions, independent professional associations, religious institutions, pacifist groups, human rights organizations, and the ecological movement -- who led the largely nonviolent revolt against the all-encompassing, Marxist state.*

*We in the United States have more than two centuries of experience in working out an understructure of democracy. What we have learned may be useful to the emerging democracies. In particular we have richly varied experience with citizen associations and with methods for achieving citizen participation in governmental decision-making and implementation. We have a body of practical knowledge that can be offered not as a simple pattern to copy without change but rather as lessons from hard-earned experience which can suggest points of departure for others facing afresh the challenge of developing a vital democracy.*

### **Citizen Associations**

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*In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objectives, than in America. Beside the permanent associations which are established by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals.<sup>ii</sup>*

*Elaborating on this finding, he wrote:*

*Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds -- religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminutive.<sup>iii</sup>*

*De Tocqueville offered a lengthy list, which could be expanded many-fold today. Associations are organized along various lines: geographic (block, housing project, neighborhood, subdivision, township, city, county); economic (business, labor, professional, trade); civic concerns and causes (housing, social welfare, environment, education, and many more); and particular interests (music, the arts, recreational activities, and lots of others).*

*In the United States many citizen associations supplement the work of government, often proceeding in tandem through a cooperative relationship. They also have advocacy functions and engage in citizen participation processes.*

*To assist emerging democracies we can offer ideas on how to organize and run effective citizen*

associations, how they can function in response to unmet community needs, how they fit into democratic pluralism.

### **Citizen Participation**

Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel ended his recent address to the U.S. Congress by recalling Thomas Jefferson's words that "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

After the United States gained independence, elections and the functioning of political parties developed as primary means for gaining such consent. Other methods also developed:

- o citizens seeking to influence legislation and executive decisions through lobbying;
- o various forms of public advocacy, including protest activities (the peaceful variety being protected by the First Amendment);
- o processes of citizens interacting with governmental officials in decision making and program implementation.

The latter often goes by the name of "citizen participation". These are activities that take place throughout the year, thus supplementing the periodic elections.

Citizen participation is important in a democracy for a number of reasons. Citizens need access in structured ways to public decision-makers, both elected and appointed. A sense of social equity requires that special effort should be made to achieve participation of persons most affected by a public program, particularly the less-well organized. As citizens participate, they contribute to the knowledge base upon which decisions are made. They can also make positive contributions to carrying out public programs.

Furthermore, if citizens are not involved, they might rise up and block implementation of a project or program. If too dissatisfied through lack of participation, citizens can withdraw their consent and display this withdrawal through mass demonstrations. In the United States, for instance, this kind of citizen mobilization contributed to ending the Vietnam War, and recently in Eastern Europe it has led to the downfall of regimes.

In the United States citizen participation has many expressions:

- o involvement in planning public works: highways, schools, parks, refuse disposal facilities, etc.;
- o participation at successive stages of public program cycles: planning, implementation, and evaluation leading to the next round of planning, implementation, and evaluation;
- o appearance at public hearings;
- o service on advisory committees;
- o citizen-initiated proposals.

Thus, we can draw on this diverse experience in achieving effective citizen participation to offer ideas to people in the emerging democracies.

### **Utility of Associations and Citizen Participation**

In reflecting upon the value of the understructure of democracy, one can add "citizen associations" to municipal institutions in the following observation of de Tocqueville.

*Local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Municipal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.* <sup>iv</sup>

Around 1960 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba made a comparative study of the civic culture in the United States, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Among their findings they stated:

*As many writers have argued, local government may act as a training ground for political competence. Where local government allows participation, it may foster a sense of competence that then spreads to the national level -- a sense of competence that would have had a harder time developing had the individual's only involvement with government been with the more distant and inaccessible structures of the national government.*<sup>v</sup>

Thereafter during the 1960s the War on Poverty required "maximum feasible participation by persons and groups served" by the program. The Model Cities Program had similar participation requirements. These and related efforts were a veritable training ground for blacks, Hispanics, and other groups previously underrepresented in the ranks of local and state officials, in Congress, and top appointive positions. Thus, one can add to the Almond-Verba finding that not only local government but also local associations and citizen participation processes provide training for political competence. They also teach skills that enable newcomers to enter the political process, to seek election to public office, and to take on administrative assignments.

In considering competence and democratic values, Almond and Verba noted:

*Everything being equal, the sense of ability to participate in politics appears to increase the legitimacy of a system and to lead to political stability.*<sup>vi</sup>



*Participation provides competence and makes citizens self-confident.*

*In many ways, then, the belief in one's competence is a key political attitude. The self-confident citizen appears to be the democratic citizen. Not only does he think he can participate, he thinks that others ought to participate as well. Furthermore, he does not merely think he can take part in politics; he is likely to be more active. And, perhaps most significant of all, the self-confident citizen is also likely to be the more satisfied and loyal citizen.<sup>vii</sup>*

*These are values which the new leaders in the emerging democracies are articulating. The American experience may offer them useful ideas to adapt to their own situations. As they do, they will be building durable foundations for the new democracies.*

*[March 22, 1990]*

## Notes

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- i. Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Eastern Europe: The Story the Media Missed" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1990, pp. 17-21.
- ii. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. Translated by Henry Reeves. New York: A.S Barnes & Co., n.d. Vol. 1, p. 204
- iii. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 114
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- v. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1965.
- vi. *Ibid.*, p. 204
- vii. *Ibid.*, pp. 206-297

*Building the Understructure of Democracy  
Learning from the American Experience*

*Some Ideas Suggested  
by Howard W. Hallman\**

*The emergence of democracy in many parts of the world is one of the heartening developments of our era. As new democratic systems replace previous totalitarian regimes, they face many challenges.*

*The structure of democracy is complex. Most visible is the **superstructure** whose design deals with the "big questions": division of government into branches; relative power of these branches and the relationships among them; electoral processes and political parties; methods for protecting fundamental rights; geographical division of government (federalism, confederation, or delegation of powers from central authority to subordinate units); governmental organization and the conduct of public management.*

*Less visible is the **understructure** of democracy. Among its major elements are the following:*

- o organization and functioning of government and political parties in localities;*
- o networks of citizen associations which people use for advocacy, lobbying, and carrying out tasks for themselves;*
- o governmental processes that enable people to deal with their government on a day-to-day basis;*
- o various forms of citizen participation in public decision-making;*
- o all of these held together by a spirit of civic concern and responsibility.*

*Without these undergirding elements the superstructure of democracy would collapse.*

*This has been recognized in Eastern Europe through consideration of the concept of "civil society", composed of "a constellation of informal, voluntary, nongovernmental associations."<sup>i</sup> Indeed, it was the practitioners of civil society -- autonomous unions, independent professional associations, religious institutions, pacifist groups, human rights organizations, and the ecological movement -- who led the largely nonviolent revolt against the all-encompassing, Marxist state.*

*We in the United States have more than two centuries of experience in working out an understructure of democracy. What we have learned may be useful to the emerging democracies. In particular we have richly varied experience with citizen associations and with methods for achieving citizen participation in governmental decision-making and implementation. We have a body of practical knowledge that can be offered not as a simple pattern to copy without change but rather as lessons from hard-earned experience which can suggest points of departure for others facing afresh the challenge of developing a vital democracy.*

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\* Howard W. Hallman is executive director of Methodists United for Peace with Justice. He has written several books on neighborhood action and has conducted training and technical assistance on citizen participation.

### **Citizen Associations**

When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s, he observed:

*In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objectives, than in America. Beside the permanent associations which are established by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals.<sup>ii</sup>*

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To assist emerging democracies we can offer ideas on how to organize and run effective citizen associations, how they can function in response to unmet community needs, how they fit into democratic pluralism.

### **Citizen Participation**

Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel ended his address to the U.S. Congress on February 21, 1990 by recalling Thomas Jefferson's words that "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Finding ways to achieve this consent has been a major theme of American political history.

After the United States gained independence, **elections** and the functioning of **political parties** developed as primary means for gaining such consent. Over the years other methods developed, such as:

- o citizens seeking to influence legislation and executive decisions through **lobbying**;
- o various forms of **public advocacy**, including protest activities (the peaceful variety being protected by the First Amendment);
- o processes of citizens interacting with governmental officials in decision making and program implementation, sometimes described as **citizen participation**.

These kind of activities take place throughout the year so that gaining consent is a continuous process, not merely the periodic event of elections.

Citizen participation is important in a democracy for a number of reasons. Citizens need access in structured ways to public decision-makers, both elected and appointed. A sense of social equity requires that special effort should be made to achieve participation of persons most affected by a public program, particularly the less-well organized. As citizens participate, they contribute to the knowledge base upon which decisions are made. They can also make positive contributions to carrying out public programs.

Furthermore, if citizens are not involved, they might rise up and block implementation of a project or program. If too dissatisfied through lack of participation, citizens can withdraw their consent and display this withdrawal through mass demonstrations. In the United States, for instance, this kind of citizen mobilization contributed to ending the Vietnam War, and recently in Eastern Europe it has led to the downfall of regimes.

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In many ways, then, the belief in one's competence is a key political attitude. The self-confident citizen appears to be the democratic citizen. Not only does he think he can participate, he thinks that others ought to participate as well. Furthermore, he does not merely think he can take part in politics; he is likely to be more active. And, perhaps most significant of all, the self-confident citizen is also likely to be the more satisfied and loyal citizen.<sup>vii</sup>

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September 1990

## Notes

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- i. Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Eastern Europe: The Story the Media Missed" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1990, pp. 17-21.
- ii. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. Translated by Henry Reeves. New York: A.S Barnes & Co., n.d. Vol. 1, p. 204
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- vi. *Ibid.*, p. 204
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## 2. COLD WAR IN TWO MODES

[June 27, 1988]



Note: This chapter of Farewell to Nuclear Arms! is written as if were to be published toward the end 1988 or early 1989 and the United States and the Soviet Union had successfully negotiated a strategic arms reduction treaty. If this doesn't occur, the chapter would be re-written.

## 1. CHOICES WE FACE

In our quest to remove the danger of nuclear holocaust we have now come to a three-tined fork in the road. It is a mountain road -- precarious where we have been, still dangerous ahead.

We are coming down from a higher, more perilous roadway. The descent began when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and to cut in half their strategic forces (the weapons that can strike the adversary's homeland from afar). When carried to completion, the INF Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will take away slightly over one-fourth of the world's supply of nuclear weapons: down from approximately 50,000 nuclear warheads to around 36,000.

But grave danger remains. As we move along, we now have a choice of three routes. From a lookout tower we can see ahead that the third route divides, thus offering a fourth choice later. We sense a hazardous journey by whatever route we choose.

One of our present choices is to reascend by rebuilding the size of the nuclear

arsenal that President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev have agreed to reduce. Those who think reduction is a mistake (and there are some who take this position) favor a return to the heights of 50,000 or more nuclear warheads. They are adventurers who are seemingly oblivious to risks.

The second route goes straight ahead, staying at the same level of nuclear warheads but refining the accuracy and evasiveness of delivery vehicles and finding better methods of defense to protect our own missiles from attack. The guides who would lead us along this roadway are technologists. One group consists of scientists and engineers in the weapons laboratories who are developing yet another generation of nuclear weapons and are designing exotic defensive measures. Another group are the strategists in the think-tanks and government bureaus who are working out plans for strategic defense, war in space, and pre-emptive strikes. They are willing to accept the current reduction but are dubious about further cuts. The path they would lead us along, although apparently level, follows a rocky ledge, high above a deep chasm. One misstep and we plunge into the abyss.

The third route of the three-tined fork proceeds downward. It continues the descent started by the two Reagan-Gorbachev arms reduction agreements and proceeds to a level where another quarter of the peak supply is removed, putting us at a mid-point on the mountainous nuclear arsenal. There the roadway divides into two, offering a pair of further choices: one remaining at the new level, the other continuing the descent. The downward branch forks again at three-quarters of the way down from the top with one roadway leveling off and the other continuing downward all the way to the valley floor.

The repeated choice of leveling off or continuing the descent fosters an ongoing debate between advocates of minimal deterrence and supporters of complete abolition, between minimalists and abolitionists.

Those favoring minimal deterrence believe that as far ahead in time as we can see, we will need a supply of nuclear weapons to assure that an adversary will not use nuclear weapons against us. Our capability of retaliation is the deterrent, the minimalists explain. They maintain that the level can be much lower than the present supply, but they differ among themselves about what the necessary minimum might be. Some say 5,000 nuclear warheads worldwide (about 10 percent of the 1987 supply). Others say 2,000, and some as low as 200 for each side, or a total of 400 worldwide. Hence, repeated decisions in the road ahead along the downward route: whether to level off or descend further. But the minimalists agree that we can never in the foreseeable future reach zero elevation. Nor should we try, they insist.

In contrast, the abolitionists argue that only by eliminating every last nuclear weapon can the world be safe from nuclear devastation. They assert that the destructive level of even the smallest minimum advocated by the minimalists -- about 400 warhead worldwide -- would be able to destroy all of the two principal adversaries. This is not a safe world, the abolitionists emphasize.

The minimalists inquire, "What about the warheads one side might hide in a cave just above the valley floor? The other side must openly keep a small supply to deter cheating."

The abolitionists respond, "We can and must have stringent verification

procedures, including on-site inspection. Even if one party hid some, it could not as easily hide the delivery vehicle."

"What about a new entrant who develops nuclear weapons (for the knowledge of how to make them can't be erased)?" ask the minimalists. "In that way even a small nation or a group of terrorists could blackmail a big nation."

"We have ways to prevent proliferation and must use them effectively," reply the abolitionists. "As to blackmail, the issue is no different than a threat to use conventional weapons. You don't allow yourself to be intimidated by blackmailers."

"Anyway," continue the abolitionists, "the risks of global nuclear disarmament are much less than the dangers of a supply of 2,000 warheads, or even 400. And certainly safer than the 36,000 that would remain if we are content to cease nuclear arms reduction after the Reagan-Gorbachev agreements."

And the debate goes on and on as we stand now at the three-tined fork in the road, see a fourth route ahead, and have to choose which pathway to take. In this debate adventurers, technologists, and minimalists all agree that abolition is an idle dream. But otherwise the adventurers, who want to re-escalate, stand pretty much alone. On some issues minimalists and abolitionists concur. They join together to counter the arguments of the technologists, who are content with the levels of the INF and START agreements but want to enhance destructive power while seeking a better defensive shield. In contrast, minimalists and abolitionists perceive strategic defense as a false and dangerous route. They are willing to journey together along the downward route by continuing to reduce the level of the nuclear

arsenal in the next several years. But looking ahead they will part company at the point where the minimalists will want to level off while the abolitionists will insist on descending to the valley floor.

This is no frivolous debate. The outcome, demarcated by which roadway we choose, is crucial for humankind. A slip can be calamitous.

None of the paths is easy. Climbing back to former heights, leveling off now, proceeding to a lower elevation before leveling off, or going all the way to zero -- each has its hazards. The journey ahead is precarious. And challenging.

The challenge ahead is ours. The choice. We must use our greatest wisdom, our most effective skills, our staunchest determination to find the path that offers the surest way to a world safe from nuclear holocaust.

There are, of course, other ingredients for world peace. Among them are conventional disarmament; abandonment of the quest for territorial expansion; ending of foreign occupation; terminating civil strife among ethnic, religious, and political factions within nations; protection of human rights; achieving justice for the poor and downtrodden. But ending the reign of threatened nuclear terror stands highest on the list of tasks to accomplish in our search for peace.

This book offers guidance for this journey among one of the routes.

## 2. A MATTER OF RIGHT AND WRONG

Let me state immediately that I am an abolitionist. I believe that all nuclear weapons should be abolished. Totally. I advocate that this goal be achieved no later than December 31, 1999 so that we can enter the new century free from the scourge of nuclear terror.

My position is based upon both idealism and realism. It is a judgment of what is right and wrong and what is practicable. From both viewpoints abolition is the correct course. I offer the perspective of idealism in this chapter and in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 contains an introduction to realism by examining the self-interest all nations have in nuclear disarmament. Much of the remainder of the book lays out a practical course to achieve this goal.

### Here I Stand

The use of nuclear weapons is wrong. So also is threatened use in order to intimidate and to deter. Accordingly the possession of any and all nuclear weapons is wrong.

In this age when moral relativity and situation ethics are so pervasive, such absolute condemnation may seem too strong to many. Instead, they voice all kinds of "yes,but" justifications for keeping the existing supply of nuclear weapons and continuing to develop more. They cite situations where they might be used. But on this matter there can be no moral compromise.

Now is the time to take a firm stand. Now is the time to insist that we must rid the world of these dangerous devices as soon as possible. Now is the time to start down the road to complete, worldwide nuclear disarmament and to complete that journey before

the year 2000.

### Destructive Effects

Any use of nuclear weapons is wrong because of the massive destruction they produce. Use of even one against a city would immediately cause tens of thousands of civilian deaths. Lingering effects would later lead to many more deaths. Drifting radioactive fallout would harm numerous additional people, livestock, crops, and other natural resources in distant places. Use of a single nuclear weapon against an isolated military site, such as a ballistic missile launcher, would cause fewer immediate casualties but would produce widespread harm because of fallout.

Use of many -- a more likely scenario if nuclear weapons are called upon in a future war -- would kill millions of people and inflict devastating damage to the environment. So great would be the loss of human life that nuclear attack by one nation on another must be considered an act of genocide, that is, the deliberate, systematic destruction of a people, race, or ethnic group. The combined effects of all-out nuclear war could produce a nuclear winter and destroy all human life, an action of mutual suicide.

### Religious Belief

From a religious perspective, nuclear weapons -- used or threatened -- have no proper place. By religion, we are speaking of devotion to God and obedience to God's will. In the Judeo-Christian heritage this also encompasses how we relate to fellow humans under the sovereignty of God. It also takes into account how we respect other aspects of God's creation.

More than 3,000 years ago the Hebrew people came to an understanding that there is One God for the whole universe. This contrasted with the prevailing notion of a

collection of tribal or territorial gods. Christians and Muslims are spiritual descendants of this belief. Christianity has stressed three principal aspects of God's nature: Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer. In the East people also gained the insight that there is One True God, though they express their belief with different terms. We travel different routes, but we approach the same point: Eternal God, the Loving Force that unifies creation.

As God is One, so also humankind is bound together in organic and social unity. We are biologically the same, though on the surface we may look different. We all have the same basic nature, combining concern for self and concern for others, though how this combination is expressed may vary. Even though we are divided into nations, we share the same planet.

War and other forms of violent conflict shatter the fundamental unity of humankind. War pits some of God's creatures against others and is therefore contrary to the centrality of religious beliefs and teachings. As children of the Divine who are bound together in creation, we separate ourselves from God when we harm one another. There may be rationalizations -- that in this sinful world acts of war may be unavoidable, that war may be a lesser evil than succumbing to tyranny. But the best of religion recognizes war as an action falling far short of the highest religious aspirations.

Of the various rationalizations, none can properly shelter nuclear weapons because of their indiscriminate and far-reaching destructive powers. Their use would cause loss of human life and damage to the environment vastly disproportional to any reasonable military objective.

Numerous religious bodies have condemned the kind of massive destruction nuclear



weapons would cause. Thus, the Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church in 1965 addressed the matter of total warfare (of which all-out nuclear war would be the ultimate expression) and concluded (n.d.:218-219):

Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation.

When the U.S. Catholic bishops took up this issue in the early 1980s, they affirmed this statement and added (1983:47):

Retaliatory action whether nuclear or conventional which would indiscriminately take many wholly innocent lives, lives of people who are in no way responsible for reckless actions of their government, must also be condemned. This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck. No Christian can rightfully carry out orders or policies deliberately aimed at killing noncombatants.

Moreover, they stated:

We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare, on however restricted a scale, can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be resisted by other means.

Three years later United Methodist bishops in the United States took up the same issue and forthrightly stated (19865:92):

we say a clear and unconditional No to nuclear war and to any use of

nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, they considered whether nuclear weapons should be used as a deterrent and offered this conclusion (1986:47):

We believe, however, that the moral case for nuclear deterrence, even in an interim ethic, has been undermined by unrelenting arms escalation. Deterrence no longer serves, if it ever did, as a strategy that facilitates disarmament.

Therefore, they insisted (1986: 48):

Deterrence must no longer receive the church's blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.

[To be added: position adopted by the United Methodist General Conference in May 1988 and updating of position of U.S. Catholic bishops in June 1988.]

Protestant Christians with an evangelical orientation have also spoken out on this issue. Thus, in 1978 world-renowned evangelist Billy Graham while visiting Auschwitz, Poland, the site of a Nazi extermination camp, exclaimed,

"The present insanity of the global arms race, if continued, will lead inevitably to a conflagration so great that Auschwitz will seem like a minor rehearsal." Elaborating on his views the following year, he explained (1979:12):

Now I know there are mysteries to the workings of God. I know that God is sovereign and sometimes he permits things to happen which are evil, and he even causes the wrath of many to praise him. But I cannot see any way in which nuclear war could be branded as being God's

will. Such warfare, if it ever happens, will come because of the greed and pride and covetousness of the human heart. But God's will is to establish his kingdom, in which Christ is Lord.

As another example, the faculty and trustees of Fuller Theological Seminary (Pasadena, California), which follows the evangelical tradition, have issued "A Declaration of Conscience about the Arms Race" to make these points (1983:29-31):

We believe that total war between the superpowers cannot be morally justified.

We believe that the present arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is dangerously unpredictable with respect to human survival and intolerably expensive with respect to human needs. It must, in God's name, be stopped.

Though it is only part of the solution to the dangers of world-threatening warfare, we believe that the United States and the Soviet Union should give bilateral nuclear disarmament the highest possible priority and pursue it with the vigor and persistence appropriate to a matter that may determine the future of human civilization.

We believe that the United States should also pursue aims beyond military deterrence and thus encourage fundamental change in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

From the Jewish perspective the Union of American Hebrew Congregations has probed both halacha (Jewish law) and aggada (legend) for guidance and has indicated (1983:8-13):

Although the normative tradition is not a pacifist tradition, then, we are committed to rofei shalom, pursuers of peace.

To this end the halachi tradition developed five regulations on war:

First, we are mandated never to allow force to become an end in itself. It must be used as a means of achieving peace.

Second, before a battle was launched, an opportunity had to be given in the clearest terms for the opposing side to choose peace.

Third, there was a special concern for the lives of the noncombatants. An opportunity for escape must be provided.

Fourth, the war could not be waged in such a manner as to destroy God's creation (i.e., the Earth and its capability to sustain life).

Fifth, before every battle, the "Priest Anointed for Battle" had to read the soldiers the rules and regulations on war (the Jewish equivalent to the Geneva Convention).

Applying these rules to nuclear war leads to this conclusion:

Clearly the speed with which a nuclear war could happen, the distances over which it is fought and the virtual absence of opportunity to use human judgments to regulate the war once missiles are launched mitigate against the ability of any nation to fight a "human" nuclear war. From this brief view of the halachi stipulations on war, it is evident that nuclear war would violate almost every rule and regulation and would therefore be impermissible.

Moral and Ethical Teachings

Basic morality -- that is, standards of what is right and wrong -- throws its weight against the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons. These standards of right conduct can be derived from religious faith, as we have already reviewed. Or they can be formulated by reason and pragmatic study of the best and most workable relationships of human beings with one another.

The essence of moral instruction is summarized in what is known as the Golden Rule. Here are some sample formulations by philosophers and religious teachers in ancient times (Copeland, 1942:180):

What you do not want others to do to you, do not to others.

(Confucius, c. 500 B.C.)

Do not do to others what would anger you if done to you by others.

(Isocrates, c. 375, B.C.)

What you yourself hate, do to no man (Tobit IV, c. 180 B.C.)

This is the sum of all true righteousness: deal with others as you

would yourself be dealt by. Do nothing to your neighbor which you

would not have him do to you hereafter. (The Mahabharata, c. 150 B.C.)

Whatsoever you would that men should not do to you, do not do that to

them. This is the whole law. The rest is only explanation. (Hillel Ha-Babli, c. 30 B.C.)

So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this

is the law and the prophets (Jesus, c. 30 A.D.)

In the eighteenth century the German philosopher Immanuel Kant formulated

what he called the "categorical imperative," stated as:

Act only on that principle which you can will to be universal law.

He also offered another formula:

So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in another, always as an end, and never as a means.

Take your pick of these and apply them to nuclear weapons:

Treat your adversaries as human beings with worth and dignity, just as you want them to treat you.

If you wish your adversary to refrain from attacking you with nuclear weapons, don't attack him. If you wish other nations to put away their nuclear weapons and not threaten you, do likewise for them.

Act to rid the world of these weapons of massive destruction so that this can become the universal practice.

The moral perspective condemning nuclear deterrence and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction has never been expressed more plainly and bluntly than a 1973 statement of Fred Charles Ikle (who was then a civilian defense analyst and later served for seven years as an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration) (1973:280-281):

Our arms control experts and military planners insulate themselves from the potential implications of their labors by layers of dehumanizing abstractions and bland metaphors. Thus, "assured destruction" fails to indicate what is to be destroyed: but then "assured genocide" would reveal the truth too starkly.

Continuing, Ikle explained:

The jargon of American strategic analysis works like a narcotic. It dulls our sense of moral outrage about the tragic confrontation of nuclear arsenals, primed and constantly perfected to unleash widespread genocide. It fosters the current smug complacency regarding the soundness and stability of mutual deterrence. It blinds us to the fact that our method for preventing nuclear war rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages -- the mass killing of hostages.

Another expression of this moral concern came from the FREEZE/SANE Commission, which in proposing merger of these two peace organizations, produced a Credo containing these words (1986:14):

We believe that the greatest threat facing humanity is the danger of nuclear war. This danger comes from a war system which squanders vast economic resources on military preparations rather than meeting human needs and which leads to constant military intervention abroad.

The people of the United States and the world have a right to live free from the threat of nuclear annihilation. We reject as immoral and an ultimate violation of our right to security the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Our children have a right to grow up free from the problems and fears imposed by massive military spending and the threat of nuclear war.

As human beings and as a nation we must chart a new course toward

peace. We must use our best instincts, our talents, our resources and our commitment to freedom and democracy in the service of what is genuinely our national interest -- international peace and justice.

....

Our overriding objective must be to replace the existing war system with a peace system based on an end to the arms race, peaceful international relations and non-violent conflict resolution.

### The Greater Evil

In spite of religious and moral condemnation of nuclear weapons, some persons insist that, though nuclear weapons are indeed instruments of massive destruction, having them deters our enemy from attacking us with their nuclear weapons, and even with conventional forces. There might even be circumstances, so the proponents argue, when nuclear weapons will have to be used: to ward off aggression, to defend freedom. Even at the risk of ourselves being attacked by nuclear weapons. Or to retaliate an enemy nuclear attack against us. Even at the risk of escalation to an all-out nuclear war. In such cases, using nuclear weapons would be the lesser evil. "Better dead than Red" is how one slogan phrases it.

They are wrong. Nuclear weapons are the greater evil. In every conceivable circumstance the use of nuclear weapons with their massive destructive power and their widespread, long-lasting effects would itself be a greater evil than the evil they are meant to oppose.

This conclusion is reached when one draws upon "just war" criteria



of proportionality and discrimination (or immunity of the innocent) that comes out of one strain of Christian theology. In nuclear war the damage inflicted would be vastly disproportional to the evil being opposed and would cause indiscriminate harm to noncombatants, even in distant lands, and to the Earth's environment.

U.S. military and political leaders have come to the same conclusion as a practical matter in a variety of circumstances during the past forty years. In certain situations, especially the Korean and Vietnam wars, they considered the use of nuclear weapons but in the end decided that the military result either could be achieved in other ways or wasn't worth the political cost. The latter was an important consideration, for we are engaged in a struggle for the minds of men and women at least as much as territory. In a world with a non-white majority, the United States could not politically afford to carry the stigma of attacking only Asians with these awesome weapons. The same military and political reasons persuaded France in 1954 to refuse a U.S. offer to provide several nuclear bombs when the French were losing their war in Indochina. (We'll examine these and other cases in greater depth in Chapter 7).

Thus in these circumstances at least, decision-makers perceived that use of nuclear weapons would be the greater evil. A greater evil than defeat, as both France and the United States experienced in Vietnam.

The same judgment can be rendered in other situations. Such as defending a city experiencing foreign occupation (as when Prague, Czechoslovakia was occupied by Russian, Polish, East German, and Hungarian forces in 1968), for a nuclear attack against the occupying forces would destroy what you are trying to preserve. Such as defending West Germany from invasion by Warsaw Pact forces, where a million or more Germans

would die (the ones you are trying to save) and the soil would be poisoned for decades thereafter. Such as resisting Soviet adventurism in the Third World, especially their use of military surrogates, where guerrilla warriors and mobile bases are scarcely assailable even by conventional weapons. Such as dealing with terrorists and hostage takers. In all of these situations, using nuclear weapons would be the greater evil because of their impracticality, disproportionate destruction, and harmful effects on civilians.

And so also would be an all-out nuclear war that would destroy the Soviet Union, the United States, and all of Europe and would cause unspeakable harm throughout the globe through drifting fallout, possibly risking the end of human life on Earth. Thus, in every conceivable circumstance nuclear war is the greater evil.

In addition to these very practical reasons which make nuclear war the greater evil, there are superior ways to resist tyrannical aggressors and to block the spread of communism.

The political struggle between soviet communism and western democracy is ideological at its core. And as George Kennan wisely explained three decades ago (1958:55):

The true end of political action is, after all, to affect the deeper convictions of men: this the atomic bomb cannot do. The suicidal nature of this weapon renders it unsuitable both as a sanction of diplomacy and as the basis of an alliance.

Furthermore, we can never win and sustain the support and loyalties of the people of other nations by brandishing nuclear weapons.

Nor are these weapons of any use in internal struggles for political power within Third World nations. In this contest economic aid, technical assistance, support for human rights, and selective use of economic sanctions are the key tools. Even for those favoring military aid, nuclear weapons are not practical devices to supply, nor worth the risk of misuse.

Superpower competition also occurs between two types of economic systems. Economic results will determine the winner of this contest. Possession of nuclear weapons can have only negative effects by draining away economic resources.

Finally, if the Soviet Union should ever invade any of our allies, there are numerous other tools far superior for defense than nuclear weapons. They start with diplomatic measures to assure harmonious relationships so that invasion will not be contemplated. They include conventional military defenses of national borders and plans for civilian-based resistance to let the potential invader know that the nation cannot be subdued. (More on this in Chapter 9).

In sum, the "better dead than Red" mental outlook poses a false duality. Not only is the use of nuclear weapons the greater evil but also the willingness to resort to nuclear war ignores superior ways to resist the evils of tyranny and suppression that we all want to oppose.

For all of these reasons -- religious, moral, practical -- the possession of nuclear weapons is wrong. Also, their threatened use as deterrence. Their actual use would be gravely wrong, for that would constitute the greatest evil.

The right course is the elimination of all nuclear weapons. As soon as possible. By all nations throughout the world.

### 3. BASIC SELF-INTEREST

As we live by ideals, so also we must be practical. Significantly, as idealism determines that possession of nuclear weapons is morally wrong, so also practicality provides ample reasons for their elimination. Of the pragmatic reasons, most prominent is the realization that basic self-interest demands it. Self-interest of Americans, Russians, of all peoples of Earth.

Homeland Security

Of all the matters of self-interest, a concern for homeland security rates top billing: assurance that one's homeland is secure from invasion and occupation by a foreign power, or from destruction even without occupation.

Once upon a time for the United States vast oceanic expanse to the east and west and friendly neighbors to the north and south provided sufficient homeland security. Today we remain safe from invasion, but since 1955 we have been vulnerable to nuclear attack by long-range Soviet bombers. This danger increased in 1957 when the Soviets successfully launched their first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of carrying nuclear warheads to U.S. targets. Thirty years later the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile has further eroded our homeland security.

Even so, the United States today still experiences no threat of invasion by land, sea, or air -- not by the Soviets or any other force. We have no legitimate fear of occupation by any foreign power. Nuclear attack on cities and military installations and radioactive fallout are the only threats to U.S. security at home. Accordingly, our self-interest overwhelmingly favors elimination of this danger.

The Russian people, located as they are in the heart of the Eurasian land mass, have been far less secure historically than the American people. For centuries they have suffered invasions from east and west, and themselves have invaded and spread their empire. This combination of fear and imperial ambition caused Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin to erect a buffer of satellite states in Eastern Europe after the end of World War II in order to block yet another land invasion from the west. Whether this is really necessary for Soviet security interests is debatable. But what is indisputable is that the buffer states offer the Soviets absolutely no protection from nuclear missiles launched in Western Europe -- or from North America, China, and the oceans. Thus, the greatest threat to the Soviet homeland is nuclear missile attack, not land invasion. Soviet self-interest clearly calls for eliminating this possibility.

The homelands of U.S. and Soviet allies in Europe -- nations belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact -- have similar insecurity from nuclear attack. This is compounded by a fear of land invasion. In Central Europe where the two superpowers and their allies have amassed the largest accumulation of military force in the world today, nuclear and conventional forces are inextricably intertwined. It is this combination that makes European homelands gravely insecure.

Yet, neither side -- NATO or the Warsaw Pact -- has any self-interest in invading the other: NATO forces moving into Eastern Europe and beyond to the Soviet Union; or Soviet forces, joined by troops from other Warsaw Pact members, moving into West Germany and beyond to the Atlantic Ocean.

Certainly the United States has no compelling national interest to invade and occupy the Soviet Union. Nor the capability. Neither does any of our West European allies, nor NATO as a whole. None at all. We may not like the Soviet form of government, its economic system, or the way its leadership acts. We haven't throughout the 70 years since the Communist revolution. But there is remarkably little we can do about it directly from the outside, and no possibility that

we could change their system through force.

Likewise for the governments of Eastern Europe. We had an opportunity to make an attempt at the time of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 (when we had overwhelming nuclear superiority) and decided that direct intervention was imprudent. Likewise when the Soviets suppressed a reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968, we chose not to get involved. In 1975 in the Helsinki Accords we accepted the post-World War II boundaries of Eastern and Central Europe. We affirmed these boundaries in the Stockholm Final Document of 1986. Although some American politicians may feel called to advocate the rollback of communism in Eastern Europe, the United States and our NATO allies lack the capability of doing so by any direct means.

Furthermore, as Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard University (a "hawkish" adviser to President Reagan during his first term) has observed (1986:

186):

There is nothing that countries of the Soviet Bloc possess that could conceivably tempt the Western alliance to commit aggression against them: neither national resources (these can be gotten cheaper elsewhere), nor industrial and other forms of man-made wealth (poor and primitive by Western standards), nor markets for their goods (insignificant for lack of hard currency). It would produce an economic disaster of the first magnitude were the West to conquer the Eastern Bloc and assume responsibility for administering and feeding the area.

Neither does Soviet national interest encompass invasion and occupation of Western Europe. First, they couldn't be sure that they would be victorious. (Note, for example, the failure of the Red Army to subdue Afghan resistance forces in more than eight years of warfare). Second, there would be risk of escalation to World War III, which would cause enormous destruction to the Soviet homeland. Third, the Soviets seem to lack confidence in the reliability of the military forces drawn from their Warsaw Pact allies, and their supply lines would stretch through their satellites and be vulnerable to sabotage. Finally, if they prevailed, they would occupy a devastated land, even if no nuclear weapons were used (look at World War II pictures to get an idea, and today's conventional weapons are even more destructive.) They would have to govern a hostile population, which would undoubtedly wage a prolonged underground resistance.

The Soviet Union also signed the Helsinki boundary agreement. With the decline of Communist parties in the West (and some of the remaining ones hostile to Moscow), the Soviets must realize that their dream of altering the governments of Western Europe is as illusory as ours regarding Eastern Europe. Furthermore, as Admiral Gene LaRocque (U.S. Navy, retired), head of the Center for Defense Information, has pointed out(1983.4), there is

the positive value the West holds for the Soviets. The Soviets have consistently sought economic relations with the West which would bring desperately needed goods and services to the Soviet Union. They need our grain. They need our technology. They need our trade.

Therefore, self-interest in European disarmament -- both nuclear and conventional -- is doubly reinforced. Both sides want their homelands secure from attack. Neither side has any self-interest in attacking the other. Here are the conditions for a solid political settlement, if only we could get past dogmatic ideology, hostile rhetoric, and mindless allegiance to obsolete military doctrines.

## Economic Benefits

The economic self-interest of the United States and the Soviet Union, and other nations, too, calls for the end of the arms race -- conventional as well as nuclear.

The current annual military budget of the United States is \$ \_\_\_ billion, which amounts to \_\_\_ percent of its gross national product. (Gross national product, or GNP, is "the economy's total output of goods and services valued at current market prices paid by the ultimate consumer.") The current annual military budget of the Soviet Union, converted to U.S. dollars, is \$ \_\_\_ billion, \_\_\_ percent of its gross national product. The United States, with a population of \_\_\_ million, spends \$ \_\_\_ per capita on the military. The Soviet Union, with \_\_\_ million people, spends \$ \_\_\_ per capita. [Current data to be added.]

Both nations are willing to spend whatever they consider necessary to achieve national security, but both would be better off to spend this money for other purposes. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated during the third month of his presidency (1953: \_\_\_):

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, and the hopes of its children.

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

The truth of Eisenhower's statement is shown by a few comparisons of spending patterns in the United States:

[Updated information comparing the cost of major weapon systems, such as one Trident submarine, one MX missile, etc. with various domestic services, such as health care, child welfare, food stamps, etc.]

Undoubtedly similar data would show how Soviet military expenditures are depriving social needs within the Soviet Union.

High military expenditures are also a drain on overall economic productivity. This occurs because a considerable portion of military production does not recycle into other economic activities. For example, whereas a tank is used for training purposes or placed in position for future battle but does nothing else, a tractor pulls farm equipment to produce food. Civilian trucks have numerous business uses and create jobs in selling and servicing the trucks. Military aircraft consume fuel but have slight economic utility while private aircraft contribute to commerce. Guns use up ammunition, missiles consume fuel in test flights, but otherwise they are stored and produce no further economic activity. The personnel sitting around in the missile silos and at bomber bases are lost for economic activity. These and many other military expenditures are economic deadends whereas civilian expenditures cause a flow of activities that create jobs and in other ways contribute to a dynamic economy.

The arms race squanders talent, especially some of the best scientific and engineering brains. Much of the military technology is not readily transferable to the civilian sector, and what is transferred could be developed much cheaper if accomplished directly. One of the ironies of the post-World War II era is that the defeated powers, Japan and Germany, forced by the victors to curtail military operations, have been able to devote a much greater portion of their technological talent to new civilian products and have surpassed the United States in a number of technologies. Japan especially, but also West Germany, approach world trade through economic strategic planning while the United States and the Soviet Union concentrate more on military strategic

planning. In this manner, Japan and Germany have both achieved far more benefits for their people through worldwide economic activities than they ever did through military conquest.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union struggles with failing economic enterprises and low productivity while the United States battles budget and trade deficits and lagging productivity. Both superpowers would gain substantial economic benefits if they could get out of economically wasteful military competition.

#### Interests Favoring Nuclear Arms

You might ask: if self-interest in achieving homeland security and in obtaining broad economic benefits through nuclear disarmament is so strong, why then have we had the nuclear arms race? Surely it can't be merely a misunderstanding of what our true interest is.

Well, yes, it is partly a product of false reasoning. But it also results from other sets of interests, some quite broad, others narrow, which have favored the development and deployment of nuclear weapons.

In the broad sweep of events, competing imperial ambitions of the two superpowers has been the driving force in sustaining the arms race, reinforced by ideological passion. This has manifested itself in the formation of alliances (NATO, Warsaw Pact, and others), in support for opposite sides in civil wars (Korea, Vietnam, African nations), in support of revolutionaries, counterrevolutionaries, and established governments in the Third World, in military combat one or two steps removed from direct confrontation, in rhetoric hostility and continuous ideological contention. These clashes of two competing empires are backed by strong political forces and economic interests within the respective nations and by historical forces centuries old.

Likely this superpower rivalry will continue for another twenty to forty years, for it has considerable momentum, almost a life of its own. But this should not prevent the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. As we'll explore in greater depth in Chapter 7, nuclear weapons have no military utility in any Third World situation where the two superpowers are in conflict -- such as has occurred during the 1980s in Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan. Nor do they have any deterrent capacity to prevent a superpower from backing one particular party in these kinds of internal disputes. We have previously mentioned their disutility in Europe. If we have to have imperial rivalry between the two superpowers, let it occur without nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to each other's homeland (but we'd both be better off by eliminating conventional military rivalry, too).

But if nuclear disarmament is to happen, sets of special interests favoring nuclear weapons will have to be overcome. They exist within both nations, including:

- o scientists and engineers who, by developing new weapon systems, achieve intellectual satisfaction -- and in the United States economic gain, in the Soviet Union special privileges;

- o U.S. corporations, their managers, employees, and stockholders, who receive economic livelihood from the nuclear arms race;
- o managers and employees of Soviet production facilities who do likewise;
- o localities in both nations whose economic base is heavily dependent upon military production and defense installations;
- o generals, admirals, the rest of the officer corps, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees of the defense establishment whose careers are based upon continued superpower military rivalry;
- o politicians and party leaders who have made careers of vigorously

- o opposing the enemy and promoting defense projects;
- o ideologists whose anti-Communist or anti-American fervor has gained them public attention and followers.

This is a formidable array of special interests imbedded deeply within the economic and political systems of the two superpowers. They are highly motivated to continue the nuclear arms race. But they can and must be overcome if the transcending general interest of both nations in nuclear disarmament is to be fulfilled. Truly the ultimate self-interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union requires the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This makes nuclear abolition practicable and achievable.



#### 4. Patriotism and True Strength

Patriotism -- the love of one's country -- also calls for elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

This may seem like a strange claim, for to a considerable extent the U.S. military buildup has occurred in the name of patriotism (as has the Soviet's). But must patriotism always be equated with militarism? Does one have to be jingoistic, that is, be an adherent of chauvinistic nationalism, to be patriotic? Love of one's country, the essence of patriotism, is desirable, but it doesn't have to encompass hatred of other nations.

For citizens of the United States the pledge of allegiance in its deepest meaning expresses this kind of genuine love of country without threatening harm to other nations. Reflect on the words.

"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America"

The key words are "United States," etched deeply in a historic quest to balance diversity and unity. The struggle of newly independent colonies to achieve a unified national government while maintaining significant roles for the states. The choice of "E pluribus unum" for the national motto, that is, "out of many, one." The decades-long agony over whether one nation could be half-slave, half-free, and the wrenching, bloody Civil War. The challenge continuing to this day to sustain a federal system which, as James Madison described in *The Federalist*, combines national and state government, and in our day local government, too, which "are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes" (n.d.:304-5).

From this proud though painful heritage we have much to offer the peoples of the globe, who are even more diverse. Our practical experience of "E pluribus unum" is a much more valuable resource to other nations, separately and together, than technical knowledge of how to manufacture nuclear bombs and how to launch devices to conduct war in space.

"and to the Republic for which it stands"

A republic is a representative form of government, which derives its just power from the consent of the governed. This phrase and others like it from the Declaration of Independence are the most effective instruments we have in the competition for the minds of men and women throughout the world. And also our example of democracy in action: political campaigns, elections, public hearings, lobbying, petitions, protest, and dozens of other methods of citizen participation. That is the kind of republic the peoples of the world want, not the military dictatorships with which we have sometimes become wrongly associated in our desire to take any ally in the struggle against Communism. Unnecessarily so.

"one nation"

In the turmoil of democracy we continuously search for common causes, we seek the broad public interest and try to curb the excesses of special interests. Just as we strive to be a unified nation so also all the peoples of Earth should strive to be one world in spirit (a goal that doesn't require a single world government). We in the United States can and should contribute our wisdom and support for this quest.

"under God"

This is the Eternal God, the Loving Force of the Universe that binds us all together in unity. Not only the diverse people of the United States but also all other peoples, all of humankind. In contrast, war separates people and destroys God's creation.

"indivisible"

Again the search for unity. The quest for a sense of community, which need not be

restricted to the boundaries of a single nation.

"with liberty"

Freedom as the foundation of democracy. A concern for our own freedom and also the freedom of persons living elsewhere. Furthermore, the need for wisdom in how to promote freedom abroad, including avoidance of placing other nations under a nuclear siege, which their rulers can use as an excuse to suppress freedom. And care not to undermine liberty at home through an obsessive concern for conformity in the name of national security.

"and justice"

This is legal justice, social justice, and economic justice. Here we must recognize that an economy distorted by excessive military spending takes money away from the poor and the oppressed. Also, a concern for justice requires the use of just means in dealing with our own citizens and with other nations. And clearly nuclear weapons can never be considered just.

"for all"

This means equal rights for everyone living within the republic. By extension we want the benefits of liberty and justice to be available to all peoples. Military attack, or the threat of attack, is not the way to promote liberty and justice. Rather this requires educational and political means.

Then, cannot we all pledge allegiance to the United States committed to these objectives and to the use of just means? Is not this true patriotism, rather than the jingoistic version?

Yes, why can't we have patriotism as envisioned in the words of "America, the Beautiful"? Let patriots love the spacious skies, the amber waves of grain, the purple mountain majesties, the fruited plain. Let patriots strive to create brotherhood (and sisterhood) from sea to shining sea, to work for alabaster cities gleaming undimmed by human tears. And let us realize that we can also rejoice in other nations' spacious skies and grieve when their fruited plains suffer from drought. Let all patriots realize that we need God's grace and God's guidance to mend our flaws, to confirm our souls in self-control, our liberty in law. That is true patriotism.

To those who preach patriotism based on "peace through strength" and who advocate an awesome nuclear arsenal as the means, let us ask: what is true strength in the long-range perspective, transcending even nations? Who was stronger, Martin Luther King, Jr. and his unarmed followers or Sheriff "Bull" Connor with his police dogs, and other suppressors of black freedom? Who was stronger, Mahatma Gandhi or the British Raj? Who was ultimately stronger, Adolf Hitler or Pastor Martin Niemoeller whom he imprisoned, Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer whom he executed, and other resisters of Nazism? Who was stronger, the baby Jesus lying in a manger or King Herod, who out of fear and jealousy had all the baby boys in Bethlehem murdered? Who was stronger, Jesus on the cross praying, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" or Pontius Pilate, wielder of Roman power, who, frightened by his wife's dream, washed his hands of the death of him whose execution he ordered?

What is true strength to go with true patriotism? True strength is commitment to freedom, democracy, justice, individual opportunity, and social responsibility, to just means for achieving these ends. In a strange irony, reliance upon nuclear weapons represents weakness rather than strength, a reliance unnecessary for any self-confident nation that has a clear understanding of means and ends. Because the end is contained in the means, as is the oak tree in the acorn, true peace (compared to a fearful absence of war) and justice cannot be achieved by the use or threat of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the wise and patriotic course is to abolish them.

## 5. CLASH OF IDEOLOGY AND EMPIRE

"You make it sound so easy," some readers might observe, "the case you make for global nuclear disarmament: the rightness of the cause, true self-interest, patriotism. Yet, your arguments appear to be too simple, indeed simplistic. If it's all that clear, why have we had the nuclear arms race? Why is nuclear disarmament so difficult to achieve?"

Because, I must answer, deep underlying currents of US/Soviet rivalry, combined with continual surface disturbances, inhibit the search for the mutually beneficial goal of nuclear disarmament. This rivalry is characterized by a clash of ideologies and a clash of empires. The two sources of conflict are intermeshed.

Accordingly, to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament requires lowering the emotional level of ideological contention and finding ways to achieve mutual respect for one another, even as we continue to champion different economic and political systems. It also requires foreign policy changes on both sides and the resolution of some difficult political issues that have been on the world agenda for decades. These actions will not be easy to accomplish, but they must be taken simultaneously with the quest for nuclear disarmament.

### Ideological Differences

Ideological fervor has fueled the rivalry. Emotions have run high, spurred on each side by a conviction that "we" possess the truth and a perception that "they" are pursuing an erroneous and ill-begotten course.

Dominant opinion in the United States for many years has perceived the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime that represses human liberty, a communist economy dominated by state bureaucracies that suppress individual initiative, and a philosophy of atheism. We see ourselves as the champion of liberty, dedicated to free economic enterprise, and worshipful of God, though

with freedom of religious expression.

In contrast, the Soviets seem to perceive the United States as the embodiment of the capitalist system that exploits workers to benefit the wealthy, callously allows people to be homeless and hungry, and treats racial minorities as second-class citizens. They see their own system as using the power of the state to assure employment, housing, health care, and other necessary services to all.

Objectively each nation has practices that confirm the other's claim: for example, restrictions on individual liberty within the Soviet Union and racial inequality and persistence of poverty in the United States. But subjectively we heighten these conditions to confirm predetermined ideological opinions.

We in the United States have read the writings of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin, who have asserted that workers have the right and duty to overthrow existing economic and political arrangements in order to set up a one-party state, dominated by the proletariat, to own all property for the benefit of all. We have heard four generations of Soviet leaders proclaim the inevitability of worldwide communism. And we have seen numerous actions that seem to confirm their intent to turn rhetoric into reality.

Over the years the Soviets have likewise observed the United States using military power and coercive political acts to protect and expand the economic interests of capitalists. They have paid attention not so much to our ideals of life, liberty, and self-government as expressed in the Declaration of Independence but rather to economic philosophers who insist that the quest for economic gain should be the underlying force to drive a market-oriented economy. They have noticed that this school of economists has little concern for the suffering of those who fall by the wayside in what Soviets would call the "brutal competition" of capitalism.

This has been the predominant tone of ideological rhetoric for 70 years. Some softening has occurred in recent months as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has advocated greater glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), including "democratization," within Soviet society. But as welcome as such changes are, there remain significant differences in the basic ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, over the years, and still today, each side has tended to exaggerate, to caricature the other's ideology, to deny positive accomplishments, to play down one's own shortcomings. This imbalance of judgment is rooted in a strong assurance that one's own way is the true way. This easily leads to intolerant self-righteousness. This tendency is reinforced, and perhaps caused, by the clash of two empires competing in their quest for power and influence around the globe.

### Empires in Contention

"Empire?" many Americans might ask. "Maybe they're an empire, but we're not." The reason for this response is that the concept of "empire" often carries a negative connotation.

But let's put values aside for a moment and be descriptive. Let us think of an empire as a nation-state controlling or dominating extensive territory inhabited by diverse people. This might be contiguous territory, acquired by expansion from a small, original core (such as when Prussia expanded to create a unified Germany and then Hitler's Third Reich conquered further territory). It might be scattered lands (as the former British empire was). Control over new imperial territory can be exercised by complete incorporation (as Imperial Russia did), by colonial administration (the Roman Empire, the British), or through subjugated, puppet governments (the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe). Domination of ostensibly independent nations can be achieved by providing military protection, economic support, and military and technical assistance. and on occasion reinforced by direct military intervention (the approach of the United States).

By this definition both the United States and the Soviet Union are continental empires with worldwide outreach.

Historically the United States and the Soviet predecessor, Imperial Russia, grew through transcontinental expansion. Russia relied heavily upon military conquest of already occupied territory in Europe and in West Central Asia and then moved eastward across mostly uninhabited Siberia to the Pacific. The United States of America, established by former British colonies, expanded through sparsely settled land westward to the Pacific. This was accomplished by picking up and purchasing land claims of other empires (British, French, Spanish, Mexican), displacement of earlier inhabitants (American Indians), annexation of land already occupied by American settlers (Texas, Pacific Northwest), and military conquest (taking much of the West from Mexico).

After its establishment in 1919 the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics took over Imperial Russia's territory, lost and regained land during the next four years, lost East European territory at the beginning of World War II and regained it, and even more, at the end of the war. At the 1945 Yalta conference Joseph Stalin gained recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent state, though in practice it functions as a Soviet satellite. He proceeded to set up another half-dozen satellites in Eastern Europe during the next three years. In this period Stalin tried to assert Soviet dominance over other communist states -- Albania, Yugoslavia, and China -- without much success. The Kremlin was also unsuccessful in helping Communist parties in Western Europe come to power through the ballot.

After Stalin's death in 1953 his successors sought to expand the Soviet empire around the globe by supporting revolutionary movements in various countries, particularly in Third World nations emerging from European colonialism, and also by making allies of independent socialist

regimes (such as Cuba). The Soviet Union has supplied arms, trained revolutionaries, instructed newly installed governmental officials, provided economic assistance, and furnished technical assistance in many parts of the Third World, but the Soviets have not sent their own combat troops to these far-flung nations. In Europe the Soviet Union set up the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955 in conjunction with its East European satellites. Soviet armed forces put down revolts and reform movements in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to assure regimes responsive to Soviet interests. So, the Soviet Union has used a variety of imperial techniques to control diverse territories.

The United States, after completing its transcontinental expansion, acquired its first non-contiguous territory in 1867 with the purchase of Alaska from Russia, then in 1899 annexed Hawaii where American settlers a few years earlier had overthrown the native monarchy, and in the same year, after defeating Spain, took control of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. However, later the Philippines gained political independence, and Puerto Rico became a self-governing commonwealth in union with the United States. After World War II the United States established a strategic trusteeship over South Pacific islands previously conquered by Japan, but in recent years the U.S. has been seeking to establish four separate political entities there, though with strong ties to the United States remaining.

Otherwise the United States has not attempted to gain overseas territory to rule directly. Rather the U.S. has sought power and influence, especially in Latin America (but in other parts of the globe, too) through economic ties, technical assistance, military support for friendly regimes, here and there covert support for groups trying to overthrow "unfriendly" governments, and sometimes direct military intervention. For instance, on 39 occasions from 1898 to present the

United States has sent military forces into 12 different nations in Central America and the Caribbean region, mostly to protect economic interests of U.S. businesses, though in the last 25 years to oppose communist regimes. Elsewhere the United States has created military alliances (such as NATO in Western Europe), provided military arms and equipment to numerous nations, based its own troops and planes around the globe, and fought in two civil wars (Korea and Vietnam).

Many Americans insist that our motives have been honorable. Others dispute it, if not in all instances at least in some cases where intervention served narrow special interests rather than a broader public interest. We need not settle this debate to acknowledge that many U.S. actions of the last 90 years (beginning with the Spanish-American War) have the characteristics of empire, whether good, bad, or benign.

For nearly half that period we have seen the other global empire -- the Soviet Union -- seeking to expand its power and influence. As we'll examine more fully in the next chapter, resistance to Soviet expansion has been the most significant driving force of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II. Thus, we provided military assistance to Turkey and Greece in the late 1940s, furnished massive economic assistance to Western Europe in the same period through the Marshall Plan, joined with West European nations and Canada to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), stood up for the free status of West Berlin on several occasions, went to the defense of South Korea, forced Soviet missiles out of Cuba, and in many other ways tried to block Soviet expansion. It has been an intense and continuous rivalry between two huge empires.

The enormous growth of the world's nuclear arsenal has occurred within the context of this US/Soviet imperial rivalry. If we are to shrink and eventually eliminate the supply of nuclear



weapons, we must calm and contain this competition. As we do so, it seems quite unlikely that we will be able to achieve agreement on the best kind of political and economic system to have. So the ideological contest for the minds of men and women will continue for the foreseeable future. Nor are we likely to eliminate completely the competition for allegiance of various nation-states to one bloc or the other. But at least we should try hard to restrict the rivalry to nonlethal competition, to elevate the quest for mutual security and common interests.

## 6. COLD WAR IN TWO MODES

For a period during World War II the United States and the Soviet Union mostly put aside their ideological and imperial rivalry as they joined together to defeat Nazi Germany. But even before the war was over the two powers (along with Great Britain) began maneuvering for favorable position and advantage in the postwar world. Within two years after V.E. Day -- Victory in Europe, May 8, 1945 -- the wartime alliance was badly tattered as the Soviet Union and the United States began engaging in rancorous disputes on a wide range of issues. Soon this conflict acquired the designation of Cold War, a term previously used in the 1930s to describe German efforts to gain territory through intimidation without fighting. In the case of US/Soviet rivalry the Cold War consisted of continual, acrimonious challenge and response in numerous locations around the globe.

Forty years later we can look back and observe that this Cold War has occurred in two principal modes, interconnected but each with its own set of dynamics.

Cold War I, as I shall call the first mode, has featured Soviet attempts of peripheral expansion and U.S. efforts of containment. This prolonged engagement has taken place mainly in Europe, and by extension, in the North Atlantic, North America, and North Pacific. A bit of Cold War I has also reached the Soviet border areas in Southwest Asia. In the 1950s China was involved but is now "in between" the two superpowers. Essentially it is East-West conflict taking place in the Northern Hemisphere. The two sides have deployed an enormous military force, including most of the world's nuclear arsenal, but they have not engaged in armed combat against one another.

The second mode, Cold War II, has consisted of the quest for power by

Communist-related movements outside Europe, frequently related to the Soviet Union, and U.S. resistance; also, U.S.-initiated drives for power and influence in Third World nations and resistance by forces allied with Moscow. Much of this has occurred in lands emerging from colonial rule previously imposed by the Japanese (Korea), Dutch (Indonesia), French (Indochina, in Africa), British (Asia, Africa) Portuguese (Africa), plus former German and Italian colonies (in Africa). But Cold War II has also taken place in Central and South America and the Caribbean area, under the shadow of U.S. dominance.

Essentially a Third World phenomenon, Cold War II has featured intrigue, open and covert support of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces, propping up or seeking to topple existing regimes, economic and military aid, sometimes military intervention directly or through surrogates. On many occasions it has become a hot war, though never with U.S. and Soviet combat forces arrayed against one another. All of the battles fought by U.S.-and Soviet-backed forces in the Third World have used conventional, not nuclear, weapons. Indeed, very few nuclear weapons have been deployed in Third World situations, and nuclear deterrence has been essentially irrelevant (as we'll discuss more fully in the next chapter).

Although not every event in U.S./Soviet relations of the past forty years can be neatly assigned to one of these two modes of the Cold War, it is a useful division to help us understand the role of nuclear weapons in this relationship and thereby can help us figure out how to eliminate them.

### Historical Setting

If we want to end the Cold War, which we must do if we want to achieve global nuclear disarmament and other peace objectives, we need to understand how it began and the historical context in which it arose. We need to comprehend the nature of the Cold War in its formative

period and the dynamics of its early years. By looking back in this manner, we can discover that the foreign and military policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union are driven by doctrines that may have been relevant in the late 1940s -- from the viewpoints of national leadership at that time -- but have little relevance for the 1990s.

To help our understanding we should consider the historical perspective of national leaders governed at the beginning of the Cold War. Starting with the Soviet Union, let us -- at the risk of oversimplification -- list some major events in Russia and the Soviet Union during the lifetime of Joseph Stalin (born 1879) up to the middle of World War II.

- 1890s -- Growth of revolutionary movements (Marxists and others ) to overthrow the tsarist government. V.I. Lenin (b. 1870) began his career as a revolutionary organizer in 1891, Stalin in 1898.
- 1905 -- Japan defeats Russia in Far East; an aborted revolution in Russia.
- 1914 -- World War I begins; under Triple Entente, Russia joins Great Britain and France against Germany; early Russian success on the Eastern front, but then defeat and retreat.
- 1917 -- February Revolution against tsar and formation of a provisional government by moderates.  
Lenin returns from exile in Switzerland; Stalin from exile in Siberia; both had spent most of the previous fifteen years exiled from Russia. including imprisonment for Stalin.  
October Revolution as the Bolsheviks (the more radical segment the Communist Party) seize power.
- 1917-18 -- Finland and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania declare independence from Russia.
- 1918 -- In March new Soviet government withdraws from World War I, cedes

- vast territory to Germany.
- Beginning of nationalization of industries.
- In November Germany defeated and signs armistice with Allied Powers.
- 1918-20 -- Civil war in Russia: Red Army versus White Army. Western Allies and Japan side with Whites, send troops (including U.S. soldiers) into Russia, but Red Army prevails.
- 1919 -- Peace treaties create new nations in Eastern Europe. From old Austro-Hungarian Empire: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary; Yugoslavia (combined with Serbia); Romania doubled in size. A new Poland (last independent in 1795) out of territory held by Austria, Germany, and Russia.
- 1921-22 -- In Russia drought, failure of grain crop, starvation, food relief from West, including from United States, administered by Herbert Hoover.
- 1921 -- Lenin's New Economic Policy with more opportunities for private enterprise.
- 1924 -- Lenin dies. In next three years Stalin consolidates power as successor.
- 1928-32 -- First Five Year Plan for Soviet economy, emphasizing industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, end of free enterprise. Increase in industrial jobs; displacement of kulaks (independent farmers) and peasants; forced labor; food shortages; millions of deaths by starvation and exile.
- 1933 -- Hitler comes to power in Germany.  
United States re-establishes diplomatic relations with USSR (broken off in 1917).
- 1935 -- Nazi Germany commences rearming.
- 1936 -- Axis formed by Germany, Italy, and Japan.
- 1936-38 -- Stalin purges Communist leadership through trials and

executions.

- 1938 -- German troops move into Austria.  
Czechoslovakia cedes Sudetenland to Germany (Munich agreement)
- 1939 -- March: German forces occupy remainder of Czechoslovakia.  
August: German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (which secretly divides Poland between them.  
September: Germany invades Poland; Great Britain and France declare war on Germany; Soviet forces move into Poland from east to line predetermined with Germany.  
November: Soviet forces invade Finland.
- 1940 - Soviet Union takes control of three Baltic States.  
Germany conquers the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France.  
Hungary and Romania, ruled by Nazi sympathizers, join the Axis.
- 1941 -- Bulgaria joins Axis.  
German forces invade Soviet Union.  
After Pearl Harbor is attacked by Japan, United States declares war on Japan, Germany, and Italy.
- 1942 -- German forces penetrate deep into Soviet Union; enter Stalingrad (now Volgograd), reach outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad.
- 1943 -- Beginning of German retreat from Soviet Union.

Many of these events were important for the United States, though not all of them with the same immediacy. And there were other events during this era which were particularly significant in their effect on American leaders. Here are some of them:

- 1917 -- United States enters war against Germany, particularly provoked by German submarine warfare against U.S. ships. Franklin Roosevelt (b. 1882) serves as an assistant secretary of the Navy;  
Harry Truman (b. 1884) is an artillery captain in combat in France; Dwight Eisenhower (b. 1890) trains tank battalions at

- bases in the United States.
- 1918 -- German defeat and armistice on November 11.
- 1919 -- Treaty of Versailles signed, including Covenant of League of Nations.  
A majority of the U.S. Senate approves treaty but less than the two-thirds required for ratification.
- 1918-20 -- Small contingent of U.S. military force joins Allies on Russian territory to support White resistance to Red forces.
- 1920s -- Isolationism a dominant force in the United States.
- 1929 -- Stock market crash and beginning of Great Depression.
- 1933 -- Franklin Roosevelt becomes president, starts New Deal.  
U.S. recognizes government of Soviet Union.
- 1935-39 -- United States tries to keep out of growing conflict in Europe;  
Congress enacts legislation to prohibit shipment of arms and ammunition to any belligerent.
- 1939 -- After German invasion of Poland, Congress repeals arms embargo.
- 1940 -- Roosevelt transfers 50 destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for leases to put bases on British territory in Western Hemisphere.
- 1941 -- March: Lend-Lease program to supply nations fighting against the Axis (in next four years one-half went to Great Britain, one-fourth to Soviet Union, and remainder to China and other allies)  
December: Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. U.S. declares war on Japan, Germany, and Italy.
- 1941-45 -- Huge contingent of U.S. forces move throughout the world to fight against Axis powers.
- 1943 -- Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin meet in Tehran to discuss war aims and postwar issues.
- 1945 -- The "Big Three" meet for a second time in Yalta, Crimea in the Soviet Union, especially to deal with postwar matters.

The Tehran and Yalta conferences helped the wartime Allies to settle some important issues about the war and the postwar world, but some matters were unresolved. In retrospect, aspects of what later became the Cold War were foreshadowed in these Big Three meetings.

At Tehran in [month] 1943

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met next at Yalta in February 1945 as the Allies were moving toward victory over Nazi Germany to work out understandings on postwar issues. At Yalta the three leaders formulated the occupation zones for Germany but did not reach agreement on German reparation. They agreed to reestablish Poland as an independent nation, worked out a plan for a new Polish government, but could not agree upon the western boundary of Poland. Regarding the nations being liberated from Axis rule, the three Allied governments in the Yalta declaration promised to assist the people "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." At Yalta the three leaders also made decisions on the shape of the United Nations, and Stalin made a commitment to go to war against Japan within three months after German surrender.

### Cold War I -- The First Ten Years

Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945. By then U.S. and British forces had moved through Germany as far as \_\_\_\_\_ and into Czechoslovakia and Austria. Soviet troops had met the Western armies across these three nations. Within \_\_\_\_\_ months Soviet, U.S., British, and French forces had taken up positions in predetermine occupation zones. [Outline.]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had already taken steps to expand its territory and influence in Eastern Europe. As the Red Army drove back Nazi forces, the Soviets took control



of the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had gained independence in 1918 after more than a century of Russian tsarist rule. The Soviets also annexed parts of Finland, Poland, East Prussia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Soviet forces occupied the rest of Romania, all of Bulgaria, Hungary, and what would become the new Poland, and a portion of Germany and Czechoslovakia (the remainder of these two nations being occupied by Western troops). National forces allied with Moscow liberated Yugoslavia and Albania. Thus, the defeat of Hitler gave the Soviet Union and Communist allies an opportunity to expand control over most of Eastern Europe. Motivation was both ideological and nationalistic: the desire to spread Communism; ambition for territorial expansion, long a strong force in Russia going back to tsarist days; and a concern for security by establishing buffer states between the Soviet heartland and Germany, which had invaded Russia twice within 25 years.

Another Big Three meeting took place in Potsdam, Germany near Berlin in July 1945. By then Harry Truman was president of the United States, following the death of Franklin Roosevelt in April. Half way through the conference Clement Atlee replaced Winston Churchill as British prime minister and came to Potsdam to take his place. Only Joseph Stalin remained of the original Big Three. After      days of meeting these representatives of the victorious powers agreed

In the months that followed the Soviet Union moved to consolidate its hold over Eastern Europe. Quickly the Soviet occupiers set up Communist governments in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, whose previous regimes had joined the Axis and supported the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviets ignored the Yalta agreement to have all major interests represented in a new Polish government, instead installing a Communist regime. For all four nations the Yalta commitment to free elections was ignored. For awhile      Czechoslovakia had a coalition

government of communists, social democrats, and populists. The communists had control of the police force and used this power to take over the government in February 1948 with Soviet blessing. National communist forces in Yugoslavia and Albania set up their own governments. In June 1948 the Soviets tried to foment overthrow of the Yugoslav regime led by Marshal Tito, who was displaying independence from Moscow domination, but they were thwarted. Thereupon, Yugoslavia split from the Soviet bloc.

In this same period the Soviet Union tried to expand toward the southwest but was blocked by the United States. The first event occurred in Iran, where Soviet, British, and U.S. forces were stationed during World War II. The British and the Soviets came originally to block a feared German takeover as well as to uphold historic interests in that region. The Americans arrived in connection with the lend-lease supply line that ran from the Persian Gulf into the Soviet Union. Soon after the war was over British and U.S. forces departed, but Soviet troops remained in Northern Iran until a vigorous diplomatic nudge by the United States caused them to evacuate.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was putting pressure on Turkey to regain a couple of provinces which had previously passed back and forth and to share in control of the Bosphorus and Darnanelles straits. In Greece the Soviet Union sided with and sent supplies to leftist partisans in a civil war which had broken out while World War II was still underway. Historically Great Britain had supported Turkey and Greece in great power competition, but in the postwar years Britain could no longer play this role. So the United States took up the slack. To demonstrate support for Turkey in face of Soviet demands, President Truman dispatched the battleship Missouri for a visit to Istanbul in the summer of 1946 and thereafter the U.S. 6th Fleet became a fixture in the Eastern Mediterranean. In January 1947 Truman requested Congress to provide economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey and in March gave a speech which set forth what

became known as the Truman Doctrine: that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."  
[quoted in Gaddis, 1982: 22. Look up original.]

Thus, two years after the end of World War II in Europe the two basic forces of Cold War I were well established: Soviet expansionism, particularly into Eastern Europe; and U.S. containment, the effort to block the peripheral expansion of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were able to expand by occupying territory liberated from Nazi conquest. The United States responded by seeking to stop Soviet expansion beyond the occupied zone.

In the West the intellectual basis for containment was laid out by George Kennan, first in a lengthy telegraphic message from his post at the U.S. embassy in Moscow in February 1946 and then in an article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," signed only as "Mr. X" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs when Kennan was director of the State Department's planning staff.

## 7. MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

In the chilly atmosphere of the Cold War the doctrine of nuclear deterrence became a fundamental concept of U.S. foreign and military policy. According to this doctrine, the threat to use nuclear weapons against an adversary will deter aggressive acts that the adversary would otherwise perpetrate. This has been the orthodox belief of every presidential administration from Truman to Reagan.

Yet -- as I shall show in this chapter -- the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a mirage. An illusion. A false vision and a phony theory. A myth we have erroneously believed.

What has occurred is that theorists have latched on to our commonplace understanding of deterrence. It is a type of action we all understand, experience, and engage in: the highway patrol cruising the highways and using radar to slow down speeders; parents' threats of punishment to get children to behave; the rules of schools and employers; civil laws and religious precepts, backed by the threat of sanctions, temporal and eternal. People can indeed be deterred from particular acts by threats.

The notion of deterrence has long been a part of military theory and international relations. Thus, in their study of deterrence Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke have indicated (1974:12) that

Thucydides, in his Peloponnesian War recounts many instances where one side or another maneuvered for allies or other advantages in such a way that its opponent would think that beginning a war, or expanding it would not be worth the risks or costs. Among other early writers, Emperor Leo of Byzantium and Maciavelli both emphasized the "show of force" and similar devices as economical means of persuading an enemy that the costs and risks of aggressive action might be too high.

This idea of military deterrence has carried into modern times.

Having been brought up in this tradition, military theorists and political strategists in the United States latched on to nuclear weapons as a new method for deterrence. Working at universities and independent thinktanks, at the Pentagon and in other governmental agencies, they have developed an elaborate and grandiose doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Eight successive presidents have accepted this theory, and so has a majority of the Congress.

But acceptance doesn't make the theory right. If we examine carefully forty years of international experience with this doctrine in place, we will come to see that it is a false doctrine.

If we go back to origins, we find that the only two uses of nuclear weapons in warfare -- the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in August 1945 -- were not the result of failed deterrence but rather an extension of the policy of strategic bombing that guided the United States and its allies during World War II. The purpose was to destroy the enemy's war-making capacity by attacking military bases in the homeland, war factories, research centers, transportation systems, command posts, and ultimately whole cities filled with noncombatants. This was called "strategic" in contrast to "tactical" fighting directly against the enemy's armed forces.

The precursor of strategic bombing occurred during World War I when Germany used Zeppelins and winged aircraft to make a few token raids against London. In the wars of the 1930s Italy waged air attacks against Ethiopia, Japan bombed Chinese cities, and German bombers attacked Guernica, Spain during the Spanish civil war. In the opening period of World War II air attacks concentrated on enemy forces rather than cities. The first Nazi air raids on the British homeland occurred after the British retreated from the European mainland via Dunkerque, and the German Luftwaffe bombed British airbases in Southern England in preparation for an intended invasion.

In response the British Royal Air Force staged a symbolic raid against Berlin. The Germans retaliated by attacking several English cities and then began bombing London almost every night for eight months. The Allies adopted the same strategy in the war against Germany by devastating numerous cities, and then against Japan where incendiary bombs produced fire storms to destroy cities containing mostly woodframe buildings. Numerous German and Japanese civilians died in these attacks. Having gone this far, U.S. political and military leaders perceived that an atomic attack against Japan was a natural extension of strategic bombing.

The 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing produced a renewal of a mostly forgotten debate among historians on whether the United States might have had a second purpose in dropping two bombs on Japan: intimidation of the Soviet Union by demonstrating this new American capability. Gar Alperovitz has made this argument, maintaining that Japan was ready to surrender anyway and that President Truman knew it (1985). Others have maintained that imminent Japanese surrender wasn't all that certain and that, as Chalmers Roberts insisted, "Truman chose to drop the bomb essentially to end the war in a hurry and save American lives" (1985).

This is one of those disputes that can never be settled with certainty. But even if the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only an application of strategic bombing, it was immediately apparent that by raising enormously the threshold of destruction, atomic bombs were dramatically different than all previous weapons. This demanded new thinking.

One of the first attempts to formulate a nuclear weapons theory was a collection of essays entitled *The Absolute Weapon*, published in 1946. One of the authors, Arnold Wolfers, spelled out three lines of defense for dealing with the Soviet Union, already perceived by many as the new enemy (1946:131-

134):

- o proper efforts on our part to settle our disputes with the Soviet Union peacefully and to avoid adding new ones
- o international agreements and controls
- o all the steps a country can take in order to deter another country from risking war or from attacking it with atomic weapons....In the atomic age the threat of retaliation is probably the strongest single means of determent.

In another, widely quoted essay Bernard Brodie stated (1946:76) that

the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind....Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other purpose.

Thus, the seeds of nuclear deterrence theory were sown. Others picked up the task of elaboration, but the fundamental idea was already established in 1946: that the threat of nuclear retaliation -- nuclear deterrence -- would be a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. (For the history of how nuclear deterrence theory has evolved, see Freedman (1983), Kaplan (1983), and Smoke (1984).)

Has it worked? Proponents of nuclear deterrence readily say, "Yes, it's worked. After all, we haven't had World War III. The Soviet Union has not conquered Western Europe. If it weren't for the U.S. nuclear arsenal and delivery system, the world would be a much more dangerous place."

The problem with this claim is that it is wholly a matter of conjecture. There is no sure

way to prove why something did not occur. There can be many reasons other than the one claimed. Moreover, if we look at world history of the past forty years we can observe numerous situations where nuclear deterrence did not prevent war and other grievous events. This includes 120 wars that have taken 25 million human lives. [update]

Accordingly, an important step in our test of nuclear deterrence theory is to examine these events that have actual happened -- where the nuclear arsenal did not deter aggression. These undeterred events can be summarized in twelve categories.

First are Asian civil wars waged by two parts of divided nations, one side allied with the United States, the other side with ties to the Communist bloc. Two have occurred: in Korea and in Vietnam.

Korea was divided into two occupation zones at the end of World War II as Soviet troops enter the north and U.S. troops entered the south to accept the surrender of the Japanese army. The demarcation line ran near the 38th parallel. The two occupying powers could not agree upon a government for all of Korea, and by 1948 separate regimes were governing North Korea and South Korea. The Soviets withdrew their forces at the end of 1948, and U.S. troops left in mid-1949. On June 25, 1950 the army of communist North Korea invaded South Korea. Quickly the United States got the United Nations Security Council to sponsor a collective response to this invasion. U.S. forces were joined by troops from other nations. The Soviet Union sent military supplies to North Korea, and Chinese troops entered the war to help the North Koreans. A truce agreement on July 27 ended the war, and a 2 1/2 mile buffer zone across the Korean peninsula was established to separate the armed forces.

Some historians argue that this war occurred because U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had left South Korea out of a January 1950 listing of places the United States would



defend. Others say the Soviets encouraged the North Koreans to invade because they considered the United States too distracted by events in Europe to be responsive. Some insist the North Koreans acted on their own. But all of this is conjecture. What is certain is that only the United States had deliverable nuclear weapons at that time (the Soviets had detonated a test explosion in 1949 but yet had no effective delivery capacity). Yet, the U.S. nuclear weapons monopoly failed to deter North Korean aggression.

The division of Vietnam at approximately the 17th parallel occurred in 1954 at an international conference in Geneva that ended French rule in the Indochina peninsula. The North Vietnamese government was a continuation of a communist regime, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, established by Ho Chi Minh after the end of World War II when Japanese occupation forces withdrew. For a short period in 1946 France recognized this republic as the government for all of Vietnam, a free state in the French Union, but withdrew recognition when Vietminh forces attacked the French army that remained. Fighting continued until the 1954 peace settlement. A new government formed in South Vietnam, with the Ho Chi Minh regime in control of the North. In 1959 communist guerrillas (Viet Cong) from North Vietnam began invading South Vietnam. The United States started sending military advisers to assist South Vietnam and in 1964 dispatched fighting forces, which reached a peak of xxx,000 personnel in 196x. Australia and New Zealand (?) also sent military forces to assist South Korea. Until 1965 China was the principal source of outside military supplies for North Vietnam, but as U.S. forces increased, the North Vietnamese turned also to the Soviet Union for equipment, weapons, and ammunition. But neither China nor the Soviet Union sent in their own soldiers. As fighting continued, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces failed to subdue the North Vietnamese invaders. Finally a peace treaty signed in Paris in 1973 ended the war, and all U.S. forces withdrew. In

197x North Vietnam took control of the whole country.

As with Korea, the U.S. nuclear arsenal did not deter North Vietnam and the Viet Cong from aggression toward South Vietnam. And as we'll examine later, nuclear weapons were ruled out in the fighting that occurred. Thus, twice during the first two decades of the nuclear weapons era, U.S. nuclear might failed to deter aggression by communist allies of the Soviet Union.

The second category of events that nuclear weapons did not deter is civil wars in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union sent its armed forces but in various ways provided assistance to one of the contestants. This has occurred in many parts of the Third World during the last 30 years, especially in African nations emerging from colonialism. Examples during the 1980s include Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. [Others?] Wars of this kind are caused by political unrest and internal struggles for power. In no way is nuclear deterrence irrelevant in such situations.

Third are regional wars where the superpowers are involved through proxies, especially in the Middle East. There the United States has consistently supported Israel but has also maintained relationships with many, though not always all, of the Arab nations. The Soviet Union has had an on-and-off relationship with many of these Arab nations. But Jewish-Arab rivalry has continued unabated by the nuclear stockpile of the superpowers. The one situation that had the potential of pulling in the United States and the Soviet Union directly was the 1973 Israel-Egyptian-Syrian war, but this was resolved before it escalated to that stage. Although Israel appears to have a secret stockpile of 100 or more nuclear weapons, it is Israel's conventional power that serves as a deterrent -- to the extent that military might plays this role in the Middle East.

The fourth category consists of regional wars where the superpowers have been less

directly involved. India versus Pakistan, Iran versus Iraq, Libya versus Chad are cases of this sort. These have happened because of national ambitions and ideological factors. The existence of nuclear weapons held by other nations has not prevented these wars from happening. Nor has the nuclear stockpile averted the Iran-Iraq conflict from spilling into the Persian Gulf, where the United States has become involved.

The fifth type of event not deterred by nuclear weapons is the establishment of Soviet satellites in adjacent nations. The first, the Mongolian People's Republic, originated in the 1920s and was recognized by the United States and Great Britain at the 1945 Yalta conference prior to the detonation of the first atomic bomb. Most of the Soviet's East European satellites came about because of Soviet occupation in 1944 and 1945 in driving back the retreating Nazis, but the final coup providing complete communist control of Czechoslovakia occurred in 1948 when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons. But this monopoly did not prevent consolidation of communist control of this satellite nation.

Sixth, Soviet repression of national rebellion in these East European satellites hasn't been deterred by the American nuclear arsenal. This includes major uprisings in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980, and repeated minor uprisings. In the 1950s the United States had overwhelming nuclear superiority which was irrelevant to preventing Soviet repression in East Germany and Hungary. The U.S. still had a margin of superiority in 1968 when the Soviets overturned a Czech reform administration. Nuclear superiority had no deterrent effect upon these situations.

Seventh, repeated Soviet fomentation of crises over the status of West Berlin has not been prevented by the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The first crisis occurred in 1948 when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons. Renewed Soviet attempts in 1959 and 1961 to

drive the United States out of West Berlin were not prevented by U.S. nuclear might.

An eighth event not deterred by nuclear weapons was Soviet invasion of an isolated, neighboring state -- Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet tanks and planes roared in, unafraid of possible nuclear retaliation.

The ninth category is repression of human rights within the Soviet Union, shown in many ways: imprisonment of dissenters or placement in mental institutions, restrictions on Jewish emigration, suppression of publications critical of the government and the Communist Party. There is no way in which nuclear weapons can deter such actions by a government against its own people.

Tenth, nuclear weapons have no deterrent effect upon the taking of hostages and other forms of international terrorism.

Eleventh, Soviet efforts to develop allies in the Third World, and to dominate them, has waxed and waned without any attention to the relative nuclear strength of the two superpowers.

The Center for Defense Information has provided the following scorecard (1986):

- o Starting from a very low base of political, economic, and military involvement, the Soviets have increased their influence around the world. After World War II the Soviets had significant influence in 9% of the world's nations. They peaked at 15% in the late 1950s, dropping back to 11% today. Of the 164 other countries in the world, the Soviets have significant influence in 18.
- o With the exception of Eastern Europe and Mongolia, the Soviet Union has been unable to sustain influence in foreign countries over long periods of time. The Soviets have been unable to command loyalty or obedience.
- o Soviet foreign involvement has to a large extent been shaped by local

conditions over which the Soviets have had little control.

These figures indicate that Soviet influence peaked at a time of strong U.S. nuclear superiority and declined as the Soviet Union approach nuclear parity with the United States. Major losses of Soviet influence occurred in China, Indonesia, Ghana, Egypt, Bangladesh, Somalia, and Congo, and in a number of smaller nations. U.S. nuclear weapons did not prevent Soviet entry in these nations and did not cause the Soviets to leave.

And twelfth, even the Soviet attempt to install nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 wasn't deterred by the nuclear superiority then possessed by the United States. On the contrary, the Soviets made that move because they wanted to counterbalance U.S. superiority in intercontinental missiles by installing intermediate-range missiles close to the United States. The situation was resolved by calm diplomacy and by judicious use of conventional measures, especially a naval quarantine, not by a threat to use nuclear weapons. Twenty years after this event, six of President Kennedy's closest advisers reflected on this experience and indicated (Rusk and others, 1982:85):

The Cuban missile crises illustrates not the significance but the insignificance of nuclear superiority in the face of survivable thermonuclear retaliator forces. It also shows the crucial role of rapidly available conventional strength.

From this analysis of twelve categories of events, we can see that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is vastly overrated in its ability to prevent numerous kinds of wars and other grievous events. Moreover, nuclear weapons have proven to be totally useless in dealing with these various crises and in warfighting.

Thus, the 1948 Berlin blockade was overcome by the massive and persistent airlift.

Although "atomic capable" U.S. bombers were dispatched to bases in Great Britain, they were not supplied with atomic bombs and were not a factor in ending the blockage. In the Korean War both President Truman and President Eisenhower considered the use of nuclear weapons, but they concluded that conventional weapons were sufficient to achieve the military objectives of that limited war. Furthermore, political pressures from other nations and a reluctance to drop nuclear bombs again on Asian people weighed heavily against their use. Political considerations as well as military disutility were also factors in French refusal of a U.S. offer of tactical nuclear shells to help relieve French troops under siege by the Vietminh at Dienbienphu in 1954. In the same country both President Johnson and President Nixon considered using tactical nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War, but they concluded that they were unsuitable and unacceptable for battlefield use in that setting, and also politically undesirable. So within a 20 year span Western forces twice accepted military defeat in Vietnam even though they had nuclear weapons available. In none of the other events we have examined was the use of nuclear weapons even considered, as far as we know.

It is interesting to note that in these situations U.S. political leaders came to conclusions similar to those one would make by applying criteria for a "just war," as developed in one stream of Christian thought. "Just war" theory specifies a number of conditions that must be met before warfighting can be justified: just cause, just intent, last resort, initiated by legitimate authority, reasonable hope of success. Once war begins other standards are to be applied, especially those of proportionality and discrimination. This means that the damage inflicted must be proportional to the military objective, and indiscriminate harm must not be inflicted, particularly providing immunity of noncombatants from direct attack. The very nature of nuclear weapons in these limited wars makes them disproportionately too powerful. Directly and through drifting

radioactive fallout they was cause indiscriminate harm to civilians. Therefore, their use cannot be justified. Although Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon pursued another line of reasoning, they all came to a similar conclusion.

Since nuclear weapons have not been used in these situations and quite likely would not be used in similar situations, they are not a creditable threat. Being noncreditable, they have no effective deterrent capacity to keep these types of events from happening.

But, some would ask, were not some other prospective acts of aggression actually prevented by the threat to use nuclear weapons. A few such possibilities have come to light, particularly from the 1950s, but the strongest evidence is that the particular crises were resolved in other ways and that U.S. political leaders never reached the point where they had to make a final decision about using nuclear weapons.

[To be added. See Gaddis' chapter on U.S. self-restraint.]

By process of elimination we come to two other events -- both horrendously destructive if they occurred -- that some would argue have been prevented by U.S. nuclear deterrence. One is an out-of-the-blue attack on the U.S. mainland by the Soviet Union. The other is Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Many nuclear weapons proponents claim that these events have not happened because of nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the nuclear stockpile has been well worth the cost. But is this true?

I've searched and searched and have been unable to find any serious analyst who believes that the Soviets are likely to wage a direct, surprise nuclear attack against the United States. Among those thinking this to be not likely was the late Herman Kahn, he who was willing to consider the unthinkable: nuclear war. In his last book he wrote:

I do not believe that the Soviet Union would be likely to give serious

consideration to a deliberate, calculated first strike against the United States except under the most extreme circumstances. Cultural, ideological, and analytical factors indicate that the Soviet leadership would act with prudence and caution. The Soviet Union lacks a tradition of successful "wars by calculation"; Soviet ideology stresses patience and warns against recklessness in the long-term struggle with capitalism; and technical uncertainties as to how military equipment would actually perform in a nuclear war would prompt the Soviets to think very hard before initiating a nuclear attack (1984:74-75).

The extreme circumstances he was talking about would be some crisis, arising from some other cause, which would escalate into nuclear war. But it would be a crisis which nuclear weapons are incapable of deterring.

This leaves only the possibility of protecting Western Europe from Soviet invasion as the purpose of U.S. nuclear deterrence. In Chapter 3, we saw that neither the Eastern bloc nor the Western bloc in Europe has any true self-interest in invading the other. Confirmation comes from a long line of witnesses who have offered testimony that such action is highly unlikely to occur. For example, when John Foster Dulles testified as a private citizen at a 1959 Senate hearing on the North Atlantic Treaty, he stated:

I do not know of any responsible official, military or civilian in this Government or any other government, who believes that the Soviet now plans conquest by open military aggression" (1949:383).

In the mid-seventies, when we began to hear about the "window of vulnerability" which was said to negate U.S. nuclear deterrence, Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard University wrote that



a direct military attack on Western Europe by the Red Army seems highly improbable. Not only do the Russians have no wish to trigger a nuclear exchange, but also have less apocalyptic reasons for caution: the desire to maintain good working relations with the United States; lack of experience with coordinated offensive operations on foreign territory; mistrust of satellite armies, and fear of disorders in the event of military reverses (1976:56).

Subsequent Soviet experience in Afghanistan can scarcely have built their confidence for offensive operations.

More recently Admiral Gene R. LaRocque has indicated:

I do not believe that at any time there has been any evidence to suggest that the Soviets were planning to launch a military attack on the U.S. or Western Europe. There is no time in their history when the Soviets would have anything to gain from an attack on the U.S. or Europe, nor can I visualize any set of circumstances when it would be to their advantage. Soviet officials have never evidenced any illusions about the mortal danger they would put themselves in by such action. They have never shown any confidence that Soviet military power is such as to even raise the prospect of success in such a war (1983:4).

Indeed, true Soviet interest is not to invade Western Europe but rather to foster greater trade and technological exchange, a course they have consistently followed. Therefore, the perceived remaining purpose of U.S. nuclear deterrence -- to keep the Soviets out of Western Europe -- turns out to be a mirage because it claims to deter an action which is not within the self-interest or intent of the Soviet Union. There is nothing to deter!

What I've offered from a U.S. perspective also applies for the Soviets. They, too, have

witnessed the events of forty years, including many not at all to their liking, that have taken place undeterred by their stockpile of nuclear weapons. They need have no fear of an out-of-the-blue attack by the United States, for we have no national interest and no intent in doing so. Likewise, they need not fear our invading Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, for we have no self-interest in doing that either, and certainly lack the capability of forcefully occupying their vast land. Thus, like ours, their nuclear weapons have no true deterrent function because what they may fear and want to deter are actions we have no interest or intent in undertaking. And like us, they have found that their nuclear weapons have no battlefield utility in the kinds of warfare they have been engaged in. The most vivid illustration is Afghanistan where they were never able to subdue rebel forces, could not use nuclear weapons effectively in the kind of warfare they were engaged in (even if they were willing to), and ultimately had to withdraw without victory.

Nevertheless, even if nuclear weapons are of dubious deterrent value and so far have had no warfighting utility beyond the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan to end World War II, some people want to hold on to the nuclear arsenal in the belief that they might be useful in some future war. But these massively destructive weapons will have no utility in any type of war that may be on the horizon, as a number of experienced military leaders have testified.

Among them is Admiral Noel Gayler (U.S. Navy, retired), commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific from 1972 to 1976, who has insisted that "there is no sensible military use for nuclear weapons." In explanation, he has provided an around-the-globe survey (1984:16-18):

Taking the Pacific first, when I was Commander-in-Chief (Pacific), I could not find, in scrutinizing the whole of the Pacific Command, any area where it could conceivably have made sense to explode nuclear

weapons in order to carry our military objectives. Clearly our experience in the Vietnam War suggests that we would not do such a thing.

We did not do even "conventional" things which were well within our capability because of understandable political and humane considerations.

Nor could I see a case for nuclear weapons anywhere else on the Asian continent. For example, the Korean Demilitarized Zone is one flash-point that comes immediately to mind. My evaluation, together with that of senior generals, both Korean and American, responsible for the defense of the Demilitarized Zone and of the city of Seoul and its approach and environs, was that it simply was not necessary to contemplate a nuclear strategy.

In considering the rest of Asia, Admiral Gayler noted that our only previous use of nuclear weapons was against Japan, and this remains a strong political issue through Asia.

For that reason, it is my belief that the use of a nuclear weapon against any Asian people, for any purpose whatsoever, would polarize Asia against us. It would clearly not be worth the candle.

Continuing, he indicated:

Another potential theater, of course, is maritime Russia: the Soviet naval forces dispersed throughout the Pacific area, their bases, lines of transit, choke points. All I would say about that is that, while it is an important place, it is less important than the entire problem that would be involved if you were actually to fight Russia.

Turning to another region, he observed:

In the Middle East, there have been various scenarios proposed, including initiative use of nuclear weapons to block certain passes down into Iran and so forth. Pacific Command did a considerable study of that potentiality and came to the

conclusion that we were so outgunned by the Soviets in nuclear delivery capabilities and in respect of the

small number of highly critical targets we owned, compared with the very large number of less critical targets they had, that it was not something that we should open up, on strictly military grounds.

As to the European sector, where official U.S. policy contemplates the possibility of making first use of nuclear weapons, Admiral Gayler reported:

I have seen some pretty persuasive studies which support my own conclusion that we could not possibly gain an advantage by the initiative use (first use) of nuclear weapons to defend Europe against a conventional attack.

The first consideration is that, were we to use them except as a demonstration, we would have to use them in numbers of tens and low hundreds. Attack on this scale would be required to stop, say, four nominal tank breakthroughs (a common assumption). The number of non-combatants killed would be very high. I have seen competent estimates which suggest that a median number killed might be a million people. It is difficult to believe that that kind of slaughter of civilians could take place without creating serious strain with the Alliance between Germany, whose citizens would be killed, and the rest of the Alliance....

The danger of escalation after the first use of nuclear weapons I regard as extremely high....

Finally it does not appear that relative advantage would occur to NATO from a nuclear first use, because of the fact that we have a far more vulnerable target system, smaller numbers of highly critical targets like harbors, depots and airfields, and that the Soviets have a capability to attack those sorts of targets with nuclear weapons at

least comparable to ours.

Having made this analysis, it is not surprise that upon his retirement from the Navy Admiral Gayler became a staunch advocate of a general nuclear settlement so as to rid the world of nuclear weapons. He has pointed out, "the enemy is not the Soviet Union, and it is not the United States. It is the nuclear weapons themselves" (1984:236).

The late Lieutenant General A. S. Collins, who was deputy commander-in-chief of the U.S. Army in Europe from 1971 to 1974, also has spoken about the futility of limited use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (1984:31):

Tactical nuclear war would quickly become strategic or total war for small nations and the local populations over whose fields and cities nuclear weapons are exploding. Hiroshima, after all, was destroyed by what is considered to be one small tactical nuclear weapon in today's arsenal.

I do not believe that a tactical nuclear war could be fought in areas like Western Europe for more than a few days, or even a few hours without getting out of control.

Drawing upon his own experience commanding combat troops in World War II and Vietnam, General Collins indicated (1984:P34-35):

What will the reply be to the first use of these weapons Historically US forces cannot claim any awards for restraint in the use of fire-power: we really pour it on. Once the nuclear barrier is broken, it is hard to believe that commanders, steeped in the US military tradition of concern for the lives of their troops, will respond with moderation, especially if their units have suffered severe losses in the first attack. Soviet doctrine leaves no room for doubt: their nuclear response will be massive and overwhelming.

A group of thirteen former NATO generals and admirals from eight European nations have come to the same conclusion (1984:92-93):

From a military point of view a nuclear war in Europe would mean that:

- the use of nuclear weapons could not be limited to military targets;
- in the case of an intensive nuclear combat, it would be impossible adequately to protect the civilian population;;
- the annihilation of Europe would be total. Even those who survived the war would die of the after-effects.

Commonsense demands that a nuclear war must never happen -- either in Europe or in any other part of the world! Prevention is the only protection from the consequences of a war.

These practical observations by experienced military commanders, while not couched in theologians' language, come to the same conclusion as religious leaders. The destructive power of nuclear weapons is by far disproportionately greater than the military objectives sought and would cause vast and indiscriminate harm to civilians, including those being defended.

What kind of a defense is it, then, that destroys with overwhelming devastation what you are trying to save? In Europe and everywhere else nuclear weapons have no useful role in military combat. They have no deterrent value, as we have seen, first because more than forty years of experience has shown that they haven't and cannot prevent numerous "little" events. And second, the "big" events -- including Soviet attack on the U.S. homeland and Soviet invasion of Western Europe -- will not happen even if there were no nuclear weapons. Therefore, as I've said before, nuclear deterrence is an illusion.

All of these reasons make it essential to abolish all nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, it is a practicable course to pursue, for we would not be losing anything that has any

appropriate use anyway, either for deterrence or for warfighting. Thus, idealism and realism come together -- our highest aspiration and a careful analysis of practicality -- to demand the global elimination of all nuclear weapons.

## 8. ARMS CONTROL LEGACY

Although I am convinced that nuclear deterrence is illusory, the molders of U.S. foreign policy have steadfastly believed in it. Some may have regretted the necessity. For instance, President Carter came to office in this mood. And President Reagan, in announcing his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, called Star Wars by some), indicated (1983:442), "I've become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence." But notwithstanding such regrets, the U.S. government for more than 40 years has accepted nuclear deterrence as a fundamental doctrine.

Even arms control policy has operated within a context that believes in and accepts nuclear deterrence. At one stage advocates of arms control spoke of "sufficiency." That is, there is no need to build the nuclear arsenal beyond a level which is sufficient to deter the adversary. There is no need for excessive overkill, just enough to do the job -- destroy the enemy -- sufficiently. Now the terminology is changing to speak of "arms reduction" (rather than mere "control"), but for the proponents this means cutting back to a minimal level needed for deterrence to be effective. The minimalists remain true believers in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Even though this belief may be unjustified, as the previous chapter demonstrated, nuclear arms control efforts of the past 40 years are a worth heritage. They have kept matters from getting worse and have set the stage for moving toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The journey to abolition has to traverse through arms control (halting the growth) and arms reduction (beginning to disband the nuclear arsenal). Thus, the mountain path metaphor of Chapter 1 showed the minimalists and the abolitionists traveling together for quite awhile.

We can trace the arms control legacy back to the early days of the nuclear weapons era.



In June 1946 Bernard Baruch presented to the United Nations a U.S. plan calling for an international authority to have exclusive ownership and management of all weapons-grade atomic materials everywhere in the world, except for peaceful research conducted under international licensing and inspection. Once this international body was established, the U.S. would dismantle its atomic weapons and turn over the fissionable material. The next year the Soviet Union countered with a proposal requiring the United States first to destroy its weapons and then have a UN inspection system established, applicable only to pre-designated atomic facilities. Enforcement would be in the hands of the UN Security Council, where the Soviet Union had a veto. The U.S. plan would allow the United States to remain as the only nation with proven knowledge of how to construct atomic bombs. The Soviet plan would not prevent secret manufacture of atomic weapons. However, by then the Cold War was underway. As a consequence, no serious effort was made to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement out of these conflicting proposals.

As the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test explosion in 1949 and Great Britain followed in 1952, a concern grew that other nations would want to join this exclusive company if they could produce or otherwise obtain fissionable material. Yet, this same material had peaceful uses in power production, medicine, and scientific research. Accordingly President Eisenhower proposed in a 1953 speech to the United Nations that the three nuclear powers transfer some fissionable material to an international organization, which would supervise its use by other countries for power generating and other peaceful uses. But the Soviet Union rejected this idea. So the United States launched its own Atoms Peace program, offering to share nuclear technology with other nations in exchange for a commitment to exclusively peaceful use and acceptance of inspection for compliance. Thirty nations have signed cooperate agreements with the United

States for this purpose. [Check this figure.]

The United States continued to press for UN action, and this initiative bore fruit in 1957 when the United Nations established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Its purpose is to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and at the same time to maintain controls in order to prevent diversion to military use. This is done through a safeguard system of audits, physical inventory, and inspection. The IAEA now has 110 (?) member nations and monitors approximately 700 installations in more than 50 countries.

Creation of IAEA was the first of a number of efforts that have occurred to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. One such preventive measure was the Antarctic Arms Control Treaty of 1959, initiated by the United States to provide for complete demilitarization of this polar continent and to specifically prohibit any nuclear testing or radioactive waste disposal there. So far 22 nations, including all with activities in Antarctica, have signed. [check figure] Two other uninhabited environments were protected through the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits orbiting nuclear weapons, and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971, which outlaws placing nuclear weapons on the bottom of the world's oceans.

Another effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons occurred in 1967 when the Treaty of Tlateloco created a nuclear-weapon free zone encompassing all of Latin America. Some implementation has occurred, but not to the full extent called for in the treaty. A more far-reaching measure came the next year with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, developed under the auspices of the United Nations. So far it has been ratified by three of the five "nuclear weapon states" (those possessing nuclear weapons in 1967), United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain, and 121 other nations. In 1985 six nations in the South Pacific

region created a nuclear weapon free zone and are seeking ratification and implementation. We'll look at these attempts of nonproliferation much more fully in Chapter 16.

In the 1950s as the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain carried out a steady series of nuclear weapons test above ground, there occurred a growing public concern about radioactive fallout. Particularly an enormous explosion of a U.S. hydrogen bomb at Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific in 1954 triggered this response. In the 1956 presidential campaign Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, made a major issue of his advocacy of a ban on large nuclear test explosions. During the next couple of years the United States and the Soviet Union traded test ban proposals, each of them containing provisions unacceptable to the other side. Meanwhile, both sides continued atmospheric testing. In 1958 the Soviets announced a unilateral moratorium, but when the United States continued its testing the Soviet Union resumed theirs. Then each side suspended testing for 2 1/2 years, all the time trying to negotiate a treaty applicable to all kinds of nuclear weapon testing. The Soviet Union started atmospheric testing again in 1961, and the United States followed a few months later. Public outcry and the chastening experience of the Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962 caused President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev and their advisers to try harder to resolve this dispute. This was accomplished by restricting the scope of what tests would be banned. The result was the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

In this treaty the three initial signers -- United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain -- agreed not to carry out nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water and not to cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted." This ended the hazards of radioactive fallout from the test of these three nations, but they continued to test underground,

actually at an increased rate (more on this in Chapter 15). France, which had conducted its first test in 1960 did not sign the treaty, nor did China, which was on the threshold (and succeeded in 1964). Both of these new nuclear powers continued atmospheric testing, France until 1974 and China until 1984. In 1974 India detonated a nuclear device above ground. Another 105 (?) nations have signed the treaty even though they aren't involved in nuclear weapons testing, but several of the potentially new nuclear-weapon states have not agreed to its provisions.

Subsequent to signing the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty the United States and the Soviet Union have sporadically tried to reach a comprehensive test ban agreement, but so far without success. Unable to make significant breakthroughs on divisive issues, the two sides in 1974 agreed upon a lesser approach in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Each party pledged not to conduct underground tests exceeding more than 150 kilotons in explosive power (ten times the size of the original Hiroshima atomic bomb), not to interfere with each other's means of verification, and to exchange detailed data on all tests and test sites in order to facilitate verification. In 1976 negotiators from the two nations worked out a Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, also with a 150 kiloton limitation.

The U.S. Senate had ratified neither treaty when Jimmy Carter became president. He decided not to press for their approval but rather to once again seek a comprehensive test ban treaty. Some progress occurred in 1977 and 1978, but little in the next two years. Negotiations were suspended in November 1980 after Carter was defeated for re-election. President Reagan did nothing to get them going again, and in July 1982 his administration announced that the United States was no longer interested in negotiating a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. Nor did Reagan press for Senate ratification of the two treaties pending since 1974 and 1976, though both sides have announced that they have observed the explosive limits of the Threshold Test Ban and

are no longer conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful uses.

In anticipation of the 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, the Center for Defense Information and other citizen organizations called for a nuclear test moratorium to go into effect on August 6, 1985. Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to this and announced that the Soviets would suspend all testing until the end of the year. The United States refused to reciprocate and continued testing. The Soviets extended their unilateral moratorium twice, but after the first U.S. test explosion in February 1987 the Soviets resumed their own testing. About this time the U.S. Senate finally took up the long-unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion treaties, but then wanted some modifications and reassurance from the Soviet Union on certain matters. These came in 1988, and Senate ratification occurred in [to be completed if this occurs]. Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union were exploring the possibility of once again renewing negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty -- an idea by now more than 30 years old.

About the same age is the idea that the possessors of nuclear weapons should limit the number and types of nuclear weapons, eventually seeking their abolition. To get around Soviet resistance to on-site inspection, which had first surfaced in their opposition to the Baruch plan, President Eisenhower in 1955 offered an "open skies" proposal of aerial reconnaissance. The following year the United States called for a mutual halt in production of fissionable material. The Soviets in 1955 presented a disarmament plan containing elements that could form the basis for negotiation. For the next couple of years tried to work out an agreement, but to no avail. Then the Soviets began calling for "general and complete disarmament," though without being too specific on how this would come about. However, upon taking office in 1961 President Kennedy took this serious and assigned John J. McCloy to meet with Valerian A. Zorin, representing the

Soviet Union, to work out some principles for disarmament negotiations. The McCloy/Zorin Agreement of September 1961

specified the following principles:

1. Secure disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes...war no longer.
2. Retention of non-nuclear forces for domestic order and a UN Peace force.
3. All military forces, bases, stockpiles, weapons, and expenses to be ended.
4. Implementation by time stages with compliance and verification agreed to at every stage.
5. Equitable balance at every stage so no advantage to anyone and security for all.
6. Strict control to make sure of compliance by all parties and creation of an international disarmament organization with inspectors having unrestricted access everywhere without veto for full verification.
7. Disarmament process must be accompanied by measures to maintain peace and security and a United Nations peace force strong enough to deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the United Nations Charter.
8. States should seek widest agreement at earliest date while continuing to seek more limited agreements which will facilitate and form part of the overall program for secured general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

These largely forgotten principles are still valid and if reaffirmed could be useful today and into the 1990s. Among other things they can provide a longer term perspective to arms control negotiations that so often become bogged down in minutia and the quest for short-term, national advantage.

Following the McCloy/Zorin Agreement relations between the United States and the Soviet Union worsened as Khrushchev increased tensions over the status of West Berlin and brought about the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 created an atmosphere of reduced tensions, but before much more could be done John Kennedy was assassinated and Nikita Khrushchev was removed from office. It fell to their successors to take the next steps. An opportunity for this occurred when Soviet Premier Kosygin came to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly. President Johnson arranged to meet him "halfway" between New York and Washington, and Glassboro, New Jersey was selected as the site.

## 9. PERCEIVING OUR COMMON HUMANITY

So much for the past -- the clash of Soviet and American empires, the rivalry of ideology and economic systems, prolonged tensions of the Cold War, the amassing of the nuclear arsenals, adherence to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence (illusory as it actually is), the arms control legacy that has tried to contain nuclear weapons competition. What about the present and the future?

The future is in our hands. Although we cannot amend the past, we need not be restricted by our historical inheritance forever and ever. We have it in our power to transform Cold War insecurity into peaceful common security.

Where to begin? Well, let's first step back and see who we are and who our adversaries are -- deep down within, not merely on the surface. As we do, we can perceive that we have a common humanity.

### Our Fundamental Nature

If we look at the people of the Soviet Union -- for many years our primary adversary , we should acknowledge that they are genuine flesh-and-blood human beings. Real people, just like us. They breathe, eat, and sleep, just like we do. They reproduce in the same manner. Every member of the human species bleeds when cut. That blood is one of four types (A,B, AB, or O) and either Rh-positive or negative, not distinguishable by race or nationality. Everyone will die. We all have one God, who is the same for all of us, regardless of our belief or disbelief (for God's nature is determined by God, not our belief).

Our basic human nature is also the same, down deep. Through what I am and what I observe in others, I find that human nature displays a pair of intertwined characteristics: self-seeking and self-giving. The one has an inward pull of what's in it for me, the other an



outward thrust of how I relate to others and care for them. The two impulses are interwoven, and neither is totally missing from anyone.

The root of self-seeking is the desire to survive -- individually and as a species. Thus, the initial drive for economic gain rests on the need for food, clothing, and shelter. And sexual desire is nature's way of preserving the species. On this foundation we build an elaborate structure of personal vanity and acquisitions, and sometimes a quest for power.

To some extent, even our involvement with other people derives from a need to fulfill our own being by developing personal relationships: a child with mother and father, children with one another, adolescents and young adults with their group, all of us interrelated in social, economic, and political processes which help us achieve personal objectives. But even if initially motivated by a desire for personal fulfillment, we become aware that these relationships must be based upon reciprocity. To receive, we must give. Then we learn that giving is a blessing regardless of the return. Ultimately we come to the truth that to find your life, you must lose it. Caring and self-giving are necessary to make your being complete.

This self-giving we call love. Through experiential learning, teaching, and the examples of others we realize that love is a major force in our lives and in the broader universe. We can understand the truth that God is Love. We can be aware that love for others can be as strong and influential as concern for self. In many respects our existence is defined by the interaction of these two essential aspects of human nature -- self-seeking and self-giving.

Everyone of every nationality possesses these two intertwined traits. The relative emphasis varies among individuals and over periods of time, but neither trait is missing from anyone. Even the most saintly, altruistic person has an element of self-seeking. Even the most diabolical person has a remnant of self-giving and a potential for much more.

These two aspects of human nature influence the response of individuals and groups to one another. Because self-giving is rooted in a desire to survive, when a person feels trapped or otherwise threatened he or she seeks to escape or to find another means of protecting oneself from harm, perhaps by fighting back. When a group or a nation feels threatened, the same kinds of responses arise.

Conversely when a person reaches out to another in a loving and caring manner, there is a good chance that the other person will respond in kind. Not always, for some are so wounded by life's experience that they are distrustful of even friendly gestures. Others are so taken up by self-seeking that they will try to take advantage of those coming in friendship. Yet the spirit of love can be a remarkable force for positive change.

Yes, all humans have fundamental similarities physiologically and in their basic nature. At the same time each of us is an individual who varies in some ways from every other human being. We also have special ties binding us to a particular segment, such as family, clan, ethnic group, nationality. This segmentation is the basis for many of the adversarial relations with "others" whom we confront. These "others" are different from us, but they also have similarities. If we could understand this better, we could then search for mutual interests. Doing so could take the raw edge off our conflicts.

If we apply this approach to the Soviet Union, we may discover that we have a great bond of commonality with the Soviet people even if we don't like their political and economic system and disapprove of actions taken by their leaders.

#### Comparison of Hopes, Fears

To make this discovery for yourself, let me suggest a four-part exercise.

First, before reading any further, take a sheet of paper and pen or pencil and make two

columns. In one write the greatest hopes of your life and in the other your greatest fears.

Second, try to imagine a Russian who is similar to yourself in age, sex, occupation, place of residence (rural, small town, suburban, city), and other common characteristics. Even though the Soviet Union contains numerous nationalities, I suggest Russian because they are politically dominant. Give your counterpart a name: Ivan, Natasha, or some other name. In your mind think of his or her life story, compared with your own.

For instance, if you are in your sixties or older, remember what it was like when Nazi Germany waged war throughout Europe, your own involvement in World War II, the postwar period, and the years since. What did the Russian go through in those same years?

If you were born in the fifteen years after the Second World War, then the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was in full force when you first became aware of international relations. In your lifetime you have seen the civil rights revolution in the United States, national leaders assassinated, the divisive Vietnam War, rapid rise of oil prices, inflation, detente, return to US/Soviet hostilities, a recent relaxation of tensions. What has a Russian of your age gone through?

If you are college age, you were born in a tumultuous period of the late sixties and early seventies, but you were not aware of public events until the Vietnam War was over. Already you have lived through several recessions and economic recoveries. You have noticed the political mood of the nation changing. What about your Russian counterpart? How many changes of leadership has she or he experienced? What do you think of your job future? What are the Russian's prospects?

Beyond this political slant, what is it like to be a Russian of age, occupation, and family status similar to yours in everyday life events? Shopping for food and clothing. Going to school.

Work. Getting around the city or countryside. Dealing with bureaucracy. Recreation. Entertainment. Courting and marrying. Birthing babies and caring for young children. Having friends and parents die. Looking ahead to one's own death. Sure, there are lots of differences. But aren't there also many things the same?

Third, take another sheet of paper, make two columns, in one write what you think are your Russian counterpart's greatest hopes and in the other his or her greatest fears.

Fourth, compare your hopes and fears with the Russian's. Which are the same? Which are different? If we are truly honest in this comparison, we will discover that in our common humanity we have many similar interests and concerns, far more than our differences.

Among the hopes you listed, there may have been some of the following: Enough to eat. Adequate shelter and clothing. Personal safety. Sanitary water, clean air. Perhaps wealth, social status, and the symbols of such status (possibly you disguise this desire rather than stating it openly). Good friends. Successful courtship (if you're at that place in life). A loving spouse (in the future, or for your present spouse to be more loving). Children and a happy family life. A good future for your children and grandchildren. End of racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual discrimination. Better personal communication within your family, at work. Good health, lack of pain. Death (if you're willing to face it) to come after a long, happy life, to be painless and not a burden to your family. An afterlife (if you so believe).

Your favorite team to win the championship. Success in school. Success in business, profession, trade, or occupation. Better TV programs. Retention of incumbents holding positions of authority in government, political party, church, club, or other organization -- or their replacement. To win an election yourself. A nice vacation with good weather. If a farmer or a gardener, the right combination of rain and sunshine. The person in the next apartment to be less

noisy (and maybe less nose). The neighbors next door to keep their dog under control. Better treatment from the bureaucracy (of government, utilities, department stores, motels, hospitals, church structure). Lessening of restrictions on personal freedom. Restoration of lost independence. Never experience a nuclear war or any other kind of attack on your homeland. Have other nations quit threatening us and our interests.

Your list will undoubtedly vary from this one in some respects because we each express our hopes differently. What about the listing of hopes you made for your Russian counterpart? For me, the list would be virtually identical with my own. Sure, there will be different emphases arising from cultural factors, economic interests, and political differences. But, sharing a common humanity, the hopes of Russians and ourselves will have many, many similarities.

Likewise our fears. Some of them are the converse of our hopes: Fear of personal injury, verbal abuse, theft of property, death. Fear of unruly neighbors and disorderly youth. Loss of status. Loss of job, income, and home. Nuclear attack. Invasion.

Other fears are matters of psychological discomfort: Fear of change and uncertainty. Fear of differences we don't like or understand. Fear of alien ideas. Fear of other social, political, and economic systems. Fear of losing first place, or fear of being considered second rate. Fear of being replaced (if you're in a position of authority).

These fears, which we have in common with the Soviet people, are natural and inevitable. Many of them arise from our instinct for survival, from our desire to avoid discomfort, from the self-seeking part of our nature. Fears can scarcely be avoided. What matters is what we do about them and whether we let other people exploit our fears in a manner harmful to our long-range interests.

If after going through this process, we begin to perceive the Soviet people as human

beings like ourselves, we are building a foundation for reconciliation. Yet, this doesn't take away from the fact that our two nations -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- are in conflict in a variety of ways in many parts of the globe. Perhaps then we conclude that the Soviet people may be all right but not their rulers, those who control the instruments of power.

### What about Their Leaders?

Certainly it is the Soviet leaders with whom those who represent the United States must deal. It is they, and their predecessors, who have developed and maintained the system. It is they who have the greatest stake in preserving the present regime, in keeping their position of power. It is they who will decide whether the Soviet Union will work out a nuclear arms agreement with the United States, whether the Cold War will continue, or whether armed conflict will occur.

Soviet leaders are human beings. Real people. They have all the traits previously discussed. Because the path to the top of most organizations requires ambition, aggressiveness, and a strong ego, they are likely to possess these traits to a much greater extent than the average citizen. (And so do most of our leaders). But, like most of us, they never feel wholly secure.

In the Cold War era since the end of World War II we have confronted three generations of Soviet leaders. First, Joseph Stalin and his henchmen. Stalin rivaled Adolph Hitler in brutality and drive for power. In the 1930s he caused the death of millions of his own countrymen, perpetrated through purges of political opponents and genocide by starvation in the Ukraine and elsewhere in forcing collectivization of the land. But Stalin was also venerated within the Soviet Union as a great national leader in turning back the German invaders and saving Mother Russia. After the war he extended the harsh features of his regime to satellite states in Eastern Europe.

Next came men who arose in the party structure under Stalin. They survived purges, may have participated in some of the brutality, but came to recognize the excesses. Nikita Khrushchev especially lead a de-Stalinization campaign. Whereas Stalin was content with expansion into contiguous territory (though hoping for Communist parties to gain control further into Western Europe), this new group embarked upon efforts to gain allies and create Communist states in the Third World. They suppressed dissent at home (as Stalin had done previously) and used force to overturn reform initiatives and citizen revolts in the satellite nations. They brought the Soviet nuclear arsenal to parity with the United States, but they were also willing to negotiate arms control agreements.

Mikhail Gorbachev and his appointees represent a new generation of Soviet leaders. Most of them were teenagers during World War II, so have vivid memories of battles, destruction, suffering, and the fight to save the nation. They were coming of age at the end of the Stalin era and were starting to climb party ranks during the de-Stalinization period. They have inherited all the Cold War stereotypes about their chief adversary, the United States, but they seem to be less dogmatically ideological than earlier leaders. They have also inherited a stodgy, bureaucracy-laden economic system. Andrei Gromyko's remark that Gorbachev has a "nice smile and iron teeth" indicates toughness determination, combined with a more appealing public personality than his three predecessors. He is more open to new ways than any of them, but not at the expense of fundamental Soviet interest, as he perceives it.

A good sampling of Gorbachev's thinking is contained in his book, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, written, he indicated, "to address directly the peoples of the USSR, the United States, indeed every country" (1987:9).

## 2. I AM AN ABOLITIONIST

Let me state immediately that I am an abolitionist. I believe that all nuclear weapons should be abolished. Totally. I advocate that this goal be achieved no later than December 31, 1999 so that we can enter the new century freed from the scourge of nuclear terror.

I favor the complete abolition of nuclear weapons because I believe that the use of nuclear weapons is totally wrong. So is threatening their use. Chapter 3 explains why. To do with this idealist stance, I am firmly convinced that total nuclear disarmament is quite realistic because it meets the true self-interest of the United States, the Soviet Union, and all other possessors. Chapter 4 offers my reasoning. Abolition is also the patriotic course to pursue, as indicated in Chapter 5. And it is a practicable course, as laid in Part III of this book.

### Getting to the Core

In speaking to audiences about nuclear weapons, I sometimes hold up an onion and a baseball.

The onion is layered. You can peel off one layer at a time until you reach a small, inner core. Each layer can be consumed or discarded in turn. In some respects, the present approach to nuclear arms reduction is like that, trying to peel off successive layers of nuclear weapons until reaching a smaller core that would satisfy the minimalists, or that could be finally eliminated if abolitionists have their way.

However, I consider the layers-of-the-onion metaphor an oversimplification of what's necessary for eliminating nuclear weapons. The baseball offers a better illustration.

A baseball contains a lively inner core of hard rubber. This core is surrounded by tightly wound string and an outside, securely-stitched cover. By analogy, nuclear weapons are the lively inner core. They are surrounded by an interwoven conventional military forces,



deployed around the world with the heaviest concentration in Central Europe. The cover is the Cold War, stitched together by fear and distrust.

We can make an incision into the baseball and remove part of the core. This we are doing with nuclear weapons as we cut into the nuclear arsenal and remove a small category of weapons -- intermediate-range nuclear forces -- and reduce the number of another category that has a huge surplus of overkill -- strategic nuclear weapons. However, we cannot get at the total hard core of nuclear weapons unless we unwind the tightly entwined conventional forces, especially in Europe where simultaneous conventional and nuclear disarmament must occur. And we cannot do that unless we remove the Cold War cover that has protected the assemblage of half the world's military forces in Europe and the surrounding seas. To do this we must undo the stitches of fear and distrust.

This baseball metaphor -- like most figures of speech -- may lack precision, but it helps make my point that the nuclear arsenal must be approached in the context in which it arose. This was the Cold War, primarily in Europe, as the Soviet Union sought to expand its territorial control and political influence and the United States sought to contain the spread of Communism. The growth of the nuclear arsenal related almost entirely to superpower rivalry in the European sector, a matter we'll explore in depth in later chapters.

I call this Cold War I in contrast to Cold War II, which has consisted of superpower rivalry in the Third World.

For the latter, nuclear weapons have scarcely been a factor. Not so in Europe, though, because about \_\_\_ percent of the world's nuclear weapons supply is based between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains and \_\_\_ percent in nearby seas. Most of the remainder consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles based in the United States and Siberia, submarine-launched

ballistic missiles carried through the wide oceans, and nuclear bombs on long-range bombers. Such strategic forces serve primarily as backup for forces located on the European continent. The small nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France are entirely committed to the European sector. Only China's arsenal and Israel's reputed secret cache are deployed apart from East-West confrontation in Europe.

Accordingly, European disarmament must be a necessary ingredient of nuclear disarmament. And this cannot come about unless both sides change what are by now badly-outmoded Cold War policies stemming from the 1940s and 1950s. They're all associated together: Cold War I, European military concentration, and the nuclear arsenal. That's why nuclear disarmament approached by itself (the layers-of-the-onion approach) is insufficient.

Although some skeptics might insist that to end the Cold War in Europe, to substantially disarm the European continent, and simultaneously to eliminate all nuclear weapons is overly ambitious and entirely infeasible, it is a highly practicable course. That's because it is within the self-interest of the Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies, as later chapters show.

That being the case, we need not wait for world government, as Jonathan Schell has suggested in *The Abolition*. Nuclear disarmament can be achieved by mutual agreement among the nations possessing nuclear weapons. It is in their national self-interest to do so. This makes it a feasible, quite realistic course to pursue. Nuclear disarmament also responds to the highest aspirations of humankind -- to remove this horrible means of self-destruction. This represents the best of our idealism. So for this cause, realism and idealism unite to seek the total abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the globe.

## 2. HISTORICAL SETTING OF THE COLD WAR

World War II brought about tremendous changes in international relations. Defeated Japan relinquished all the territory on the Asian mainland and in the Pacific region that it had acquired by military conquest. The German Third Reich, which had gained control over much of Europe, disappeared. Other European nations lost their overseas colonies as their global empires came to an end. The Soviet Union, badly damaged and suffering 20 million deaths, emerged victorious with the Red Army occupying much of Eastern Europe. Of the major industrial nations, only the United States escaped homeland destruction and would be expected to play a much larger role in global affairs than it had previously.

In the past the United States and Tsarist Russia, and also the latter's successor, the Soviet Union, had operated mostly in separate spheres and seldom confronted one another. During World War II the U.S. and the Soviet Union were allies, though with enough rough spots in their relationship to portend possible difficulties in the postwar period. But in spite of such omens, could there be greater international cooperation, after the war, as idealists hoped? Or would the world revert to the divisiveness of zealous, aggressive nationalism? Could there be One World, peaceful and harmonious? Or would the world divide into blocs of nations, pitted against one another?

Answers to these questions lay largely in the hands of the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union and in the reaction of the people they governed. All too soon the response would take the form of the Cold War. The hope for One World faded as Two Worlds emerged, two powerful blocs of nations, one led by the Soviet Union, the other by the United States. The postwar, world scene would be dominated by an intense rivalry of opposing ideologies and

empires. This conflict would come into focus first and foremost in Eastern Europe and Germany. Later it would spread to the Third World, that is, to the less-industrialized, developing nations.

Deep are the historic roots of this clash of empire and ideology. Eastern Europe, where the Cold War began, has long been a region of shifting political boundaries, forms of government, and alliances. Germany, where repeated Cold War crises have occurred, has had a history of military aggressiveness, as earlier did Prussia, whose initiative created the unified German state. Accordingly, if we are to understand the origins of the Cold War we need to consider the historical setting in which it arose.

### Empires in Contention

"Empire?" many Americans might ask. "Maybe they're an empire, but we're not." The reason for this response is that the concept of "empire" often carries a negative connotation. But let's put values aside for a moment and be descriptive.

An empire is a nation-state controlling or dominating extensive territory inhabited by diverse people. Examples before the time of Christ include Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria. Then came the Roman Empire, controlling all lands bordering the Mediterranean Sea and much of Northern Europe. These earlier empires expanded primarily through military conquest. Closer to our day the British Empire spread around the globe by means of settling sparsely occupied territory (in North America, Australia, and New Zealand) where English settlers became the majority population and by dispatching commercial companies to inhabited lands, leading the way to colonial administration of native populations with a minority of Englishmen in control.

The Russia empire commenced from a relatively small territory occupied by Russians, a major branch of Slavs, and expanded outward to encompass territory inhabited by people with many other ethnic identities. For example, in 1710 Peter the Great took Latvia, Estonia, and

Finland away from Sweden and then established a foothold in Georgia south of the Caucasus Mountains. Catherine the Great in the years between 1772 and 1795 joined with Prussia and Austria to partition Poland out of existence as an independent state, absorbed Lithuania, and contested with Turkey for territory on the northern shore of the Black Sea. Russian hunters and traders, moving eastward in the 16th century, led the way into Siberia, followed by settlers, who established the first Pacific outpost on the Sea of Okhotsk in 1639. Nearly a century and a half later Russia in 1784 set up the first white settlement in Alaska and fifteen years later organized the Russian-American Company, which exercised commercial and governing power in Alaska for the next 68 years. Russian penetration into Central Asia began in the 17th century, and during the second half of the 19th century Imperial Russia gained control of the Turkestan area north of Afghanistan. Except for the Alaskan venture (which ended in 1867 when Russia sold the territory to the United States), all of this was expansion on contiguous land. In the process highly varied ethnic populations were absorbed, beginning with the original Slavs in the European sector and adding Finno-Ugrians, Armenians, Turko-Tartars, Mongolians, and many more.

This was the extensive territory and diverse population controlled by the tsarist regime that was overthrown in March 1917. After the Bolsheviks came to power in November they proceeded to withdraw from World War I, in which Russia was an Allied Power fighting against the Central Powers, led by Germany. In the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Central Powers, the new Soviet government gave up vast territory that had been part of Imperial Russia, including Finland, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Russian "share" of Poland, the Ukraine, and territory south of the Caucasus Mountains. Finland, the three Baltic states, and the Ukraine took advantage of the situation by declaring their independence. The Allied victory in 1918 enabled Poland to become an independent nation. In the next three years the

Soviet regime had to fight off the Allied Powers, which sided with the White army in the Russian civil war, and an invasion by Polish forces. In the 1921 Treaty of Riga that ended this conflict, the Soviet Union regained the Ukraine, ceded land to Poland, and recognized the independence of the Baltic republics. Eighteen years later in August 1939 when Stalin and Hitler entered into a nonaggression pact, they secretly divided Poland. The next month after the Nazis invaded Poland from the west, the Red army entered from the east. Later that year Soviet forces invaded Finland. Thus, as World War II got underway the Soviet government continued a centuries-old Russia practice of seeking territorial expansion when the opportunity seemed to be available.

Being on the Eurasian land mass, the original Russian nucleus, next Imperial Russia, and finally the Soviet Union have all experienced the obverse of expansion: invasion. This has included the Tartars from the east in the 13th century (and still remembered), Polish invaders in 1610, Sweden a hundred years later, Napoleon and the French army in 1812, the conquered Polish people seeking independence in 1830-31, the Ottoman Empire and its allies in 1855, Japan in the east in 1905, Germany in World War I, the Allied powers against the new Soviet government in 1918-20, newly freed Poland in 1920, and Germany again in 1941 after Hitler broke the nonaggression treaty.

In contrast to the way in which the Russian/Soviet empire came about through peripheral expansion, absorbing diverse peoples, loss of territory to invaders, and regaining this land and sometimes more, the United States has displayed a different pattern as it grew into a continental empire and then became a global power. Historically the process goes back to the voyage of Christopher Columbus to the West Indies in 1492. Thereafter three European empires -- Spain, Great Britain, and France (plus the Netherlands for a brief period and Sweden on one occasion) -- sent expeditions to North America, claimed virtually all the land, and commenced sending settlers.

In the process they dislocated the earlier inhabitants, the American Indians who themselves had migrated to North America from East Asia many centuries earlier.

When thirteen British colonies broke away in 1776 and formed the United States of America, they took over the British land claims westward to the Mississippi River. During the 19th century the United States, asserting what its citizenry considered a manifest destiny, expanded across the continent to its present size. This was accomplished by picking up and purchasing land claims of other empires (British, French, Spanish, Mexican), displacement of earlier inhabitants (American Indians), annexation of land already occupied by American settlers (Texas, Pacific Northwest), and military conquest (taking much of the West from Mexico). During the War of 1812 with the British, U.S. troops made several incursions into Canada, even taking control of York (now Toronto) for several months. But the intent was to defeat the British Army, not acquire territory. The story was different in the Mexican War (1846-48), for a major U.S. war aim was to take over Mexican territory between Texas and the California shore. To force acceptance of U.S. demands, the United States Army invaded Mexico and occupied the capital, Mexico City, withdrawing only after Mexico ceded 525,000 square miles of territory to the United States.

The United States acquired its first non-contiguous territory in 1867 with the purchase of Alaska from Russia. In 1898 the U.S. annexed Hawaii where American settlers a few years earlier had overthrown the native monarchy. In the same year after defeating Spain in Cuba and elsewhere, the United States took control of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (and freed Cuba from Spanish rule). This marked the beginning of U.S. expansion beyond continental limits and emergence as a global power. Thereafter, the American empire grew not by territorial acquisition but rather by asserting U.S. power over weaker nations, especially in Latin America.

This has happened through economic measures and selective military intervention.

Unlike Russia, the United States has been almost invasion-free throughout its history. The main exception was the War of 1812 when British forces invaded from Canada, took control of Detroit and other territory inside the United States near the Canadian border for awhile, came ashore from the Chesapeake Bay, occupied Washington, D.C. and burned the Capitol. But the British left in 1815 and never returned. At the beginning of the Mexican War in 1846, Mexican forces crossed the Rio Grande into territory claimed by both nations but were soon expelled. Ever since peaceful relations with Canada and Mexico have kept the United States free from the threat of land invasion. Likewise the vast oceanic expanses have protected the United States from sea attack. During World War II there was fear that Japanese or German submarines might lob a few shells on coastal cities. Indeed, the Japanese released some balloons to carry explosives into the states of Washington and Oregon, [results]. But otherwise during the global conflict of the 1940s U.S. citizens faced no real threat to their homeland security.

This is a long catalogue of territorial expansion, invasions, treaties, and boundary changes. It is offered to provide a sense of the historical background that U.S. and Soviet leaders carried into the post-World War II period when the Cold War began. For indeed, they represented two powerful empires. They also possessed two decisively different ideological outlooks.

### Ideological Differences

In a historical sense the ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are rooted in different responses to social conditions brought about by the Industrial Revolution. National political traditions have also been a factor.

Different people see the same phenomenon but explain the cause differently. If it is a



problem to be solved, they may offer a variety of remedies. Divergent exposition of cause and solution can lead to distinct ideologies, that is, different patterns of thought and belief.

And so it was with the Industrial Revolution that began occurring in England in the middle of the 18th century and then spread elsewhere. It was marked by the invention of new machinery to manufacture goods and new methods of producing mechanical power. This led to production in large factories instead of in homes and small workshops. These new factories required sizable investment funds (capital), careful organization of the manufacturing process (management), a large workforce (labor), and housing to shelter the workers (urban growth). Workers put in long hours. Factory towns and workers dwellings were often poorly built and crowded. Wages were low. Families sent their children to work in the factories. But the owners and managers often became quite wealthy.

Many could observe these conditions. Some felt that whatever the shortcomings, the system should be left alone to solve the problems without governmental interference (*laissez faire*). Some thought that at least something should be done to improve the life of the poor (welfare). Others considered the problem to be exploitation of workers by the owners. Several types of remedies were proposed. Workers could organize to deal with owners collectively (unions). Government could regulate working conditions (economic reform). For this to happen the electorate must be expanded to allow everyone to vote (political reform). Workers could become owners of the factories (communal ownership), or government could take control of production (socialism). These reforms could be brought about through existing political processes (democratic change) or through overthrow of existing institutions (revolution).

The latter was the remedy proposed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. They perceived the industrial world to be in the grip of a class struggle in

which the bourgeoisie (capitalists) were exploiting the proletariat (workers). Their remedy was state ownership of the means of production, to be accomplished through revolution whereby the workers would overthrow the capitalists. To foster these ideas Marx in 1864 organized the International Workingmen's Association, known as the First International, but it dissolved in 1876 because of policy disputes. European socialists formed the Second International in 1898, and it lasted until 1914 when nationalism, as manifested in World War I, proved to be a stronger force than the international ties of workers.

In the Soviet Union the socialist movement split into the more radical Bolsheviks (that is, "majority," for the term is derived from the Russian word, bolshe, meaning "bigger") and the Mensheviks (minority, from menshe, "smaller"), which placed greater emphasis upon democratic participation. As leader of the Bolsheviks, Nikolai Lenin insisted that a dedicated leadership corps from the workers party should serve as the proletariat's advance guard to lead the revolution and to rule as a dictatorship of the proletariat until socialism was well-established and the state would wither away. Lenin practiced what he preached, except for the last stage, as he led the Bolsheviks to power in the Soviet Union in November 1917. Sixteen months later he organized the Communist International, or COMINTERN (and sometimes called the Third International) as a vehicle for spreading communism to other countries.

In contrast to the Marx-Lenin approach, other remedies to problems created by the Industrial Revolution were applied in England, the United States, and elsewhere: political reform to broaden the electorate, governmental regulation of working conditions, labor unions, collective bargaining, and in some places democratic socialism. Many of these achievements came only after much controversy and long struggle in face of strong resistance. This was particularly true with the organization of labor unions.

In the United States not much support developed for the type of revolution that Marx, Engels, and Lenin advocated. The greatest controversy centered on labor organizing. Some labor organizers voiced class struggle rhetoric but concentrated mostly on workplace issues. Indeed, a major segment of the labor movement eschewed political involvement. Owners and managers vigorously resisted labor organizing. Some of them brought in police, militia, and their own security force to defeat strikes and other labor initiatives. Rural populists also employed class struggle imagery, but compared to trade union leaders, they tended more toward political solutions and electoral activities. In spite of sometimes vehement speeches by their champions, workers and farmers seldom initiated violence. In some incidents where it occurred, management or the police were the instigators. The notion of violent overthrow of the government never gained much of a following in the United States.

Nevertheless, fear of labor violence, of the potential for the growth of an American communist movement has repeatedly risen in the United States. Communist takeover in Russia in 1917 aggravated these fears, leading to the "red scare" of the early 1920s with enactment of repressive laws, investigations, prosecution, and deportation. Social unrest during the Great Depression of the 1930s gave the U.S. Communist Party recruitment opportunities, but the economic reforms of the New Deal drew much broader support from workers and the unemployed. This continued the long history of reformist responses in the United States to problems of industrial change rather than more radical and revolutionary approaches.

When the United States and the Soviet Union joined in a wartime alliance to defeat Nazi Germany, they came together with two different governmental systems, two dissimilar economic systems, and two distinct ideological perspectives. Each thought it possessed the true way. Each saw flaws in the other more clearly than its own shortcomings. Nevertheless, they were able to

put aside these differences for awhile as they sought to turn back the Nazi onslaught. But divergent ideologies and imperial ambitions lingered not far below the surface, from where they would later reappear.

### Dealing with Germany

The top leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union in World War II had all seen the consequences of German aggression in World War I under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the German Army general staff. They had witnessed the resurgence of German military power under Adolph Hitler and the steady acquisition of territory through various measures of coercion. How best to defeat Nazi Germany was a primary issue in Allied dealings between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. Likewise what to do about Germany would become a major issue in the Cold War that followed victory over the Nazis.

For Tsarist Russia the First World War began in August 1914. At that time Russia was associated with Great Britain and France in a Triple Entente. Germany was connected with Austria-Hungary (the Hapsburg Empire) and the Ottoman Empire (now Turkey), plus Bulgaria later on, known together as the Central Powers. When Germany invaded Belgium enroute to France, Russia launched twin attacks directly into Germany's Prussian province (Poland didn't exist as an independent state at that time) and into Austria-Hungary. The Russians succeeded for awhile but were eventually driven back, and the Central Powers invaded the Russian homeland. After the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917 the provisional government remained in the war, but a month after the Bolsheviks took over in November, Lenin sought an armistice with Germany. He wanted to withdraw from the "capitalist" war and provide breathing space for consolidating the revolution. When the resulting Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed in March 1918, the Bolsheviks surrendered control of extensive territory, as noted earlier.

The United States tried to stay out of World War I even though some public sympathy existed for the cause of England and France against Germany. But in 1917 after German submarines increased their attacks on U.S. ships transporting supplies to the Western allies, the United States declared war on Germany and sent troops to France. The Bolshevik withdrawal from the war meant that Germany no longer had to fight on both the eastern and western fronts. This increased western antipathy to the new regime and was a factor in Allied willingness to help the White army in the ensuing Russian civil war.

The Treaty of Versailles was harsh on defeated Germany, transferring pieces of territory to France, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, and Lithuania, taking away its overseas colonies, and extracting heavy reparations. However, reparations were later reduced, and those which Germany paid were less in value than loans it received from the United States and other countries to keep a troubled economy going (and which Germany never fully repaid). Social and economic unrest in Germany because of inflation and other economic difficulties plus bitter feelings over the terms of the Treaty of Versailles created an atmosphere in which Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist Party, the Nazis, could sow hatred and a sense of persecution and thereby work their way to political power.

The Versailles Treaty also set up the League of Nations. When the U.S. Senate would not provide the required two-thirds majority in support of the treaty, the United States did not join the League. Without U.S. participation in this new vehicle for collective security, the League proved too weak an instrument to forge strong resistance to the rising Nazis. The efforts of Great Britain, France, and other nations in Western Europe to check the resurgence of German power were disunited. The United States, dominated by an isolationist mood, did not become involved. And the Soviet Union concentrated on its own internal problems. But lest we blame the victims

we must realize that it was Hitler, his cohorts, and the consenting German people who were the aggressors.

The rise of Nazism and the renewal of German imperialistic expansion was marked by growing internal violence to intimidate opponents, the start of Jewish persecution, Hitler's decision in 1935 to disregard the Treaty of Versailles by rebuilding the German army and sending troops into demilitarized districts west of the Rhine, in 1938 the Nazis taking control of Austria and extorting the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, in 1939 the German army occupying the remainder of Czechoslovakia and seizing the Baltic port city of Memel, previously transferred from Germany to Lithuania by the Versailles Treaty. The same treaty had separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany with a strip of land given to Poland and had established Danzig (now Gdansk) as a free port under the League of Nations. Hitler demanded control of this additional territory, but Poland refused.

From the perspective of the Soviet Union, Germany was moving eastward and West European nations were too unassertive to block growing German military power. In this setting Joseph Stalin decided to cut a deal with Hitler: the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, which guaranteed Soviet neutrality in case Germany went to war and secretly gave the Soviet Union a share of Polish territory if the Germans invaded Poland. The German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, which started World War II, went so swiftly that German soldiers got to the partition line before the Soviets and then went beyond, so that the Soviet Union got less territorial spoils than it had bargained for. However, the Soviets now had a free hand to go after other territory, which they did (we'll get to that in a moment).

Nevertheless, the Soviets were no safer than any other nation who tried to bargain with Hitler. After conquering Poland, Germany moved westward and reached the Atlantic Ocean with

the fall of France in June 1940. With Western Europe under his control, Hitler turned his attention eastward again and on June 22, 1941 launched an all-out attack on the Soviet Union. In this invasion Germany was supported by Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, which had joined the Axis (whose original members were Germany, Italy, and Japan). Finland, reeling from a Soviet invasion of 1939, became an Axis member soon after German forces moved into the Soviet Union.

Thus, for the second time in 25 years the German army invaded Soviet territory. It is little wonder that the defeat of Germany became the principal war aim of the Soviet Union and assurance that German military power would never arise again became a primary Soviet peace objective for the postwar period.

From the perspective of the United States the disturbing growth of Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy and the darkening war clouds in Europe were matters most Americans wanted to stay clear of. So in 1935 the Congress enacted legislation prohibiting shipment of arms and ammunition to any belligerent. Yet, the United States was inevitably drawn in. After the German invasion of Poland, Congress repealed the arms embargo so that supplies could go to the opponents of Germany. In 1940 President Roosevelt transferred 50 destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for leases to put bases on British territory in the Western hemisphere. In March 1941 Congress approved the Lend-Lease program that enabled the United States to supply nations fighting against the Axis, and this assistance started flowing particularly to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States declared war on Japan the next day. Three days later German and Italy declared war on the United States, which the United States immediately reciprocated. By these actions the U.S. was instantly allied with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and other nations fighting against Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan.

## Eastern Europe

In the 22 month period between the German invasion of Poland and Nazi assault on the Soviet Union, Western Europe was deeply engaged in a fight for survival against the Germans. The Soviet Union, not yet involved in World War II because of its nonaggression pact with Germany, used this opportunity to seek territorial expansion of its own in the Baltic region. This followed a centuries-old Russian pattern. It was a practice that the Soviets would continue during and after World II, which would make the political boundaries and control of Eastern Europe a central issue in the Cold War.

Accordingly, if we are to comprehend the origins and the course of the Cold War, we need a historical perspective on the changing boundaries and shifts in political control that has occurred around the European edges of Russia during the past several hundred years. Let us do so by starting with the Baltic region and proceeding southward to the Balkans.

Baltic region. Historically four distinct peoples have occupied the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea: Finns, Estonians, Latvians (Letts), and Lithuanians. Each has had its own language. For than a thousand years each has had a distinct cultural identity. But until the end of World War I, all four had lacked political independence for centuries, though the desire for separate nationhood remained alive.

Finland was conquered by Sweden in 1155, but the Finns were granted equal political rights. In 1710 Peter the Great sent in Russian forces and gained control of the southern portion, but the Swedes continued to rule the north until 1809 when Tsarist Russia took over the entire land.

In the 13th to 16th centuries Estonia was ruled successively by Danes, Germans, and Poles until Sweden took control in 1561. Peter the Great ended Swedish rule in 1710, and Estonia was incorporated into Russia as part of the peace settlement of 1721.



Historically the land of the Latvians consisted of two states: Livonia on the north and Courland on the south. Beginning in the mid-12th century Germans were dominant for 300 years. Then Sweden gained ascendancy in Livonia until Peter the Great won control in 1721. Poland replaced the Germans in Courland until 1795 when Poland itself was partitioned out of existence and the Russians took possession.

Unlike the others, Lithuania was once a state with considerable power and possessed a domain reaching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, first as an independent state in the 14th century and then in union with Poland, sharing a common ruler but with two separate political units. In the 1795 partition of Poland most of Lithuania went to Russia, but Prussia claimed a portion.

Thus, in 1914 at the beginning of World War I Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were all under Russia rule. From 1915 into 1918 German forces occupied Lithuania, Estonia, and part of Latvia. In 1917-18 after the Russian tsar was ousted and the Bolsheviks came to power, all four declared their independence. But each of them had to struggle against local Bolsheviks for control, and the three Baltic republics, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, had to fight against the occupying Germans for awhile. The Treaty of Versailles recognized their new status as independent states. However, in 1920 newly independent Poland infiltrated military forces into the district in and around the city of Vilnius, Lithuania, and in 1922 formally incorporated the district into its territory. The Lithuania used the same tactic in 1923 to gain control of the port city of Klaipeda, at the time under Allied control. However, in March 1939 Germany, as part of its steady, coercive movement eastward, seized Klaipeda and restored its Prussian name, Memel. But otherwise the Baltic republics and Finland functioned as sovereign nations, free from foreign aggression, from 1918 until the autumn of 1939.

Then the Soviet Union made its move into these lands. In October 1939, two months after signing the nonaggression pact with Germany, the Soviet Union pressured Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into accepting the basing of Soviet military forces on their soil. On November 20 the Red Army invaded Finland, an action that caused the League of Nations to expel the Soviet Union from its membership. In March 1940 vanquished Finland ceded to the Soviet Union the Karelian isthmus (north of Leningrad), including the city of Vyborg, and also the port of Hanko. In June of that year Soviet military forces occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in August 1940 the Soviet Union formally annexed these three Baltic states and converted them to Soviet republics.

Poland. Living on a broad plain with no distinct physical barriers to the east or west, the Polish people have long endured invasion, division, and shifting boundaries for their homeland. They are a people with a long identity, for by the year 1000 Poland had emerged as an independent kingdom. In 1241 the Mongols, who had swept through Russia, reached Poland and devastated the land, though didn't stay to rule. Dynastic union between Poland and Lithuania started to take shape in 1384, and when it was formalized in 1569 under Polish dominance, it constituted an extensive territory, including much of the Ukraine. But by then Prussia on one side and Russia on the other were emerging as powerful states. Throughout the 17th century into the 18th, Poland was a declining power, at one point governed by members of Swedish royalty, fighting wars with the Turks, Sweden, and Russia, losing Baltic territory to Sweden and the eastern Ukraine to Russia, experiencing pressure from the Hapsburg's Austro-Hungarian Empire in the south, watching Prussia grow more powerful. In three partitioning actions in 1772, 1793, and 1795 Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary took away Polish territory until none remained, and Poland passed out of existence as an independent state. But the Poles retained their language, their cultural, their identity as a people. In 1807 Napoleon united Polish territory as a grand duchy, but the 1815

Congress of Vienna redivided Poland. In 1830 Poles drove the Russians out of Warsaw and proclaimed their independence, but in 1831 the Russians crushed the revolt. Another Polish revolution failed in 1863. During World War I the Germans drove out the Russians and took control. But when Germany went down to defeat, in 1918, Poland declared its independence, freed after 123 years of foreign rule.

The Treaty of Versailles recognized Polish independence, gave Poland access to the Baltic Sea by a land corridor that divided Germany's Prussia province in two separated sections, and made Danzig (Gdanz) a free city under the League of Nations. With the break up of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland regained the Galacia district, and after a plebiscite, took control of much of Silesia, which Prussia had previously controlled. In 1920 the newly established Soviet Union, having defeated White forces in Byelorussia to the east of Poland, moved westward into Poland. In a counteroffensive the Polish army moved into the Ukraine and capture Kiev. In seeking to arrange an armistice between the Poles and the Soviets, Lord Curzon, the British foreign secretary, offered a suggested dividing line, which both sides rejected. Ultimately Polish forces moved east of this line, and the 1921 Treaty of Riga, which settled the war, return to Poland most of the eastern territory it had lost in the partition of 1793.

After Nazi Germany had taken over all of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, it was obvious that Poland was the next target of Hitler's ambitions. The Germans demanded a strip of territory across the Polish corridor to connect East Prussia with the rest of Germany, but the Polish government would not yield. To prepare of invasion of Poland, Germany on August 23, 1939 entered into the nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union and secretly worked out a partition plan for Poland. The German blitzkrieg began on September 1. Soviet invasion from the east came on September 17. By October the last sizable Polish resistance ended, and Poland once again was

partitioned out of existence.

Ukraine. Though now an integral part of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, like other districts in Eastern Europe, has experienced a number of shifts in political control and territorial boundaries over the centuries. Its capital, Kiev, functioned as the first capital of the Russian nation from the 9th to the 12th century until prevailing power shifted to Moscow. Therefore, the Ukrainians, sometimes called "Little Russians," developed their own culture and their own language, akin to Russian but distinct. Then during the 15th, 16th, and into the 17th centuries the Polish-Lithuanian empire gained ascendancy over the Ukraine. In 1667 Russian won control of the eastern portion up to the Dneiper River and acquired the remainder in the 1793 partition of Poland. A Ukrainian separatist movement started to grow in the middle of the 19th century, and after the overthrow of the Russian tsar in 1917, Ukraine declared its independence. In March 1918 German and Austria troops occupied the Ukraine, especially to draw on its food supplies, but this ended with the defeat of the Central Powers the following November. After two unsuccessful attempts, a Ukrainian Soviet republic allied with Moscow displaced the independent Ukrainian government in 1920. In that period Ukrainian forces contested Poland for control of the Galician district, previously part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, especially East Galicia, which contained a majority Ruthenian population, akin linguistically and culturally to the Ukrainians of Russia. Poland won this struggle, as confirmed by the 1921 Treaty of Riga. In this same treaty both Poland and the Soviet Union recognized the independence of the Ukraine. However, in 1923 when the constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was adopted, the Ukraine became a constituent member.

Czechoslovakia. Established as an independent state in November 1918 at the end of the First World War, Czechoslovakia took form out a portion of the collapsed Austro-Hungarian

empire. The core of the new state consisted of the districts of Bohemia and Moravia in the western and central sections, occupied primarily by Czechs, and Slovakia in the east, inhabited mostly by Slovaks. The two peoples are Slavs, and they joined together in a quest to end long-time subjugation by other nations.

Historically the Czechs could recall a golden age in the 13th to 15th centuries when Bohemia was an important kingdom in the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, in 1346 when King Charles of Bohemia became Emperor Charles IV he ruled from Prague. But after a period of divisive religious wars in the first half of the 15th century, Polish kings reigned over Bohemia from 1471 to 1526. Then country fell under the control of the Hapsburg family of German-speaking rulers. Eventually the Hapsburg empire encompassed Hungary within its orbit, thereby bringing in the Slovaks, whose region had been part of Hungary since the 11th century.

In addition to these two major Slavic peoples, the new nation of Czechoslovakia also contained a German-speaking population, particularly in the Sudetes Mountains north of Prague and in the border area near Austria. There were also Magyars in the southern section near Hungary and Ruthenes in the eastern-most section, a people essentially Ukrainian in language and culture but living in an area long under Hungarian rule.

These ethnic divisions were important factors in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39 under the onslaught Nazi Germany. After years of agitation internally by Sudeten Germans and after 1933 outside pressure by Hitler, the Munich agreement of September 30, 1938 gave Germany (which had already absorbed Austria) all districts of Czechoslovakia where a 1910 Austrian census had revealed 50 percent or more German-speaking population. At the same time Poland took 400 square miles from Czechoslovakia and Hungary a large slice of Slovakia containing a sizable Magyar population. Altogether Czechoslovakia lost one-third of its

population. At the same time Germany encouraged the Slovaks and Ruthenes to seek greater autonomy, resulting in a constitutional revision that produced a federal Czech-Slovakia with a semi-independent Ruthenia attached. In March 1939 German troops occupied the Czech portion, which Germany annexed and at the same time made Slovakia into a supposedly independent state under German "protection", that is, domination. At that moment Hungary, ruled by Admiral Mikles Horthy and allied with Germany, annexed Ruthenia. So Czechoslovakia disappeared as a nation state.

Hungary. To the south of Czechoslovakia is the land of the Magyars, descendents of Finno-Ugrians who migrated westward from beyond the Ural Mountains, mixed with Turki people on the Russian steppes, and started settling in the middle Danube region by the end of the 9th century. By the 11th century they had expanded to take possession of Transylvania to the southeast and Slovakia to the north. At the peak of expansion in the latter half of the 15th century, Hungary also controlled Austria, Bohemia, and Silesia. Thereafter, the Turks invaded from the south, and the Ottoman empire ruled most of Hungary for 150 years. Austria, under the Hapsburg family, controlled the rest and then toward the end of the 17th century drove back the Turks. In the 19th century Hungarian desire for independence grew, culminating in a revolt in 1848, put down by Austria with Russian assistance. But after Austria suffered a succession losses to Italy and Prussia in the next two decades, the Hungarians asserted themselves to gain co-equal status in a new Austria-Hungary, united under a single monarch.

In 1918 after the defeat of Austria-Hungary in World War I, a national council of Hungarians formed a republic, but within a year a socialist-communist coalition with an orientation toward Moscow took over. This government in turn was overthrown and the monarchy was restored, but without a monarch, rather with Admiral Horthy as regent. The Treaty

of Trianon in 1920 stripped Hungary of two-thirds of its territory, transferring districts to Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. After Hitler came to power in 1933, he promised Hungary the return of its lost provinces, so Admiral Horthy allied himself and Hungary with Germany and Italy. This enabled Hungary to regain territory from Czechoslovakia in 1938 and to get back Transylvania from Romania in 1940. Nevertheless, when Hitler attacked Poland in 1939 Hungary refused to allow German troops to cross its territory, but the next year gave transit rights for the Germany army into Romania. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the Hungarian army joined the attack.

### 3. COLD WAR IN TWO MODES

No exact date can be given on when the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union began. No precise event, such as the Nazi blitzkrieg into Poland on September 1, 1939 marked the beginning of World War II. The term "cold war" itself was used previously in the mid-30s to describe German efforts to gain territory through intimidation without fighting. As a description of East-West conflict following World War II, Bernard Baruch, American financier and adviser to presidents, used the phrase in a speech in April 1946. Walter Lippmann, renowned American journalist, wrote a book called *The Cold War* that was published in 1947. Others picked by the term (*The World Book Encyclopedia*, 1963: vol. 3, p. 618b).

Forty years later we can look back and observe that this Cold War has occurred in two principal modes, interconnected but each with its own set of dynamics.

Cold War I, as I shall call the first mode, has featured Soviet attempts of peripheral expansion and U.S. efforts of containment. This prolonged engagement has taken place mainly in Europe, and by extension, in the North Atlantic, North America, and North Pacific. A bit of Cold War I has also reached the Soviet border areas in Southwest Asia. In the 1950s China was involved but is now "in between" the two superpowers. Essentially it is East-West conflict taking place in the Northern Hemisphere. The two sides have deployed an enormous military force, including most of the world's nuclear arsenal, but they have not engaged in armed combat against one another.

The second mode, Cold War II, has consisted of the quest for power by Communist-related movements outside Europe, frequently related to the Soviet Union, and U.S. resistance; also, U.S.-initiated drives for power and influence in Third World nations and



resistance by forces allied with Moscow. Much of this has occurred in lands emerging from colonial rule previously imposed by the Japanese (Korea), Dutch (Indonesia), French (Indochina, in Africa), British (Asia, Africa) Portuguese (Africa), plus former German and Italian colonies (in Africa). But Cold War II has also taken place in Central and South America and the Caribbean area, under the shadow of U.S. dominance.

Essentially a Third World phenomenon, Cold War II has featured intrigue, open and covert support of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces, propping up or seeking to topple existing regimes, economic and military aid, sometimes military intervention directly or through surrogates. On many occasions it has become a hot war, though never with U.S. and Soviet combat forces arrayed against one another. All of the battles fought by U.S.-and Soviet-backed forces in the Third World have used conventional, not nuclear, weapons. Indeed, very few nuclear weapons have been deployed in Third World situations, and nuclear deterrence has been essentially irrelevant (as we'll discuss more fully in the next chapter).

Although not every event in U.S./Soviet relations of the past forty years can be neatly assigned to one of these two modes of the Cold War, it is a useful division to help us understand the role of nuclear weapons in this relationship and thereby can help us figure out how to eliminate them.

### Historical Setting

Over long decades the United States had few significant relationships with Imperial Russia (the purchase of Alaska in 1867 was an exception). By and large Americans had scarcely formed opinions about this territorially largest nation in the world. Most of those who did would not have favored the tsarist regime, its medieval serfdom, its secret police, its repressive practices. Any most Americans in the 19th century and up until World War II in this century preferred to

keep out of the seemingly confused world of European affairs.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 changed this because of strong emotions aroused by communist rhetorical attacks on capitalism and the apparent desire to foment worldwide revolution. The United States joined the Allied Powers in supporting the White resistance to the Red Army and in doing so sent American troops into Russia in 19\_\_\_. The U.S. government refused to recognize the Communist regime until President Franklin Roosevelt changed this policy in 1933 and sent an ambassador to Moscow. Nonetheless, some American idealists looked favorably on the revolution, hoping that it heralded a fairer system for the working class than prevailed in western capitalism. Some industrialists and engineers responded to the challenge of that industrially-backward land and provided their knowledge for new production facilities and public works projects. But the majority of Americans distrusted the Soviets.

American animosity toward the Soviet Union grew rapidly after the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, which enabled Germany to invade Poland soon thereafter and then turn its attention westward to attack the low countries and France. This negative feelings were reinforced when the Soviet Union joined Germany in partitioning Poland out of existence, invaded Finland toward the end of 1939, and the next year annexed the three Baltic states. However, a reversal of American attitudes occurred after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. As the United States itself was drawn into the war against Germany, Americans applauded Soviet resistance, especially the heroic battle of Stalingrad and the drive to reppel the Nazi invaders. The United States and the Soviet Union had joined together to defeat a common enemy, deemed dreadfully evil by both the American and the Soviet peoples. By 1944 a majority of Americans were optimistic that this favorable wartime association could continue into a peaceful postwar world.

## The Big Three

By then, though, U.S. leaders dealing directly with Soviet leadership were experiencing difficulties on some important issues. These appeared in ongoing diplomatic relationships and came into focus at two wartime meetings of the Big Three: U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, Soviet Primere Joseph Stalin, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. To these sessions they each brought the interests of their countries and their own personal experience, including the influence of events that occurred in their formative years.

The Tehran and Yalta conferences helped the wartime Allies to settle some important issues about the war and the postwar world, but some matters were unresolved. In retrospect, aspects of what later became the Cold War were foreshadowed in these Big Three meetings.

At Tehran in [month] 1943

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met next at Yalta in February 1945 as the Allies were moving toward victory over Nazi Germany to work out understandings on postwar issues. At Yalta the three leaders formulated the occupation zones for Germany but did not reach agreement on German reparation. They agreed to reestablish Poland as an independent nation, worked out a plan for a new Polish government, but could not agree upon the western boundary of Poland. Regarding the nations being liberated from Axis rule, the three Allied governments in the Yalta declaration promised to assist the people "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." At Yalta the three leaders also made decisions on the shape of the United Nations, and Stalin made a commitment to go to war against Japan within three months after German surrender.

## Cold War I -- The First Ten Years

Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945. By then U.S. and British forces had moved through Germany as far as \_\_\_\_\_ and into Czechoslovakia and Austria. Soviet troops had met the Western armies across these three nations. Within \_\_\_\_\_ months Soviet, U.S., British, and French forces had taken up positions in predetermine occupation zones. [Outline.]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had already taken steps to expand its territory and influence in Eastern Europe. As the Red Army drove back Nazi forces, the Soviets took control of the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had gained independence in 1918 after more than a century of Russian tsarist rule. The Soviets also annexed parts of Finland, Poland, East Prussia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Soviet forces occupied the rest of Romania, all of Bulgaria, Hungary, and what would become the new Poland, and a portion of Germany and Czechoslovakia (the remainder of these two nations being occupied by Western troops). National forces allied with Moscow liberated Yugoslavia and Albania. Thus, the defeat of Hitler gave the Soviet Union and Communist allies an opportunity to expand control over most of Eastern Europe. Motivation was both ideological and nationalistic: the desire to spread Communism; ambition for territorial expansion, long a strong force in Russia going back to tsarist days; and a concern for security by establishing buffer states between the Soviet heartland and Germany, which had invaded Russia twice within 25 years.

Another Big Three meeting took place in Potsdam, Germany near Berlin in July 1945. By then Harry Truman was president of the United States, following the death of Franklin Roosevelt in April. Half way through the conference Clement Atlee replaced Winston Churchill as British prime minister and came to Potsdam to take his place. Only Joseph Stalin remained of

the original Big Three. After        days of meeting these representatives of the victorious powers agreed

In the months that followed the Soviet Union moved to consolidate its hold over Eastern Europe. Quickly the Soviet occupiers set up Communist governments in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, whose previous regimes had joined the Axis and supported the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviets ignored the Yalta agreement to have all major interests represented in a new Polish government, instead installing a Communist regime. For all four nations the Yalta commitment to free elections was ignored. For awhile Czechoslovakia had a coalition government of communists, social democrats, and populists. The communists had control of the police force and used this power to take over the government in February 1948 with Soviet blessing. National communist forces in Yugoslavia and Albania set up their own governments. In June 1948 the Soviets tried to foment overthrow of the Yugoslav regime led by Marshal Tito, who was displaying independence from Moscow domination, but they were thwarted. Thereupon, Yugoslavia split from the Soviet bloc.

In this same period the Soviet Union tried to expand toward the southwest but was blocked by the United States. The first event occurred in Iran, where Soviet, British, and U.S. forces were stationed during World War II. The British and the Soviets came originally to block a feared German takeover as well as to uphold historic interests in that region. The Americans arrived in connection with the lend-lease supply line that ran from the Persian Gulf into the Soviet Union. Soon after the war was over British and U.S. forces departed, but Soviet troops remained in Northern Iran until a vigorous diplomatic nudge by the United States caused them to evacuate.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was putting pressure on Turkey to regain a couple of provinces which had previously passed back and forth and to share in control of the Bosphorus and

Darnanelles straits. In Greece the Soviet Union sided with and sent supplies to leftist partisans in a civil war which had broken out while World War II was still underway. Historically Great Britain had supported Turkey and Greece in great power competition, but in the postwar years Britain could no longer play this role. So the United States took up the slack. To demonstrate support for Turkey in face of Soviet demands, President Truman dispatched the battleship Missouri for a visit to Istanbul in the summer of 1946 and thereafter the U.S. 6th Fleet became a fixture in the Eastern Mediterranean. In January 1947 Truman requested Congress to provide economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey and in March gave a speech which set forth what became known as the Truman Doctrine: that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." [quoted in Gaddis, 1982: 22. Look up original.]

Thus, two years after the end of World War II in Europe the two basic forces of Cold War I were well established: Soviet expansionism, particularly into Eastern Europe; and U.S. containment, the effort to block the peripheral expansion of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were able to expand by occupying territory liberated from Nazi conquest. The United States responded by seeking to stop Soviet expansion beyond the occupied zone.

In the West the intellectual basis for containment was laid out by George Kennan, first in a lengthy telegraphic message from his post at the U.S. embassy in Moscow in February 1946 and then in an article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," signed only as "Mr. X" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs when Kennan was director of the State Department's planning staff.

### Historic Roots

Europe has been the principal arena for Cold War I, the first mode of US/Soviet conflict since the end of World War II. In Europe the Cold War has had two main geopolitical focuses:

(1) Germany and (2) Eastern Europe, with some spillover into the Middle East on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The seeds for this conflict were sown during World War II in the soil of historic ideological and imperial rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union (which we traced in the previous chapter). A strong influence was the direct experience of U.S. and Soviet leaders in the First World War, the failed peace process, and events leading up to the Second World War. Therefore, a bit of that history is worth recalling.

Russia entered World War I as an ally of France and Great Britain (the Triple Entente) against the Central Powers (principally Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, but also Bulgaria). Among other reasons, Tsarist Russia hope to extend its influence in the Balkans where Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman regime were the dominant powers. After the German Kaiser declared war on Russia and other nations in August 1914 and launched an invasion of Belgian and France, Russian armies initiated twin thrusts of their own: westward into the Prussia province of Germany (remember there was no Polish state at the time) and to the southwest into Austro-Hungarian territory. The next year, though, the Central Powers drove back the Russians and by 1917 had penetrated well into the Russian homeland. After the Russian tsar was overthrown in March, the provisional government continued the fight against Austro-German forces, but after the Bolsheviks took over in November, Lenin sought an armistice with Germany. In terms settled on in March 1918, the new regime gave up vast territory formerly controlled by the Russian Empire, as noted in chapter 2. When Germany itself was defeated in November 1918 by the western Allies, it lost much of what it had gained but the Bolsheviks didn't get back much of what they had given up.

Twenty years later the Soviet Union, now under Stalin's despotic leadership, was seeing the resurgence of German power, this time under Adolph Hitler and the Nazi Party. Violating the

Treaty of Versailles, Hitler in 1935 began to rebuild the German army and the next year sent troops into demilitarized districts west of the Rhine River. In 1938 Nazi Germany took control of Austria and extorted the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, all without fighting. In early 1939 the German army occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia and next seized the Baltic port city of Memel in Lithuania. The Treaty of Versailles had separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany with a strip of land given to Poland and had established Danzig (now Gdansk) as a free city under the League of Nations. Hitler demanded control of this additional territory, but Poland refused.

Thus, the Soviet Union could see Germany moving eastward and Britain, France, and other nations in Western Europe not effectively blocking the resurgence of German power. In this setting Joseph Stalin decided to cut a deal with Hitler: the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, which guaranteed Soviet neutrality in case Germany went to war and secretly gave the Soviet Union a share of Polish territory if the Germans invaded Poland. The German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, which started World War II, went so swiftly that German soldiers got to the partition line before the Soviets and then went beyond, so that the Soviet Union got less territorial spoils than it had bargained for. However, the Soviets now had a free hand to go after other territory, which they did (we'll get to that in a moment).

Nevertheless, the Soviets were no safer than any other nation who tried to bargain with Hitler. After conquering Poland, Germany moved westward and reached the Atlantic Ocean with the fall of France in June 1940. With Western Europe in his control, Hitler turned his attention eastward again and on June 22, 1941 launched an all-out attack on the Soviet Union. In this invasion Germany was supported by Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, which had joined the Axis (whose original members were Germany, Italy, and Japan). Finland, reeling from Soviet invasion in 1939, became a member soon after Nazi forces moved into the Soviet Union.



Thus, for the second time in 25 years German forces invaded Soviet territory. It is little wonder that the defeat of Germany became the principal war aim of the Soviet Union and the assurance that German military power would never arise again became a primary peace objective for the postwar period.

## PART I. BEGINNINGS

Everything has a beginning. Everything that starts can end -- soon or eventually. Sometimes an ending becomes a new beginning.

The nuclear weapons era had a beginning, and it can end if we the peoples of Earth want it to. The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, the driving force that has caused the accumulation of 50,000 nuclear warheads, had a beginning. It can end if we the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union (perhaps with some help from our friends) want it to. Ending the Cold War would make possible the ending of the nuclear weapons era. Abolition of nuclear weapons would usher in a new era, a new beginning, an age of common security to replace forty years of Cold War insecurity.

To guide our way toward abolition, it is helpful to understand several beginnings: the initiation of the nuclear age; the start of the Cold War; the early development of the bizarre notion that the threat of massive nuclear destruction is a proper deterrent of one's adversary. Our knowledge of these beginnings can teach us lessons and can help us comprehend the nature of phenomena we are trying to end. Nuclear abolitionists, who are seeking a new beginning, can learn from this past experience.

Accordingly, Part I looks back to the origins of three matters that have shaped world history of the past forty years: nuclear weapons, the Cold War, and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

## 2. COLD WAR IN TWO MODES

No exact date can be given on when the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union began. No precise event, such as the Nazi blitzkrieg into Poland on September 1, 1939 marked the beginning of World War II. The term "cold war" itself was used previously in the mid-30s to describe German efforts to gain territory through intimidation without fighting. As a description of East-West conflict following the Second World War, Bernard Baruch, American financier and adviser to presidents, used the phrase in a speech in April 1946. Walter Lippmann, renowned American journalist, wrote a book called *The Cold War* that was published in 1947. Others picked by the term, and it became common usage (*The World Book Encyclopedia*, 1963: vol. 3, p. 618b).

The multiplication of nuclear weapons has occurred as an integral part of the Cold War. This happened as the chosen response to specific events and to particular sets of relationships, and it reflected attitudes of U.S. and Soviet leadership in the period when the Cold War began.

If we want to limit nuclear weapons, we must understand the causes of the Cold War. In doing so, we will find that some of the causes were temporal, associated with circumstances no longer prevailing and with persons who are long deceased. But other causes related to issues that remain alive today. In our day there are other ways to deal with these issues than stockpiling nuclear weapons, so we do have to stick with this previously adopted response. But before devising such alternative policies, we should consider the historical reasons why these issues are important to the contending parties, to the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies.

If we look back at the Cold War since its inception in the 1940s, we can observe that it has occurred in two principal modes, interconnected but each with its own set of dynamics.

Cold War I, as I shall call the first mode, has featured Soviet attempts of peripheral expansion and U.S. efforts of containment. This prolonged engagement has taken place mainly in Europe where it is connected with the way the victorious powers of the Second World War have dealt with Germany. A bit of Cold War I has also reached into Asia Minor near the Soviet border. By extension it has also drawn in military forces deployed in North America, the North Atlantic, and the North Pacific. In the 1950s China was involved but is now "in between" the two superpowers.

Essentially Cold War I is East-West conflict taking place in the Northern Hemisphere. The two sides have deployed an enormous military force, including most of the world's nuclear arsenal, but they have not engaged in armed combat against one another.

The second mode, Cold War II, has consisted of the quest for power by Communist-related movements outside Europe, frequently but not always related to the Soviet Union, and U.S. resistance; also, U.S.-initiated drives for power and influence in Third World nations and resistance by forces allied with Moscow. Much of this has occurred in lands emerging from colonial rule previously imposed by Japan (Korea), the Netherlands (Indonesia), France (Indochina, in Africa), Great Britain (Asia, Africa), and Portugal (Africa), plus former German and Italian colonies (in Africa). But Cold War II has also taken place in Central and South America and the Caribbean area, under the shadow of U.S. dominance.

Essentially a Third World phenomenon, Cold War II has featured intrigue, open and covert support of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces, propping up or seeking to topple existing regimes, economic and military aid, and sometimes military intervention directly or through surrogates. On many occasions it has become a hot war, though never with U.S. and Soviet combat forces arrayed against one another. All of the battles fought by U.S.-and

Soviet-backed forces in the Third World have used conventional, not nuclear, weapons. Indeed, very few nuclear weapons have been deployed in Third World situations, and nuclear deterrence has been essentially irrelevant (as we'll discuss more fully in the next chapter).

Although not every event in U.S./Soviet relations of the past forty years can be neatly assigned to one of these two modes of the Cold War, it is a useful division to help us better understand the dynamics of the relationships between the two superpowers. It provides a context for examining the role of nuclear weapons in today's world. This knowledge can be useful for devising ways to eliminate the nuclear arsenal.

### HISTORICAL SETTING

The Second World War devastated much of the industrialized world and left the people exhausted. The German Third Reich, which had gained control over much of Europe, was crushed and disappeared as a political entity. Militarist Japan was vanquished and forced to relinquish all territory it had occupied on the Asian mainland and in the Pacific region. Defeated Italy lost its colonies. European empires on the winning side, such as Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, experienced severe damage in their homelands and faced the prospect of giving up their overseas possessions. The Soviet Union, also badly damaged and suffering 20 million deaths, emerged victorious with the Red Army occupying much of Eastern Europe. Of the major industrial nations, only the United States escaped homeland destruction and could no longer retreat to its previous isolationism. In this setting, inevitably major changes in international relations would occur.

There might have been One World established, peaceful and harmonious, but this was not to be. The weight of history -- national and personal -- was too heavy, the forces of national and personal ambition were too strong for the world to move away from the rivalries of

nationalism and ideology. The result was a world divided into two major blocs, two worlds so to speak, with a Third World not part of either but deeply affected by the rivalry of the two superpowers. The result has been perpetual insecurity in a nuclearly armed world.

If we are to break out of this bondage, we need to understand the history that led to the Cold War and to comprehend the way the Cold War has developed. Before World War II

The views and actions of U.S. and Soviet leaders who were in power when the Cold War began were shaped by their personal experience in events of the three previous decades and by national historic memory of an even longer period. Four important factors in the Cold War -- contending empires, clashing ideologies, dealings with Germany, and territorial changes in Eastern Europe -- all have significant historic roots which need to be understood.

Empires in contention. In the broad sweep of world events the Cold War pits two energetic empires against one another. Historically both became continental empires with relatively little contact between them. From a core territory in the upper Volga River basin, Russia under a succession of tsars expanded north to the Baltic Sea, west until countering strong resistance from other peoples (Polish, Czech, Hungarian), south to the Black Sea, and eastward across Siberia to the Pacific Ocean. The United States grew from a group of 13 newly independent colonies on the East Coast of North America, moving westward across the continent to the Pacific Ocean. In the process, the Russians (the eastern branch of Slavic people) conquered gained political control over a diverse mixture of ethnic population already inhabiting the land. In contrast, the United States expanded by dislocating relatively sparse, earlier inhabitants and by drawing in immigrants from other continents.

For both nations, expansion was almost entirely peripheral. As an exception, Russian

fur traders ventured into Alaska and government followed, but in 1867 Russia sold this territory to the United States. In 1898 the U.S. annexed Hawaii in 1898 after American settlers had overthrown a native monarchy and took possession of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico at the end of the Spanish-American War. But otherwise the United States and Russia did not follow the course of Great Britain, France, and other European empires in acquiring colonies around the globe. For that reason up until the First World War the American and Russian empires seldom intersected and rarely had reasons to be intensely competitive for territory and power.

Ideology. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 changed this by introducing a strong ideological element into the relationship. In simplistic terms, it was communism versus capitalism. But in a historic sense, it was a quarrel over how best to respond to economic and social changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution, which began occurring in England in the middle of the 18th century and then spread elsewhere.

The Industrial Revolution was marked by the invention of new machinery to manufacture goods and new methods of producing mechanical power. This led to production in large factories instead of in homes and small workshops. These new factories required sizable investment funds (capital), careful organization of the manufacturing process (management), a large workforce (labor), and housing to shelter the workers (urban growth). Workers put in long hours. Factory towns and workers dwellings were often poorly built and crowded. Wages were low. Families sent their children to work in the factories. But the owners and managers often became quite wealthy.

Many could observe these conditions. Some felt that whatever the shortcomings, the system should be left alone without governmental interference (*laissez faire*). Some thought that at least something should be done to improve the life of the poor (welfare). Others considered the

problem to be exploitation of workers by the owners. Several types of remedies were proposed. Workers could organize to deal with owners collectively (unions). Government could regulate working conditions (economic reform). For this to happen the electorate must be expanded to allow everyone to vote (political reform). Workers could become owners of the factories (communal ownership), or government could take control of production (socialism). These reforms could be brought about through existing political processes (democratic change) or through overthrow of existing institutions (revolution).

The latter was the remedy proposed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. They perceived the industrial world to be in the grip of a class struggle in which the bourgeoisie (capitalists) were exploiting the proletariat (workers). Their remedy was state ownership of the means of production, to be accomplished through revolution whereby the workers would overthrow the capitalists. Half a century later Nikolai Lenin, in espousing this theme, insisted that a dedicated leadership corps from the workers party should serve as the proletariat's advance guard to lead the revolution and to rule as a dictatorship of the proletariat until socialism was well-established and the state would wither away. Lenin practiced what he preached, except for the last stage, as he led the Bolsheviks to power in the Soviet Union.

Other remedies were applied in England and elsewhere: political reform to broaden the electorate, governmental regulation of working conditions, labor unions, collective bargaining, democratic socialism. All of these except the latter found application in the United States.

In the U.S. not much support developed for the type of revolution that Marx, Engels, and Lenin advocated. The greatest controversy centered on labor organizing. Some labor organizers voiced class struggle rhetoric but concentrated mostly on workplace issues. Indeed, a major segment of the labor movement eschewed political involvement. Owners and managers



vigorously resisted labor organizing. Some of them brought in police, militia, and their own security force to defeat strikes and other labor initiatives. Rural populists also employed class struggle imagery; compared to trade union leaders, they tended more toward political solutions and electoral activities. In spite of sometimes vehement speeches by their champions, workers and farmers seldom initiated violence; in some incidents where it occurred, management or the police were the instigators. The notion of violent overthrow of the government never gained much of a following in the United States.

Nevertheless, fear of labor violence, of the potential for the growth of an American communist movement has repeatedly risen in the United States. Communist takeover in Russia in 1917 aggravated these fears, leading to the "red scare" of the early 1920s with enactment of repressive laws, investigations, prosecution, and deportation. Social unrest during the Great Depression of the 1930s gave the U.S. Communist Party recruitment opportunities, but the economic reforms of the New Deal drew much broader support from workers and the unemployed. This continued the long history of reformist responses in the United States to problems of industrial change rather than more radical and revolutionary approaches.

When the United States and the Soviet Union joined in a wartime alliance, they came together with two distinct ideological perspectives, two different governmental systems, two dissimilar economic systems. Each thought it possessed the true way. Each saw flaws in the other more clearly than its own shortcomings. Nevertheless, ideology was submerged for awhile but lingered not far below the surface, from where it would later reemerge.

Germany. What brought the United States and the Soviet Union together during World War II was their shared determination to defeat Nazi Germany. The leaders of both nations had seen the consequences of German aggression twice within a span of 30 years. What to do about

Germany would become a major issue in the Cold War that followed victory over the Nazis.

For Tsarist Russia the First World War began in August 1914. At that time Russia was associated with Great Britain and France in a Triple Entente. Germany was connected with Austria-Hungary (the Hapsburg Empire) and the Ottoman Empire (now Turkey), plus Bulgaria later on, known together as the Central Powers. When Germany invaded Belgium enroute to France, Russia launched twin attacks directly into Germany's Prussia province (Poland didn't exist as an independent state at that time) and into Austro-Hungary. The Russians succeeded for awhile but were eventually driven back, and the Central Powers invaded the Russian homeland. After the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917 the provisional government remained in the war, but a month after the Bolsheviks took over in November, Lenin sought an armistice to provide breathing space for consolidating the revolution. In what was humiliating terms of the March 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Bolsheviks gave up vast territory that had been a part of Tsarist Russia, including Finland, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, parts of what was once Poland, the Ukraine, and territory south of the Caucasus Mountains. After the defeat of Germany and three years of Civil War in Russia, the newly formed Soviet Union regained the Ukraine and southern provinces but had to accept the political independence of the Baltic states and Poland.

The United States tried to stay out of World War I even though considerable public sympathy existed for the cause of England and France against Germany. In 1917 after German submarines increase their attacks on U.S. ships transporting supplies to the Western allies, the United States declared war on Germany and send troops to France. The Bolshevik withdrawal from the war meant that Germany no longer had to fight on both the eastern and western fronts. This increased western antipathy to the new regime and was a factor in Allied willingness to help

the White army in the ensuing Russian civil war.

The Treaty of Versailles was harsh on defeated Germany, transferring pieces of territory to France, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, and Lithuania, taking away its overseas colonies, and extracting heavy reparations. However, reparations were later reduced, and those which Germany paid were less in value than loans it received from the United States and other countries to keep a troubled economy going (and which Germany never fully repaid). Social and economic unrest in Germany because of inflation and other economic difficulties plus bitter feelings over the terms of the Treaty of Versailles created an atmosphere in which Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist Party, the Nazis, could sow hatred and a sense of persecution and thereby work their way to political power.

The Versailles Treaty also set up the League of Nations. When the U.S. Senate would not provide the required two-thirds majority in support of the treaty, the United States did not join the League. Without U.S. participation in this new vehicle for collective security the League proved too weak an instrument to forge strong resistance to the rising Nazis. The United States, dominated by an isolationist mood, did not enter to other actions to check the resurgence of German power. The efforts of Great Britain, France, and other nations in Western Europe were disunited, and the Soviet Union concentrated on its own internal problems. It was, of course, Hitler and his crew who were the aggressors.

The world could observe the rise of Nazism and the renewal of German imperialistic expansion: the growing internal violence to intimidate, the start of Jewish persecution, Hitler's decision in 1935 to disregard the Treaty of Versailles by rebuilding the German army and sending troops into demilitarized districts west of the Rhine, in 1938 the Nazis taking control of Austria and extorting the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, in 1939 the German army occupying the

remainder of Czechoslovakia and seizing the Baltic port city of Memel, previously transferred from Germany to Lithuania by the Versailles Treaty. The same treaty had separate East Prussia from the rest of Germany with a strip of land given to Poland and had established Danzig (now Gdansk) as a free port under the League of Nations. Hitler demanded control of this additional territory, but Poland refused. Thus, the Soviet Union could see Germany moving eastward and Britain, France, and other nations in Western Europe not effectively blocking the resurgence of German power. In this setting Joseph Stalin decided to cut a deal with Hitler: the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, which guaranteed Soviet neutrality in case Germany went to war and secretly gave the Soviet Union a share of Polish territory if the Germans invaded Poland. The German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, which started World War II, went so swiftly that German soldiers got to the partition line before the Soviets and then went beyond, so that the Soviet Union got less territorial spoils than it had bargained for. However, the Soviets now had a free hand to go after other territory, which they did (we'll get to that in a moment).

Nevertheless, the Soviets were no safer than any other nation who tried to bargain with Hitler. After conquering Poland, Germany moved westward and reached the Atlantic Ocean with the fall of France in June 1940. With Western Europe in his control, Hitler turned his attention eastward again and on June 22, 1941 launched an all-out attack on the Soviet Union. In this invasion Germany was supported by Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, which had joined the Axis (whose original members were Germany, Italy, and Japan). Finland, reeling from Soviet invasion in 1939, became a member soon after Nazi forces moved into the Soviet Union.

Thus, for the second time in 25 years German forces invaded Soviet territory. It is little wonder that the defeat of Germany became the principal war aim of the Soviet Union and the assurance that German military power would never arise again became a primary peace objective

for the postwar period.

During the greater part of the 1930s the United States tried to stay out of European scene where war clouds were darkening. In 1935 the Congress enacted legislation prohibiting shipment of arms and ammunition to any belligerent, but after the German invasion of Poland, Congress repealed this arms embargo. In 1940 President Roosevelt transferred 50 destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for leases to put bases on British territory in the Western hemisphere. In March 1941 Congress approved the Lend-Lease program that enable the United States to supply nations fighting against the Axis, including ships to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States declared War on Japan the next day. Three days later German and Italy declared war on the United States, which the United States immediately reciprocated. By these actions the U.S. was instantly allied with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and other nations fighting against Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan.

Eastern Europe. The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact gave Stalin an opportunity to seek territorial expansion in Eastern Europe. The partition of Poland we have mentioned. Before tracing other moves, let's recall some earlier history.

It is difficult for us Americans to readily grasp the boundary changes that have occurred in Europe during this century, and long before. In our own experience the US/Canadian boundary has been firm since 1846 and the US/Mexican border has been settled since 1953, the year of Gadsden Purchase. And the boundaries of the 48 contiguous states are fixed, except for occasional, slight adjustments due to channel changes where rivers are the boundaries.

Not so in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe, populated as it is by a variety of ethnic groups, who differ in language, dress, historical heritage, and in some cases, religion. But in

many locales these ethnic populations overlap so that physical boundaries, clearly demarcating exclusive ethnic territory are difficult to define. Moreover, forced migration due to war and persecution has shifted some ethnic populations from one location to another. Some of the European ethnic groups, particularly the larger ones or those who make up most of the population of a particular district, want and have claimed separate status as a nation, or at least want such identification. Others have accepted living in a multi-ethnic nation, even as a minority, but want fair treatment and respect for their individual differences.

FAREWELL TO NUCLEAR ARMS!  
Transforming Cold War Insecurity  
into Peace through Common Security

A book proposed by

Howard W. Hallman

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Part One. The Case for Nuclear Disarmament

1. Choices
2. A Matter of Right and Wrong
3. Self Interest
4. Patriotism

Part Two. Historical Setting

5. Clash of Empires and Ideologies
6. The Cold War
7. Myth of Nuclear Deterrence
8. Arms Control Legacy

Part Three. Transformation

9. Perceiving Our Common Humanity
10. Ending the Cold War
11. European Disarmament
12. Eliminating Strategic Weapons
13. Maritime Disarmament
14. Disarmament in Northeast Asia

15. Cease Testing and Production

16. Nonproliferation

17. A Call for Citizen Action



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May 10, 1988

Derrick M. Norman, Product Manager

Abingdon Press

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P.O.Box 801

Nashville, TN 37202

Dear Mr. Norman:

When we met in the Cokesbury display area at General Conference in St. Louis, I indicated that I am working on a book on nuclear disarmament. Subsequently the General Conference passed a resolution (836 to 17) to "affirm and support the statements of the Council of Bishops in their 1986 pastoral letter, 'In Defense of Creation,' and the accompanying foundation document." In doing so, the delegates made "In Defense of Creation" the official policy of the United

Methodist Church. In a second action General Conference established Peace with Justice as a special program for the 1989-92 quadrennium, in accordance with the

definition in para. 803.9 of The Discipline, and directed the General Board of Church and Society to implement "Policies for a Just Peace" as specified in the Council of Bishop's Foundation Document. This action passed the Legislative Committee on General Administration unanimously and was included in the final omnibus resolution enacted by General Conference. What this means is that the subject of nuclear disarmament will be receiving considerable attention by United Methodists during the next four years.

Accordingly, I want to propose for your consideration a book entitled **Farewell to Nuclear Arms!** My thesis is summarized in the subtitle: "Transforming Cold War Insecurity into Peace through Common Security." The enclosed table of contents outlines the topics covered. As a sample, I am sending the first four chapters, which lay out the case for nuclear disarmament. A longer piece on "European Disarmament," which I have directed toward the U.S. Movement, presents some of my public policy recommendations.

I am far enough along with my writing so that I can complete the manuscript by the end of the summer. If accepted for publication, it could be in print by the early months of 1989. This is the first year of a new United Methodist quadrennium and also the first year of the term of a new U.S. president.

These events lead me to look ahead to what would be relevant for 1989 and the years that follow. As I see it, during the remaining year of the Reagan administration there is a good chance that the United States and the Soviet Union will reach an agreement for a reduction of long-range, strategic weapons by 50 percent. If a final agreement hasn't

been reached, it will be far enough along so that the next administration can complete it fairly soon. Then the question arises: what next? At that stage, several choices will occur, as I present in Chapter 1. A small minority of adventurers will want to rebuild the nuclear arsenal. A group of technologists will want to level off the nuclear weapons supply and proceed to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons and space-based defenses. A third group, who are minimalists, will want to achieve further reductions but will insist that the complete

Mr. Derrick M. Norman

September 1981. The abolition of nuclear weapons is impracticable. A fourth group -- abolitionists -- will push for global nuclear disarmament.

Nowadays most of the books and articles in print offer the views of the second and third groups. Indeed, publications by minimalists are increasing. They favor the kind of reductions that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev are achieving, but they are alarmed at the prospect of total abolition. Yet, the United Methodist bishops, and now the General Conference, have adopted an abolitionist perspective. No detailed plan on how to achieve abolition is offered, but the policy goal is in that direction. Nor have other abolitionists offered many specifics. My book works out a plan for abolition of nuclear weapons and thereby fills a void in current literature.

I recognize, however, that abolition of nuclear weapons must occur in the context of other events. As my own thinking has developed, I first came to realize that nuclear deterrence is actually an illusion because nuclear weapons haven't deterred numerous

grievous events of the past 40 years and what they allegedly deterred -- an out-of-the-blue attack on the U.S. mainland by the Soviet Union or Soviet invasion of Western Europe -- are highly unlikely to occur, even if the United States lacked nuclear retaliatory power (Chapter 7 deals with this). Yet, the dominant policy leaders of the United States believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is necessary to prevent Soviet aggression in Europe. This underscores the importance of achieving disarmament in Europe, both nuclear and conventional. So I advocate a goal of the complete withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. forces from Europe, and demobilization in their homelands, by May 8, 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. For this to happen, the Cold War would have to end, including a reversal of national policies formulated in the 1940s and '50s: Soviet capacity for expansion and U.S. containment practices. How I work these ideas out are expressed in the enclosure on "European Disarmament." This article forms the basis for several chapters in my book.

The connection I make between nuclear disarmament, European disarmament, and ending the Cold War introduces ideas that are scarcely articulated now in public discussion. That makes me believe that my book will be of interest to many readers and will contribute to public discussion -- both within the United Methodist Church as part of the quadrennial special program on Peace with Justice and by the broader public.

My background is summarized in an enclosed mini-vita. I am the author of nine books and more than 200 articles, pamphlets, and reports. I am a leader of Methodists United for Peace with Justice, an association of laity and clergy.

My wife is a United Methodist minister.

If you find that my book is unsuitable for Abingdon Press, please return the material to me in the enclosed stamped, self-addressed envelope.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

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May 24, 1988

Derrick Norman, Product Manager

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Dear Mr. Norman:

Since I wrote to you on May 10 and sent some sample chapters of a proposed book entitled Farewell to Nuclear Arms!, I have continued to write. I have completed Chapter 5 on "Clash of Ideology and Empire" and most of Chapter 7 on "Myth of Nuclear Deterrence" (with one gap where more research is needed).

I am sending these two chapters to you as a supplemental submission so that you can have a fuller idea of my viewpoint and my writing style as you and your colleagues review my proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Howard W. Hallman

### Fragments of Unused Material of Drafts of "Farewell"

From 6-17-88 draft of Chapter 2, then titled "Clash of Empires and Ideologies"

Thus, between 1898 and 1933 the United States on 32 occasions sent military expeditions into ten different Central American and Caribbean nations, as follows: Honduras (8 times), Nicaragua (5), Panama (3), Colombia (2), Costa Rica (1), El Salvador (1), Guatemala (1), Cuba (5), Dominican Republic (4), and Haiti (2) (Sojourners, 1984: 10-11).

However, under Franklin Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy the United States ceased military intrusions in Latin American countries (though this revived in the 1950s). Of the U.S. acquisitions from the Spanish-American War, the Philippines gained political independence in 1946, Puerto Rico became a self-governing commonwealth in union with United States in 1952, but Guam remained under U.S. control as the site of a major military base in the center of the Pacific Ocean. After World War II the United States established a strategic trusteeship over South Pacific Islands previously conquered by Japan, but in recent years the U.S. has sought to establish four separate political entities there, though with strong ties to the United States. Otherwise the United States has not attempted to gain overseas territory to rule directly.

Beyond the issue of economic organization, Americans had a concern for the totalitarian aspects of the Soviet system. The widely used Marxist term, the dictatorship of the proletariat, raised hackles among Americans. The one-party state was contrary to American experience and preference. The use of governmental power to suppress dissent and to purge opponents by imprisonment, execution, and exile was anathema. The United States saw its involvement in World War II as a fight against three totalitarian regimes: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperialist Japan. To many Stalin was a ruthless dictator as evil as Hitler and Mussolini. Accordingly, it was not merely communism but also Soviet totalitarianism that made wartime

collaboration an uneasy experience and that made Americans cautious, if not distrustful, in their dealings with the Soviet Union during World War II.

From 6-29-88 draft of Chapter 2. "Historical Setting of the Cold War"

Accordingly, as further background for understanding the origins of the Cold War, we should review the broad outline of shifting political control and changing boundaries in Eastern Europe for the past several centuries, starting with the Baltic region and proceeding southward to the Balkan area.

Baltic region. Historically four distinct peoples have occupied the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea: Finns, Estonians, Letts (Latvians), and Lithuanians. Linguistically the Finns and Estonians are related, and the Latvians and Lituanians. They each have a thousand or more years of ethnic identity, but for a period of 500 or more years before 1918, none of them had political independence. The national independence that all of them gained in the aftermath of World War I and the Boshevik Revolution lasted only until 1940 for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania but still prevails for Finland.

Finland was ruled by Sweden from 1155 to 1809, except that Russian gained control of the southern portion in 1710. Tsarist Russia took over the entire land in 1809 and retained control until the 1917 revolution when chaos in Russia gave the finns an opportunity to establish political independence.

In the 13th to 16th centuries Estonia was ruled successively by Danes, Germans, and Poles until Sweden took over in 1561. Peter the Great ended Swedish rule in 1710, and Estonia was incorporated into Russia until it declared its independence in 1918. Even then the Estonians had to fight off Germans, who had occupied the land as part of World War I, and the Bolsheviks, who wanted it back.



Latvia was under German dominance from 1158 to 1562, though the northern section, Livonia, functioned with considerable independence. Polish rule prevailed in the southern part, Courland, from 1562 to 1795 when Poland itself was partitioned out of existence. Poland and Sweden contested for control of Livonia between 1562 and 1629, when Sweden won. Swedish rule lasted until 1710, when the Russians took over. Russia acquired Courland in 1795 in the Polish partition. After the Latvians declared independence in 1918 they, too, had to battle against first Germans and then Bolshevik forces to remain free.

Unlike the others, Lithuania was once a state with considerable power and possessed a domain reaching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Then in 1385 through a marriage of rulers Lithuania joined with Poland in a union that had a common ruler but two separate political units. In the 1795 partition of Poland most of Lithuania went to Russia, but Prussia claimed a portion. During World War I Germany occupied Lithuania from 1915 to 1918, and as they ended and the Germans withdrew, Lithuania declared its independence from Russia. In a postwar dispute Lithuania lost the city of Vilnius to Poland in 1922. Then in March 1939 Germany seized the port city of Klaipeda (Memel).

In the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918 the founding Soviet government was forced to accept the political independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Twenty-one years later, though, the Soviets moved to regain what they considered to be lost territory in the Baltic region. In October 1939, two months after signing the nonaggression pact with Germany, the Soviet Union pressured Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into accepting the basing of Soviet military forces on their soil. On November 20 the Red Army invaded Finland, an action that caused the League of Nations to expell the Soviet Union from its membership. In March 1940 defeated Finland ceded the Karelian isthmus (north of Leningrad), including the city of Vyborg, and also

the port of Hanko to the Soviet Union. In June Soviet military forces occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in August 1940 the Soviet Union formally annexed these three Baltic states and converted them to Soviet republics.

## HOW DEMOCRACIES HARMONIZE DIVERSITY

*A book proposed by*

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### **I. Statement of Problem**

#### *1. Ethnic Conflict*

*Ethnic defined (encompasses national, cultural, tribal and racial groupings with common traits and customs) -- ethnic conflict the main cause of 19 of 136 wars since 1945 and a strong factor in many more -- in next two decades likely to be a major cause of civil strife within nations, sometimes spilling into international arena -- xx nations (number to be determined) have ethnic minorities which are more than 10 percent of the population -- xx of the republics of USSR and Yugoslavia likewise.*

#### *2. How Governments Respond*

*Findings of R.J. Rummel in *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map* (U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991): "The inverse relationship between democracy and foreign violence, collective domestic violence, or government genocide is not simply a correlation, but a cause and effect." -- authoritarian governments suppress ethnic conflict (illustrations to be offered) -- democratic governments value diversity and seek to resolve differences amicably (cite historic examples) -- transition from authoritarian to democratic government sometimes heightens ethnic conflict as pent-up animosity is unleashed -- Rummel: as "a policy for minimizing collective violence and eliminating war: enhance and foster democratic institutions -- civil liberties and political rights -- here and abroad."*

### **II. Framework of Democracy**

#### *3. Sovereignty of the People*

*Sovereignty defined (supreme power over a body politic) -- achieved in a democracy as the*

people (a) determine basic framework of government (constitution, statutes, consensus on established practices), (b) decide particular issues (regularly in direct democracy, occasionally through referenda in representative democracy), (c) choose public officials (suffrage, elections, political parties), (d) interact continuously with public officials (lobbying, hearings, citizen participation processes), and (e) withdraw consent if necessary (declaration of independence, street demonstrations).

#### 4. Liberty and Justice for All

Individual rights (bill of rights, statutory and judicial protection) -- prevention of government tyranny (including separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers; in some instances, federalism; in other cases, decentralization of unitary states) -- concern for basic fairness (equity), assurance of necessities of life, access to opportunity, promotion of general welfare.

### III. Harmonizing Diversity

#### 5. Human Rights

*Equal justice under law -- freedom of association, speech, assembly -- nondiscrimination on basis of race, religion, ethnicity -- acceptance of different languages, different cultural practices -- appreciation of different heritages -- honoring diversity.*

#### 6. Federalism

*Federalism defined (one government for the whole territory and other governments for regional divisions, which, as James Madison stated in *The Federalist*, are "but different agents and trustees of the people, and constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes." -- how federalism can achieve diversity with unity (E Pluribus Unum), thus setting a framework for reconciliation of territorially-based ethnic differences.*

#### 7. Electoral Process

*Suffrage (universal, easy registration, voting encouraged) -- elections (multiple candidates, diversity in slates, secret ballot without coercion), honest ballot counting) -- political parties (multiple; multi-ethnicity encouraged) -- legislative districts laid out to achieve fair representation of ethnic groups (or use of proportional representation) -- code of ethnics in campaigns to avoid agitating racial and ethnic prejudices.*

#### 8. Structured Citizen Participation

*Opportunities to resolve neighborhood, regional, ethnic differences during development of public policies and planning of public programs -- timely and accessible information -- public hearings -- community meetings with public officials and citizens -- advisory committees with ethnic diversity -- community involvement in project and program planning, implementation, and evaluation -- processes that enable citizens to advocate local interests (neighborhood, rural district, ethnic enclave) but also to understand broader needs.*

#### 9. Independent Citizen Associations

*A significant base for self-help activities and for participation in public affairs -- takes many different forms (neighborhood, school-related, crime prevention, cultural, recreational, small-scale economic activities, etc.) -- a civic training ground, providing experience valuable for*

persons seeking public office in local, regional, and national government -- provides a representational base for ethnic groups in developing positive relationships with one another.

#### 10. Resolving Community Conflict

Processes for resolving ethnic, racial conflict -- community relations agencies -- mediation -- public forums -- education -- diffusing ancient enmities -- changing attitudes and conduct -- role of leadership -- case illustrations from United States and other countries.

#### 11. Uniting for Common Purposes

Seeking a sense of community (a "we-feeling") that goes beyond a single ethnic group -- how a commitment to a common purpose can contribute -- illustrations: neighborhood improvements, water supply, food distribution, tool sharing, child care, youth activities, resource conservation and restoration, and other -- focus on concerns that unite rather than divide.

#### 12. Democratic Leadership

Leaders who listen, are committed to widespread participation, are representative but willing to surmount popular prejudices, and are constantly seeking reconciliation -- Insight of Lao Tzu: "A leader is best when people barely know that he exists....Of a good leader, who talks little, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will all say, 'We did this ourselves.'" (adding "she").

August 28, 1991

## NOTES FROM BOOKS

Irving Kristol, *On the Democratic Idea in America*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.  
149 p.

"...in a democracy, the people are the ruling class." p. 12

"...when one says that in a democracy the people are the ruling class, one means that the character of the government and the destiny of the nation are in the longer run determined by the character of the people rather than of any particular class of people." p. 13

"rational, free, and responsible citizens" "...the citizen is something different from the subject of a regime, or the member of a movement, or the adherent of a creed." p. 23

"The political ideas that men / have always help to shape the political reality they live in -- and this is so whether these be habitual opinions, tacit convictions, or explicit ideologies. It is ideas that establish and define in men's minds the categories of the politically possible and the politically impossible, the desirable and the undesirable, the tolerable and the intolerable." pp. 64-65

"For a system of liberal, representative government to work, free elections are not enough. The results of the political process and of the exercise of individual freedom -- the distribution of power, privilege, and property -- must also be seen as in some profound sense expressive of the values that govern lives of individuals. An idea of self-government, if it is to be viable, must encompass both the private and the public sectors. If it does not -- if the principles that organize public life seem to have little relation to those that shape private lives -- you have "alienation," and *anomie*, and a melting away of established principles of authority." p. 103

Quote from Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (1912) pp.104-105

**NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCILS**  
**LESSONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS' EXPERIENCE**

*by Howard W. Hallman, President  
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Bethesda, Maryland*

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neighborhood citizen committees, priority boards, neighborhood associations, district councils, advisory neighborhood commissions, community boards, et cetera. But there were many common features, as I'll describe later.

Widespread initiatives to form neighborhood councils began happening around 1970. Thus, we now have a quarter of a century experience to reflect upon. Today I would like to highlight five significant lessons.

**The first lesson from the neighborhood council movement is that we have clearly demonstrated that citizens and governmental officials can work together harmoniously.**

"Of course, that's true," most of you will respond. "That's no big deal." It isn't to you, but we should observe that this 25 year period is framed by extremists who contend that government is our enemy. Twenty-five years ago left-wing extremists said that. Today it is right wing extremists.

But as President Andrew Jackson said in 1832, "There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses."

These abuses may be in unjust laws, such as those the civil rights movement focused on. Or there may be occasional misconduct by public officials. But most of those who work for government are good, upright people who are trying to earn a living while performing public service in a respectable job.

As we were reminded by the tragic bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma City, federal employees are human beings, just like you and me. They have husbands and wives. They have children. They are our neighbors, not our oppressors. So are state and local officials.

All of you know this from your own local experience. One of the great things about the neighborhood council movement, as reflected in NUSA, is the easygoing relationship between citizens and local officials.

We might inquire: what makes this possible?

The underlying reason is a matter of attitude. In your cities and

counties citizens and public officials have respect for one another. They trust each other. They consider themselves equal, not one towering over the other. Sure, you have your disagreements, sometimes quite vigorous arguments, but after the meeting is over contenders shake hands. Most of the time!

You have applied the teaching of Martin Luther King, Jr., who said in a sermon composed in a Georgia jail: "We must not seek to defeat or humiliate the enemy but to win his friendship and understanding."

Enemy may be too strong term to describe our adversaries in public policy disputes, but the constantly seeking reconciliation is valid. Neighborhood leaders and local officials have learned this in the numerous neighborhood-city partnership they have created.

It is a lesson we should teach members of the U.S. Congress and talk show hosts who like to demonize federal employees.

**A second major lesson from the experience of the last 25 years is that resident-controlled organizations make major contributions to solutions of very challenging problems.** It's like a slogan I saw once in Oregon, "Want to live in a better neighborhood? Then join your neighborhood association!"

The neighborhoods-of-the year we are honoring today vividly attest to the capacity of residents to make notable achievements. That's true with the runner-ups, other entrants, and thousands of other neighborhoods throughout the United States.

A sample of concerns that neighborhoods deal with is well-illustrated by the workshop topics of this year's NUSA conference. You have dealt with homelessness, home ownership, community reinvestment, economic development, neighborhood planning, education, needs of children and youth, adult literacy, drug abuse, violence, AIDs, other aspects of health care, neighborhood cleanup and other environmental issues. Almost every function that government and voluntary agencies deal with has a neighborhood component.

*The third lesson is that this kind of positive neighborhood involvement comes about more readily where there is a structural framework for cooperation. How this occurs varies considerable among different cities.*

*In a few cities neighborhood councils are established by city charter. In many other places it is done through ordinance or city council resolution. Some cities have set up new organizations while others have recognized existing associations. In some places there is no official recognition but rather an ongoing relationship that gives de facto acknowledgement to the important role that neighborhood organizations play.*

*These neighborhood organizations, called by different names, belong to the residents. They select their own officers and board members. Meetings are open. The executive board keeps in touch with residents and tries to be accountable. Those of you who are neighborhood leaders, who stand for election, who sometimes deal with neighborhood factions, know how challenging this is -- and how important.*

*The other essential part of the structural framework is having units within local government that relate to neighborhood organizations. Where they are located in the administrative structure varies. The neighborhood assistance unit might be attached to the office of mayor or manager. It might be in the community development department or elsewhere. Wherever it is located, the unit is an important contact point for neighborhood organizations, although not necessarily the exclusive one.*

*Although emphasis may be upon cooperative relationships, inevitably there is some tension between neighborhood organizations and public agencies on various issues of public policy. When this happens, the city's neighborhood assistance unit may be caught in between. Many of you in this room know what I mean.*

*In the successful cities, the mayor or manager and city council accept this seeming conflict of interest. They allow the assistance unit leeway in helping neighborhood organizations even when they are opposing public*

agencies. Numerous mayors and council members understand this situation because they themselves were formerly neighborhood leaders.

**The fourth major lesson from the past 25 years is that successful neighborhood involvement must relate to real-life decision-making processes.** Dialogue about issues is not enough. You need to be involved where decisions are made.

Probably the most widespread application of this principle occurs in neighborhood planning. In the years after World War II most city planning was conducted by professional planners in downtown offices. After their studies were completed and their pretty maps drawn, they would make their plans public. Only then did citizens have their say.

This began to change in the 1960s. Nowadays some kind of neighborhood planning committee, often with membership chosen by the residents themselves, is in on the process from the takeoff as well as at the landing.

The same occurs in project planning under the Community Development Block Grant Program. Initially this came about through strong citizen participation regulations, promulgated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. But even after HUD's regulatory zeal diminished during the Reagan administration, the habit of neighborhood participation continued in most localities.

Many cities, and some urban counties, too, give residents a voice in consideration of zoning changes, liquor licenses, and other matters affecting their neighborhood, though not final decision-making authority.

Some cities have budgetary processes that involve neighborhood representatives from the very beginning. In fact, neighborhood organizations formulate their ideas at the same time city departments are preparing their requests. Then the departments are required to take neighborhood proposals into consideration.

These are all real decisions -- in planning, community development,

zoning, budget making, and other matters. Neighborhood councils and other types of neighborhood organizations provide a means for residents to be involved in public decision-making on an ongoing basis, not just hit-and-miss.

**The fifth and final important lesson I want to highlight is that arrangements for full neighborhood involvement contribute to greater racial unity, fair treatment for all, and a stronger sense of community.**

Our host city of Birmingham offers a superb example of how a system of neighborhood units can help overcome decades of racial discrimination. In the 1960s and '70s Birmingham went through three phases. First, conflict, terrorist attacks on innocent children, police dogs and fire hoses suppressing civil rights workers. Second, the beginning of reconciliation. As one response the mayor appointing a biracial committee on community relations. This was an advance. The third phase was setting up the still-existing system of neighborhood citizen committees, which come together in the citywide Citizen Advisory Board. Citizens themselves elect the members. At the city level they work together, black and white, rich and poor, and those in between.

Similar arrangements exist elsewhere and make a difference. For instance, several years ago I spent a couple of days in Dayton, catching up on the priority boards and the local budgetary process. At the airport on the way home I met a friend from Washington who showed me a reprint of a newspaper series on how Dayton's residential pattern was moving toward increased racial segregation. Yet, throughout my visit I met with racially integrated committees and city bureaus. The mayor was an African American. Because of the neighborhood priority boards and citywide committees with members drawn from all neighborhoods, the civic life of Dayton brings together diverse people in calm and effective working relationships.

When people meet together to deal with common concerns, they come to realize that they have similar interests. They come to understand one

another better and put aside old stereotypes. Mutual acceptance comes from working together.

As this happens, a sense of equity, that is, basic fairness, arises to the surface. In numerous cities around the country citizen advisory committees in the Community Development Block Grant Program have been responsive to neighborhoods with greatest needs. For example, I remember hearing of a man in Jacksonville, Florida serving on the citywide CDBG advisory committee who withdrew his request for a neighborhood recreation center when he learned for the first time that some neighborhoods in his city lacked sewers. And there is the case of Independence, Missouri where a citywide committee composed of neighborhood representatives reviewed a pothole survey and recommended the city start repairs in the neighborhood with the most potholes. That was the fair thing to do.

Likewise where citizen committees are involved in local budget making from the very beginning, they are able to recognize that some neighborhoods and some citywide projects should have highest priority.

There is even positive experience in overcoming NIMBY -- the not-in-my-backyard syndrome. Some cities have conferred with neighborhood organizations to make a fair allocation of group homes, to work out truck routes, and handle other troublesome issues. This doesn't always happen, and sometimes city officials have to make tough choices, as they are elected to do. But the fairest decisions usually come where there is ample citizen participation.

Finally, working together in neighborhood councils and citywide bodies helps to achieve a much fuller sense of community -- a "we-feeling". This is no mean accomplishment in this day and age when so many voices of hate and distrust are trying to tear us apart.

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"The common cause that unites that inhabitants should be, simply, the city -- as it is, so far as it is, good; as it might be, so far as it falls short of the ideal."

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This gets us back to the first lesson of the past 25 years, that positive attitudes make it possible for citizens and public officials to work together cooperatively. To bring this about it is helpful to have some kind of structural framework. This enables citizens to be in on decision making. It also enables neighborhood organizations to make their contribution to public problem-solving. This is an unbeatable combination.

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